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Plato on rational pleasure and two sorts of the good life

Koo, Kyo-Sun

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Plato on Rational Pleasure and Two Sorts of the Good Life

Thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

King's College London

Kyo-Sun Koo

Supervisors:

Dr. Joachim Aufderheide

Dr. Shaul Tor

Abstract

In what kind of relation does “Rational Pleasure”, i.e. the pleasure of learning, possessing, and using knowledge or true beliefs, stand to the good human life? By exploring three Platonic dialogues, namely the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Philebus*, this dissertation aims both at to achieve three distinct answers to this question, which are worthy of our philosophical attention, and to provide fresh readings of these three dialogues. In summary, this dissertation examines the three Platonic dialogues mentioned in order to scrutinize why and in what sense the good human life contains Rational Pleasure.

This dissertation maintains that, although all three mentioned Platonic works are in an agreement that Rational Pleasure does not alone constitute the goodness of the good human life, each of these three dialogues provides us with a different interesting account of how this pleasure relates to the good human life. In particular, this dissertation contends that each dialogue distinguishes two discrete sorts of the good life in its own way, and so we can obtain a richer understanding of what kind of value Rational Pleasure has in the good human life by comparing these different sorts of the good life.

First of all, this dissertation argues, the core of the *Phaedo*’s view on the relation between Rational Pleasure and the good human life is that the best embodied life needs

the pleasure of learning because enjoying this pleasure assists one who lives this life to continue living this life. By contrast, the supreme life which is lived by the fully disembodied soul either lacks pleasure or experiences pleasure only temporarily. This means that a kind of Rational Pleasure plays a merely instrumental role in one sort of the good human life, whilst it plays no role in the other sort of the good human life. Hence, this dialogue views that Rational Pleasure does not constitute the goodness of the good human life in general.

Second, this dissertation claims that the *Republic* considers that Rational Pleasure does not have either a constitutive or an instrumental value in two sorts of the good human life, namely in both the life of doing philosophy and in the life of ruling the ideal city. Yet, the dialogue allocates a significant place to Rational Pleasure in the good human life by considering that one's preference for Rational Pleasure over other kinds of pleasure indicates the supremacy of one's life in three senses: someone who lives this life (i) arranges one's own life in accordance with the highest value, (ii) meets the majority of one's own desires, and (iii) gratifies one's own desires in the most conducive way to justice.

Third, the dissertation maintains that the *Philebus* distinguishes one kind of the good life, which contains Rational Pleasure, from the other kind of the good life which lacks it, revealing that Rational Pleasure is not even a necessary condition for the goodness of the good life in general. Rational Pleasure is included in the former kind of the good life, which is viable to human beings, not just as an unharmed ingredient of it, but also

as a necessary motivator for engaging in the intellectual activities which are the key to living this life. On the other hand, there is no place for Rational Pleasure in the latter kind of the good life, which is viable only to gods, both because gods do not need Rational Pleasure to make their lives good and because gods cannot experience pleasure.

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Introduction

This dissertation is primarily an examination of how a specific kind of pleasure – which I shall call “Rational Pleasure” – is related to the good human life. More specifically, it is foremost a study of three Platonic dialogues, namely the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Philebus*. It explores these dialogues as key Platonic works in which we can find systematic views on what kind of role the pleasure of learning, possessing, and using knowledge or true beliefs plays in the human good life. This dissertation aims not merely to achieve three answers which are worthy of our philosophical attention to the question of how Rational Pleasure is associated with the good human life, but also to give fresh readings of these three dialogues. Therefore, this dissertation claims that each of these three dialogues contains its own distinct position on how Rational Pleasure is related to this life.

Undoubtedly, everyone wants to live well. However, there is seemingly no consensus on what the good life is, and thus defining this life remains a major philosophical problem. So, to investigate the good human life, it might be helpful to start by accounting for the components of this life rather than defining it. In other words, we can begin our inquiry into what such a life consists in by listing some basic elements of this life and then thinking about why they are so listed. That is to say, by filling in some items on such a list and by scrutinizing why those items are licensed to be on it, we may be able to figure out how a human being can live well.

However, is it possible to make an objective and indisputable list of the basic elements of the good human life? Just as it is impossible to have an indisputable definition of the good life, so it would be impossible to have this kind of list. Yet, I am convinced that there are some elements which everyone can agree to have on this list. To see what these elements are, let me start with the very opening scene of the *Philebus*. Here is the text.

Soc: Philebus holds that the good for all living beings (πᾶσι ζώοις) is to enjoy themselves, to be pleased and delighted, and whatever else goes together with that kind of thing. We contend that not these, but knowing, intelligence, and remembering, and what belongs with them, right judgment and true calculations, are better than pleasure and more agreeable to all who can attain them (ὅσαπερ αὐτῶν δυνατὰ μεταλαβεῖν). (11b4-c1).¹²

The dialogue starts by suggesting two candidates of the good for certain beings, i.e. (a) pleasure and its kin and (b) intelligence and its kin. To be more precise, the very beginning of the dialogue introduces two suggestions: the first suggestion proposes that (a) is what is the good for all living beings (πᾶσι ζώοις); and the second suggestion puts forward that (b) is better than (a) for those which can attain them (ὅσαπερ αὐτῶν δυνατὰ μεταλαβεῖν). Regardless of how we understand these two certain beings, it is at least clear that humans are included in both kinds of beings, because humans are a

¹ (ΠΡΩ.): Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φησι τὸ χαίρειν πᾶσι ζώοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τούτου σύμφωνα· τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμφισβήτημά ἐστι μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ μεμνησθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ συγγενῆ, δόξαν τε ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθεῖς λογισμούς, τῆς γε ἡδονῆς ἀμείνω καὶ λῶω γίνεσθαι σύμπασιν ὅσαπερ αὐτῶν δυνατὰ μεταλαβεῖν

² Unless stated, my translation of the *Philebus* follows Frede 1997 with some modifications.

kind of living being which can both enjoy pleasure and attain intelligence. So, we can consider that the dialogue starts by counting (a) and (b) as strong candidates for what is good in a human life.

Stepping away from the dialogue, one might consider it not to be obvious that (a) and (b) can be regarded as strong candidates for the good in the case of human beings. For instance, one might suspect that something internal, such as (a) and (b), does not deserve to be a strong candidate; one might then believe that external goods, such as money and honor, deserve to be strong candidates instead. Or, one might regard another internal good, such as love, as a strong candidate for the human good.

Yet, there is no way of investigating the good human life without referring to (a) and (b), because humans are creatures who cannot live well without pleasure and several intellectual activities which are introduced as the kin of having intelligence. The two main interlocutors of the dialogue clearly agree that the good human life must be neither an unmixed life of pleasure nor an unmixed life of wisdom but a mixed life of pleasure and wisdom (20c-23b). Thus, we cannot examine what the good human life is without considering what kind of pleasure and intellectual activities either constitute or belong to this life. Hence, whether or not one thinks that either of the two deserves to be a candidate for the *sole* good in human life, one ought to accept that a discussion about a good human life has to take into account these two items. Accordingly, we can presume that pleasure and intelligence are basic elements of the good human life.

In addition, it is worth noting that, by admitting pleasure and knowledge to both be basic elements of the good life, we invite a variety of one or another complex set of relations between the two basic elements into the good human life. I think the *Philebus* illuminates well how complex the relations between pleasure and intellectual activities are and why it is important to scrutinize the relations to examine this life. First, the dialogue reveals that there is no pleasure at all without certain sorts of intellectual activities, i.e. cognitive activity. For instance, one cannot experience present pleasure without a judgment that one oneself is experiencing pleasure. One also cannot retain pleasure without memory (21b-c). Moreover, the dialogue remarks that using intellectual capacities is pleasant. For instance, anticipating something can be pleasant (32c-d); there is pleasure of learning (52a-b). Regardless of how we understand the instances mentioned above, the dialogue teaches us that a good human life is not a simple collection of a set of intellectual activities on one hand and, on the other hand, a set of pleasurable experiences.³ They associate with each other in various ways in the good human life. Therefore, the dialogue suggests to examine a series of bidirectional associations between pleasure and intellectual activities in order to investigate the good human life.

The dialogue proceeds further by implying that there are specific bidirectional associations between pleasure and intellectual activity to which we have to give

³ Warren 2014, p.2.

special attention in order to examine not the good life in general but the good *human* life in particular. Let us first revisit the point that pleasure cannot occur without the service of cognitive capacities. This point implies that even non-human animals which are able to enjoy pleasure possess certain cognitive capacities, because they cannot experience it without these capacities. In other words, some cognitive capacities which are necessary for establishing relations with pleasure are present not only in humans but also in some non-human animals. Thus, to see how the good *human* life is related to several sorts of association between pleasure and intellectual activities, it may not be helpful to inquire into every kind of association between pleasure and intellectual activity a human life can make, if there is a specific feature of a good *human* life that is different from a good life which is achievable for non-human animals.

In turn, let us revisit the point that it is pleasant to engage in (certain) intellectual activities. We cannot but admit that the dog in Pavlov's experiment takes pleasure in expecting food. Also, it is possible that a dog can take pleasure in a sort of learning, because we can train a dog to respond in a certain way to human instructions. Thus, again, if there is a specific feature of the good *human* life that is different from the good life which is viable for non-human animals, it is not helpful to examine learning and expecting in general in order to see how the good *human* life is related to a series of associations between pleasure and intellectual activities. Therefore, to see (1) what kinds of pleasure are present not in non-human animals but in humans and (2) what kinds of relation these kinds of pleasure make to a good *human* life, we must find out the sorts of human intellectual activity which non-human animals cannot engage in.

However, it is an extremely difficult task to figure out the exact scope of intellectual activity which humans can engage in, but non-human animals cannot. To be more specific, first, it is not a simple matter to define the exact *kinds* of human intellectual activity which non-human animals cannot participate in. Even in terms of a kind of intellectual activity that both human and non-human animal can engage in, it is also hard to figure out the difference between human and non-human animals with respect to either the *extent* to which they participate in it or the way in which they engage in it. We likely need the help of biology, psychology, physiology, etc. to tackle this difficult task. Indeed, it is likely not entirely possible to fully address this task even with the help of these disciplines.

However, let us at least say that, it is highly likely that the human being is the only creature which places a distinctive value on truth and understanding. If so, the human being is the only creature that conceptualizes the truth and then utilizes it. That is, we can presume that at least learning, possessing, and utilizing the truth are the kinds of human intellectual activity which non-human animals cannot engage in. So, presumably, the pleasure a human takes in these kinds of intellectual activity constitutes a kind of pleasure which non-human animals cannot experience. Thus, it is worth scrutinizing what kind of relation this specific sort of pleasure makes to the good human life in order to investigate why pleasure and intellectual activities are so important for us as humans, and thereby to understand what the good human life consists in. Accordingly, from now on, I will call the pleasure of learning, possessing,

and using knowledge or true beliefs the “Rational Pleasure”, and examine how Rational Pleasure relates to the good human life.

To examine what kind of association there is between the good human life and Rational Pleasure, it is a good first step to investigate the answers provided by great thinkers. Given the choice between excellent philosophers, I want to learn something from Plato, in part because he is the first Greek thinker who carefully advocates the value of pleasure and intellectual activity at the same time. Also, he provides several thought-provoking ideas which lead his readers to reflect on the issue by themselves as my initial quotation of the *Philebus* exemplifies. In view of this, I want to give special attention to the three mentioned Platonic dialogues, the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Philebus*, since each of them has a lot to tell us about why the good human life must contain Rational Pleasure. In other words, I think that each work provides us with a different interesting account of how Rational Pleasure relates to a good human life, and so they deserve to be read very carefully. Moreover, I believe, each dialogue distinguishes two discrete sorts of the good life in its own way, and so we can obtain a richer understanding of what kind of value Rational Pleasure has in the good human life by comparing these different sorts of the good life. In short, this dissertation examines the three Platonic dialogues mentioned in order to scrutinize why and in what sense the good human life contains Rational Pleasure.

Obviously, Plato is greatly interested in pleasure, so there have been several excellent studies on Plato on pleasure. Yet, this dissertation is the first full-length study of Plato’s

three distinct views on why a specific sort of pleasure, i.e. Rational Pleasure, has its own place in the good human life.

Jussi Tenkku, who wrote *The Evaluation of Pleasure in Plato's Ethics* (1956), is a pioneer in exploring the topic of pleasure in Plato's ethics. Yet, his book is not concerned very much with Plato's positive evaluation of pleasure. Also, the book has no special interest in Rational Pleasure. Of course, J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor's ground-breaking work, *The Greeks on Pleasure* (1982), cares about the difference in the treatment of pleasure between the three dialogues, yet this work does not pay attention to how this difference affects to the three dialogues' views on the relation between the good life and Rational Pleasure.

Nearly three decades after Gosling and Taylor's work, Van Riel published a book called *Pleasure & the Good Life: Plato, Aristotle, & the Neoplatonists* (2000). The title of this book seems to imply that the book deals, at least partly, with the issue I want to treat. Nonetheless, the part of this book devoted to Plato focuses merely on the question, "What is pleasure?". Wolfsdorf's 2014 book, *Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy* (2014), also explores a number of Platonic dialogues with a special interest in pleasure, but it attempts to respond merely to the identity question as well. In short, the two volumes are not serious studies of how even pleasure in general is related to the good human life.

In the same year Van Riel's book was published, Julia Annas devoted one chapter of her book, *Platonic Ethics, Old and New* (2000), to reading several Platonic dialogues with a special interest in pleasure as an element of the good life; nonetheless, this represent neither a full-length discussion of the matter nor is she interested in Rational Pleasure. To my knowledge, Daniel Russell's 2005 book, *Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life*, is the first full-length treatment of Plato's view on what kind of pleasure has its own place in the good life. Yet, he has no particular interest in Rational Pleasure. Moreover, unlike my claim that there is no one unified Platonic view on the relation under consideration, he is in favor of understanding Plato having a unified view on it. Similarly, Sommerville's 2014 PhD dissertation, *Plato, The Hedonist?*, is interested in the role which pleasure plays in the good life without paying any special attention to Rational Pleasure. Finally, Warren devotes one chapter of his 2014 book, *The Pleasure of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists*, to discussing how Plato treats the pleasure of knowing which is either the same or at least largely overlapping with Rational Pleasure in the *Republic* and *Philebus*. Although he makes a significant contribution toward our understanding of Plato on Rational Pleasure, the limited space of his discussion does not allow an exploration of possible differences between the three dialogues' views.

Plato's particular interest in pleasure leads many scholars to ask him why pleasure is significant in the good life. Yet, few scholars have asked what kind of relation Rational Pleasure makes to the good life. Moreover, there has been no commentator who argues that Plato offers several distinct answers to this question. Therefore, by providing the

three different but equally interesting Platonic responses to this question, this dissertation not only contributes to the area of ethics which attempts to give an account of the good human life, but also fills a hitherto ignored gap in the secondary literature on a significant area of Plato's ethics.

Part 1: The *Phaedo*

The *Phaedo* illustrates the final moments of Socrates' life. While having his final conversation with his friends, Socrates rigorously argues in defense of his hope for his happy after-life, depending on the fact that he has lived a philosophical life. He then highlights that the philosopher ought to bid farewell to bodily pleasures whilst being eager for (*spoudazein*) the pleasure of learning (*peri to manthanein*, 114e). This shows that the philosophical life is at least partly characterized by certain treatments of pleasures. In particular, it is notable that he believes it important for the philosopher to be keen on the pleasure of learning. This implies that this kind of pleasure has a special position in the philosophical life which promises a happy post-mortem life, so we can presume that how one treats the pleasure of learning is closely associated with one's happiness after death. Therefore, we can expect that the dialogue will reveal the relation between happiness and a sort of Rational pleasure, i.e. the pleasure of learning.

To become clear on the relation between the good human life and Rational Pleasure in this dialogue, I shall first distinguish two sorts of the good life: (i) the life of the philosopher; and (ii) the life in Hades (Chapter I). I shall next inquire into how Rational Pleasure is associated with each of these two sorts of the good life (Chapter II). To be more specific, I shall examine how the life of the philosopher is associated with Rational Pleasure: the pleasure of learning assists the philosopher to keep doing philosophy by helping her to maintain her correct belief about the true reality which characterizes the philosopher (II.1.). I shall then scrutinize how the life in Hades is

related to Rational Pleasure: Rational pleasure is either absent from the life or exists temporarily but without playing a significant role (II.2.). After this, I shall conclude that Rational pleasure does not constitute the goodness of the good life (Chapter III).

I. The Two Sorts of the Good Life: The Philosopher's Life and The Life in Hades

The *Phaedo* distinguishes between the best livable life and the good after-life. The dramatic character Phaedo describes the last day of Socrates' life which he observes. His observation makes himself convinced that Socrates has lived well in his life and will live well in his after-life (58e). This shows that, after spending the last minutes of Socrates' life with him, Phaedo comes to conceive of two distinct sorts of the good life: (1) a good life which Socrates will enjoy after death; and (2) a good life which Socrates has lived on earth. Socrates also sees a distinction between a good life while alive and a good post-mortem life. He believes that his post-mortem life will be good, given that he states that there is a happy after-life while arguing for his conviction of living this immortal life after death (81a, 115d). In addition, we can presume that he believes that he has lived well in his embodied life, because the dialogue is a sort of praise of his life. The dialogue starts with Phaedo's admission that Socrates lived well while alive (58d) and then concludes with Socrates request to his friends to live as philosophers (114c). In other words, the main part of the dialogue is sandwiched by praise of a philosophical life, which implies that this life is highly praised in the

dialogue. Thus, the dialogue posits two kinds of life, each of which can be good: (i) the life while alive; and (ii) the post-mortem life.

Let me begin by examining the nature of the good life while alive, i.e. the life of the philosopher (“Life-P”). I will first explain the main features of this life. I will then investigate why it is good.

Socrates in the *Phaedo* sees every human as an embodied soul while alive. Throughout the dialogue, we are consistently identified with our souls by Socrates. For instance, he speaks interchangeably of ‘the soul’ which is not associated with the body with the ‘we’ who are not associated so (67a3-4).⁴ He also says that Crito could bury him in any way he wants if he were able to catch him (115c), implying that Crito cannot catch Socrates because he is not his body but his soul.⁵ Thus, throughout the dialogue, a human is understood as an embodied soul while alive.

Everyone is a body-soul composite while alive. So, one may be characterized by what kind of association one makes between one’s soul and one’s body. This is confirmed when the philosopher is distinguished from others in how he treats his body and soul. He releases his soul from a connection with the body as much as possible by avoiding

⁴ Woolf 2004, p.97 n.1.

⁵ Ebrey 2017, p.15.

bodily pleasures, bodily ornaments, etc. (64d8-65c2). He markedly disvalues (*atiman*) his body and then flees away (*pheugein*) from it by ignoring bodily pleasures and perceptions (65c10-d2). He is someone who maintains himself, i.e. his soul, as pure (*katharos*) from his body by not associating with his body as much as possible (67a3-6). The body is compared to the prison of the soul (82e) from which it is impossible to be released while alive. So, in other words, the philosopher is a prisoner who makes every effort to escape from his jail, which is a mission impossible during his mortal embodiment.

So, why does the philosopher make every effort not to associate with his body? The answer is that the Life-P is characterized not by the attainment but by the pursuit of the truth and wisdom while keeping away from bodily hindrance. The philosopher pursues the attainment of wisdom (*phronesis*, 65a9) and the truth (65b9). That is to say, it is his definitive character that he is in the process of attaining ‘what-is’ (*to on*) only by reasoning (*logizesthai*, 65c1-8), which he does by pursuing ‘what-is’ in thought itself (66a1-3). Yet, the philosopher is an embodied soul, so his sensual perceptions hinder him from using his soul itself according to itself (*autên kath’ autên*) and thus from attaining truth and wisdom. Accordingly, the philosopher has to separate his soul from his senses and virtually from his entire body to hit upon the reality (65d-66a).

Now, why is the Life-P good? Obviously, this life is derivatively good in the sense that

only a person who has lived it can live the full-fledged happy life after death.⁶ “Dying” (*apothnêskein*) is defined as “the separation (*apallagê*) of the soul from the body” (64c5-8), so every soul, i.e. everyone, enters into a disembodied state after death. Yet, every non-philosophical soul is attached to the bodily even after death and then returns to the perceptible world (81a-82b). By contrast, only the philosopher’s soul will participate in happiness when it goes to what is divine and what is wise, spending time with the gods in Hades (80d, 81a5-10). In other words, nobody who has not philosophized and purified himself when departs from his embodied life will join the company of gods; on the contrary, only the lover of learning will join this company (82b-c). Accordingly, the Life-P is good, and to be more specific, it is the best livable life in the sense that one who lives it achieves the best post-mortem life.

In turn, let us visit the post-mortem life. Socrates takes for granted the fact that the life in Hades (“Life-H”) is happy (80d-81a), so it is obvious that this life is good. To investigate why this life is happy, we have to start by examining its definitive characters. I will introduce three distinct characters of this post-mortem life.

This life of this kind is first characterized by being in the company of gods in Hades. Socrates is willing to die and he is convinced that the philosopher has the same will

⁶ C.f. Beere insists that the fact that only the philosopher can achieve the genuine virtue and then only the Life-P is genuinely virtuous suffices judging it the best, because he considers virtue the universal criterion for judging lives (Beere 2010, p. 259). I disagree with him, since even not every Socrates’ contemporary like Thrasymachus agrees that a virtuous life is good.

(61b7-c9) in believing that he will be cared for not by the very god who has taken care of him, i.e. Apollo, but the best seers while he is in Hades (62d-63c). Hades is also illustrated as the place where several gods dwell (81a, 82b). Hence, it is one of the distinctive characters of the Life-H that gods take care of one who lives this life.

The second important character of the Life-H is that this life is lived only by the purified soul. The “Affinity argument” (78b-84b) distinguishes between two kinds of disembodied soul. One kind of disembodied soul believes that nothing other than what is bodily is true, and as a result the souls of this kind remain visible and seized by what is bodily in form (*sômatoeidos*).⁷ Souls of this kind fail to reach Hades because they are not purely released and then they take part in the visible (81c4-d4). The other kind of disembodied soul is purely separated from what is bodily and thus it reaches the divine, pure and invisible realm (80a10-81a2). Souls of this kind signify the philosophical soul which has gathered itself according to itself (80e). Therefore, the Life-H is lived only by the purified soul.

Most importantly, the Life-H is characterized by a complete attainment of wisdom. Socrates explains that wisdom is achieved completely when the soul is itself according to itself (66e1-67a1). The soul in Hades is itself according to itself, as I mentioned

⁷ “[B]ody’ in this argument is taken to refer not merely to the literal body but also to the mortal and human activities of soul, as opposed to its proper activity of soul, strictly conceived.” (Russell 2005, p.99.).

above, so this soul achieves wisdom to the fullest extent. This is confirmed by Socrates' illustration of the soul in Hades. What is eternally the same is attained by reasoning through thought (*dianoia*). On the contrary, what is not eternally the same is perceived through sense-perception (79a). The soul in Hades investigates (*skopein*) what is pure, immortal and the same not through perception but as the soul itself according to itself without any bodily disturbance (79c-d). So, we can consider that the soul which is free from bodily disturbance and then is able to reason through thought, attains what is eternally the same. More explicitly, Socrates mentions that the soul in Hades is in the same state of the entities which always stay the same. He then calls this state wisdom (79d). Accordingly, the Life-H is characterized by a complete attainment of wisdom.

But, why is this life happy? I suggest that this is because the attainment of wisdom accords with the happiness one enjoys in Hades. Let me first revisit Socrates' illustration of Hades. It is noticeable that he only mentions Hades as being the place where several gods dwell on two occasions (81a, 82b). On the contrary, he highlights that it is the place where the soul, itself according to itself, encounters and stays with the object of the truth in a more serious and sustained manner (79d1-7).⁸ This may imply that it is a more significant feature of Hades that it is the place of attaining wisdom than it is the place of living with gods. Moreover, notably, he considers that

⁸ "Ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ αἰὲ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενῆς οὕσα αὐτοῦ αἰὲ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίνεταί, ὅταν περ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυταίτε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα αἰὲ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται;

what is known only through soul, i.e. what is immortal and always entirely the same, is divine (80b). This may even imply that the gods in Hades are not Olympian gods but those things which are immortal and always entirely the same. Accordingly, we can presume that when Socrates says that he will be cared for by gods after death (63b-c), he may mean that he will stay in close proximity to what is eternally the same, as 79d reports. Therefore, presumably, the happiness in Hades accords with being always with the object of wisdom which results in the full-fledged attainment of wisdom.

This line of interpretation is confirmed by the eschatological myth (107c-115a). Socrates illustrates that the happiness of the purified soul in all other ways accords with its direct awareness (*aisthêsis*) of gods and its observation of earth, sun, and stars as they really are (111c1-3).⁹ This illustration is quoted to the effect that the happiness in Hades accords with a direct awareness of something divine and an observation of things as they are. This statement implies that an observation of the Forms accords with happiness, because the Forms are the beings that are themselves according to themselves (65d), as well. Indeed, since the grasp of Forms leads up to the attainment of wisdom (79d1-7), presumably, happiness at Hades accords with the attainment of wisdom.

If my suggestion made just above is correct, i.e. that the happiness of the Life-H

⁹ καὶ τὸν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

accords with a full-fledged attainment of wisdom, we can add one more reason why the Life-P is the best livable life: the philosopher, and specifically the philosophical soul, is the individual or the soul which attains wisdom to the most possible extent while alive. I have maintained that the full-fledged happiness goes together with a complete attainment of wisdom. So, we can presume that the highest degree of happiness while alive is permitted to one who attains wisdom to the highest possible degree. One who is prepared to think about each thing as an object in its own right, i.e. one who seeks each real thing itself according to itself while using his thought itself according to itself, comes closest to knowing each thing while alive (65e2-66a6).¹⁰ The philosopher is characterized by his pursuit of wisdom while keeping away from the body as much as possible. Accordingly, we can consider him as the person who comes closest to the state of the full-fledged wisdom while alive. Hence, the Life-P is the best livable life, because this life is characterized by coming closest to the state of the full-fledged wisdom while alive.

In conclusion, there are two sorts of the good life the *Phaedo* deals with. Socrates

¹⁰ ὅς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσῃται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ᾖ τοῦ γινῶναι ἕκαστον; (...) Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσῃεν καθαρῶτατα ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ᾖ ἐφ' ἕκαστον, μήτε τιν' ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε [τινὰ] ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῦθι θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγείς ὅτι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὠτῶν καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν σύμ- παντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐώντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν ὅταν κοινωνῇ;

regards that the goodness of a life depends on how much wisdom one acquires while living it. So, the Life-H is the supreme life in which the purified soul attains the complete wisdom in Hades. The second supreme life is the Life-P, which is characterized by an embodied soul's pursuit of wisdom while continually keeping away from the body. This life is good partly because it promises the Life-H after death. Also, this kind of life is the kind of embodied life in which one attains wisdom to the highest possible degree.

II. The Pleasure of Learning and The Good Life

In the previous chapter, I distinguished two sorts of the good life. Now, the next task is to investigate how Rational Pleasure is associated with each kind of the good life. The pleasure of learning is the only Rational Pleasure that Socrates deals with in the dialogue. Thus, the basic question I intend to answer in this chapter is what kind of association the pleasure of learning has with each sort of the good life, respectively.

I shall first maintain that the pleasure of learning is vital in the Life-P because the philosopher as an embodied soul ought to be keen on the pleasure of learning to diminish the harmful impact of necessary bodily pleasures which hinders her from keeping living her characteristic life (II.1.). I shall then turn to argue that the Life-H is either pleasureless or temporarily has the pleasure of attaining the true which does not

play an important role in the life (II.2.).

II.1. The Pleasure of Learning in The Philosopher's Life

In the *Phaedo*, Socrates concludes his conversation with his friends by stating that one who should be of good cheer about his soul after death is one who has rejected bodily pleasures while being eager for the pleasure of learning (114d8-e3).¹¹ His conversation so far shows that only the philosopher is able to attain post-mortem happiness, so his final statement is the same as the declaration that the philosopher is one who has kept away from bodily pleasures whilst being eager for the pleasure of learning.

Socrates starts his conversation by pointing out that the philosopher opposes the body in every way (64d–67e), thus it is understandable that the philosopher must stay away from bodily pleasures. However, it is a little bit surprising that the philosopher should be thought to be *eager* for the pleasure of learning, since this is beyond what we would expect from Socrates's description of the Life-P. The life is defined by the pursuit of knowledge (*epistêmê*), wisdom or the truth (65a–67d), so it would not be surprising if he insisted merely either that the philosopher enjoys the pleasure of learning or that this kind of life includes this specific sort of pleasure. Yet, surprisingly, what Socrates

¹¹ ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἔνεκα θαρρεῖν χρή περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ ἄνδρα ὅστις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους εἶασε χαίρειν, ὡς ἀλλοτρίους τε ὄντας, καὶ πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐσπούδασέ

mentions is that the philosopher has an eagerness for this pleasure, although he has never explicitly said anything about it.

It is surprising that Socrates mentions the philosopher's eagerness for the pleasure of learning. So, one might want to read 114e3-4 in a different way so as to minimize the impact of this suddenness. For instance, one might translate '*spoudazein*' not as 'be eager for' but as 'be concerned with' or 'be busy with'. One might proceed further by interpreting that the passage at issue merely confirms a contrast between what the philosopher disdains, i.e. the bodily pleasures, and what he seeks, i.e. learning, which has already been affirmed in Socrates' main arguments.¹² Yet, '*spoudazein*' must express an enthusiasm, provided that it is consistent with the other occasions that Plato uses the same verb in the dialogue. The verb is used three times in the work. At first, he utilizes the verb to express the philosopher's lack of zeal for bodily pleasures in the context which, arguably, differentiates between what non-philosophers and what philosophers respectively pursue (64d). Second, Plato uses the verb to express young Socrates' strong willingness to read Anaxagoras' book (98b). In both cases, the verb reveals a strong enthusiasm, so it is highly likely that the verb at 114e carries the same tone. In addition, I maintain that it has to be explained why Socrates mentions not just 'learning' but 'the pleasure of learning' if the issue is just a contrast between bodily pleasures and learning. This is because Socrates would not have to mention 'pleasure'

¹² At the conference called "Plato's Pleasures: New Perspectives" (16, Aug., 2018), Prof. Georgia Mouroutsou read 114e3-4 in this way.

if he wanted to confirm that the philosopher pursues merely learning. Accordingly, although it is all of a sudden, Socrates talks about the philosopher's eagerness for the pleasure of learning.

In view of this, it is highly likely that Socrates uses the expression, 'the pleasure of learning', with a proper reason for its really being so. He is the philosopher who does not engage in anything contradictory to doing philosophy but rather goes wherever philosophy leads (82d2–7), so it is reasonable that this eagerness is forced by his philosophy. If so, why does philosophy force the philosopher to be keen on the pleasure of learning? Does this pleasure play any important role in the Life-P? In other words, does this pleasure contribute to the goodness of this life? If this pleasure plays a pivotal role in this life, is this role constitutive, instrumental, or something else?

Unfortunately, the dialogue is silent on any explicit answer to these questions. However, I shall claim that the pleasure of learning has an instrumental value in the Life-P since the philosopher has to enjoy the pleasure of learning in order to retain his characteristic life while diminishing the negative impact of necessary bodily pleasures.

II.1.1. The Power of Bodily Pleasure

In this section, I will maintain that the bodily pleasure has a power to suggest that the perceptible is the true reality. This means that, as I will show, the philosopher risks losing his correct view on the true reality, i.e. that the intelligible is the true reality,

because he cannot but experience necessary bodily pleasures which are enjoyed in the perceptible. Let me start by examining 83b–d, which I call the ‘Nailing Argument’:¹³

Now the soul of the true philosopher thinks that it should not oppose this release, and that is why (1) it refrains from pleasures, desires, pains and fears as much as it can: it reckons that when someone experiences intense pleasure, pain, fear or desire, they do not inflict on him the minor injuries one might assume (for example, falling ill or wasting money because of his desires) but that they inflict on him the greatest and most extreme of all evils, without it even appearing in his reckoning.’

‘What is that, Socrates?’ said Cebes.

‘It is that (2) the soul of every human being, when it experiences intense pleasure or pain at something, necessarily, believes at that moment that whatever particularly gives rise to that feeling is most self-evident real, when it isn’t so. These are above all visible things, aren’t they?’

‘Certainly’.

‘Now is it when feeling this that soul is bound tight by body to the greatest degree?’

‘How so?’

Because (3) each pleasure and pain rivets and pins it to the body as if with a nail, and makes it corporeal, since it believes to be real the very things that the body says are real. (4) Since it has the same beliefs as the body and enjoys the same things, necessarily, I think, it comes to have the same ways and the same sustenance, (5) and to be the sort of soul never enter Hades in a pure condition (83b5–d9, emphasis is mine).¹⁴

¹³ Unless stated, my translation of the *Phaedo* uses Sedley and Long 2010 with some modifications.

¹⁴ ταύτη οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχῇ (1) οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν [καὶ φόβων] καθ’ ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις σφόδρα ἡσθῇ ἢ φοβηθῇ [ἢ λυπηθῇ] ἢ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὥν ἂν τις οἰηθείη, οἷον ἢ νοσήσας ἢ τι ἀναλώσας διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ’ ὁ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακῶν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τοῦτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό.

Τί τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

Let me sum up the main points of the Nailing Argument. The first point is that, according to (1), the philosopher's soul avoids bodily pleasures as much as possible. The following inference explains why he avoids them to the greatest possible extent. At first, (2) indicates that everyone is vulnerable to the power of intense pleasure, which entices the person who has it into believing that its object is the most palpable and truest. (3) proceeds further by stating that each bodily pleasure makes the soul think that what the senses apprehend to be true are true. In other words, each bodily pleasure compels the soul to think that the true reality is the perceptible. While having this thought, the soul comes to have the same ways and the same sustenance as the body, which accords to (4). (5) confirms that each bodily pleasure distances the soul from the purified state which is appropriate for entering Hades (83b–d).

Some scholars interpret that the Nailing Argument is focused only on intense bodily

(2) Ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι περὶ ὃ ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχη, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον· ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα <τὰ> ὁρατά· ἢ οὐ;

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδεῖται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματος;

Πῶς δῆ;

(3) Ὅτι ἐκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἦλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσιν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ. (4) ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται οἷμαι ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίνεσθαι (5) καὶ οἷα μηδέποτε εἰς Ἄιδου καθαρώς ἀφικέσθαι,

pleasures, while stressing that Socrates repeatedly uses the term ‘intense’ (*sphodra*, 83b8, c6).¹⁵ On this line of interpretation, when the argument is concerned with ‘each pleasure’ (83d4), what it takes into consideration is not ‘each instance of pleasure’ but ‘each kind of pleasure’. Even if ‘each pleasure’ indicated ‘each instance of pleasure’, a support of this line of interpretation might insist that ‘each pleasure’ indicates ‘each instance of *intense* pleasure’, given the immediately preceding lines in which Socrates talks about intense pleasures.¹⁶ To put this point in another way, this interpretation asserts that only an intense instance of each kind of pleasure distances the soul from the purified state.

However, I claim that the argument is concerned with every instance of bodily pleasure. That is, I agree with those scholars who maintain that every bodily pleasure entices the person who has it into believing that its object is the most self-evident and truest, which causes the belief that the perceptible is the true reality.¹⁷

First of all, we have to note that the Nailing Argument is not introduced to account for why philosophers stay away from intense pleasures; rather, Socrates explicitly says that the argument is introduced to explain why they keep away from pleasures and pains as much as they can (*kath’ hoson dunatai*, 83b7). In addition, I think it is worth

¹⁵ Woolf 2004 pp.102–103; Russell 2005, pp.89-90; Jones and Marechal 2018, p.93.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Butler 2012, pp.110-111; Ebrey 2017, p.7.

noting that Socrates at 82c2-4 indicates that the philosopher keeps away from every bodily desire.¹⁸ It is also noticeable that, even at 81b, Socrates mentions that bodily pleasure deceives the soul about the true reality without distinguishing intense ones from moderate ones. Thus, the Nailing Argument is not interested merely in intense pleasures.

In view of this, it is noteworthy that Socrates connects intense pleasures with two superlative matters, i.e. the greatest evils and the truest (83c7-8). He then indicates that these pleasures bind us to the body to the greatest degree (*malista*, 83d1). If he were concerned merely with intense pleasures, he would not have any reason to connect these pleasures with the superlative terms that he does. By contrast, on the interpretation I support, this connection implies that every bodily pleasure affects one's soul in accordance with its intensity. This means that every bodily pleasure generates the belief that the perceptible is true and real to some extent. Therefore, every instance of bodily pleasure has a harmful impact on the soul which experiences it.¹⁹

Yet, if the philosopher who has a correct belief about what is true were free from the harmful impact of bodily pleasures at issue, she would be able to freely enjoy them. However, the Nailing Argument contends that nobody is free from the harmful effect

¹⁸ Butler 2012, p.111; Ebrey 2017, op. cit.

¹⁹ Butler 2012, op. cit; Ebrey 2017, op. cit.

of bodily pleasures. This point is implied both by Socrates' repeated use of the verb *anagkazein* (83c5, d9) and by his explicit mention of everyone (83c5), that even the philosopher cannot resist this suggestion when he experiences bodily pleasures.²⁰ This implies that the philosopher must be exposed to this harmful suggestion in his life, because he has to experience pleasure of gratifying necessary bodily desires. That is to say, as Socrates seems to admit (66b–c), even the philosopher needs to eat, drink, etc. to survive, which means that the philosopher cannot help enjoying the necessary bodily pleasures. If only intense bodily pleasures harmed the soul, taking necessary bodily pleasures would have no harmful impact at all on the philosopher's soul insofar as they are not intense. Yet, the Nailing Argument claims that every bodily pleasure is risky, so the philosopher who has to have necessary bodily pleasures may risk having an incorrect belief that the true reality is the perceptible. This is very problematic, because doing philosophy is based on the belief that the perceptible is not real. That is to say, without having a belief that there is something beyond the perceptible, the philosopher has no reason for expelling his sense-perceptions from his investigation and then doing his best to investigate only with his soul. In other words, without this belief, presumably, he investigates perceptible things and their effects as potential object of understanding (79c2-8, 83b2-3).²¹ Thus, the philosopher may risk failing to keep on doing philosophy because of his necessary bodily pleasures.

²⁰ Butler 2012, 108.

²¹ Butler 2012, p.109, 117.

II.1.2. The Power of Intellectual Pleasure

I visited the Nailing Argument and maintained that every bodily pleasure deludes the person who has it, by suggesting that the true reality is the perceptible. The philosopher cannot help having necessary bodily pleasures, which means that he cannot but be tempted to cast philosophy aside.

To keep doing philosophy and thereby living his characteristic life, the philosopher has to defend his correct belief about the true reality. Obviously, one way of retaining this belief is to come into contact with the intelligible, since the philosopher can repeatedly confirm that the intelligible is real while accessing it. Whether doing philosophy is itself sufficient to retain the correct belief about the true reality or not, we can presume that just as coming into contact with the intelligible leads one to have a belief that the true reality is the intelligible, so coming into contact with the perceptible leads one to believe that what is real is the perceptible. That is to say, for example, not merely the pleasure of eating but also eating itself as a contact with the perceptible makes one believe that what is real is just the perceptible. If so, it is at least likely that not merely coming contact with the intelligible but also the pleasure of this contact leads one to believe that what is real is the intelligible.

In view of this, in this section, I shall contend that pleasure which is taken in the intelligible suggests to the person who experiences it that the true reality is the intelligible. In particular, I shall claim that experiencing this pleasure helps the

philosopher to diminish the negative impact of bodily pleasures and to sustain his correct belief about the true reality. Accordingly, I shall conclude that he has a good reason to be keen on this pleasure.

The Nailing Argument maintains merely that every bodily pleasure pushes one who experiences it to suppose that the perceptible is the true reality. That is, the argument is not explicitly concerned with the pleasure which is taken in the intelligible (“Intellectual Pleasure”). Yet, there is no sign in the argument that bodily pleasure alone has the power of suggesting what the true reality is. Rather, it is likely that every pleasure has the same sort of power, because, presumably, the bodily pleasure has the power at issue not because of its object, i.e. that which is of the perceptible, but because of its identity as a pleasure. Thus, although it is obvious that there is a big difference between bodily pleasure and Intellectual Pleasure, it is likely that the Intellectual Pleasure compels the person who has it to suppose that the true reality is the intelligible.

This line of thought is well supported by the so-called ‘Affinity Argument’ (78b-84b) in which the Nailing Argument is located. To see how this argument buttresses this line of thought, it is first worth noting that the soul is not something invisible, intellectual, etc., but is *like* what is invisible and intellectual (80b–81a).²² While illustrating the soul in comparative terms, the argument clearly locates the soul on a

²² Woolf 2004, p.112.

continuum which is governed by the degrees of likeness to two opposites: i.e. (1) what is invisible, immortal, etc.; and (2) what is visible, mortal, etc.²³ The soul is placed somewhere on the continuum of these two sets of opposite. So, it is merely *proper* for the soul, which is situated at a position on the continuum, to be invisible, intellectual, etc. This is clearly supported by the following two statements: (i) the soul is more similar to the invisible than the body is, and the body is more similar to the visible than the soul is (79b16-17);²⁴ and (ii) the soul is more akin to what is stable than to what is unstable (79e2-5).²⁵ These two statements explicitly reveal that the soul is not the invisible and stable; it is merely *more akin to* the invisible and more stable than the body is. Accordingly, the soul is located somewhere on a continuum whose ends are (a) the invisible, stable, etc. and (b) the visible, unstable, etc.

The second notable point of the Affinity Argument is that an embodied soul which closely connected with the body in which it resides believes that what is real is corporeal and becomes visible after death (81b-d). This alludes to two significant points. First, the soul's position on the continuum is not fixed. Although the soul is naturally akin to the invisible, some souls are visible after death. This implies that the soul can be dragged from a position which is near one extreme, namely what is

²³ Burger 1984, p.92.

²⁴ Ὅμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχὴ σώματός ἐστιν τῷ αἰδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὀρατῷ.

²⁵ Πᾶς ἂν μοι δοκεῖ, ἥ δ' ὅς, συγχωρῆσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι ψυχὴ τῷ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μή.

invisible, to another position, namely near the visible. Thus, we can presume that it is not fixed where the soul is on the continuum. Second, the soul's belief that the true reality is the perceptible goes together with its movement on the continuum toward the extreme of what is visible. Notably, 81b-d states that the soul which believes that what is real is corporeal is the soul that is dragged toward the extreme of what is invisible on the continuum. In view of this, it is worth noting that the purified soul, i.e. the philosopher's soul, is not scattered after death but reaches the invisible without roaming around the visible area (80d-81e). That is, it is worth mentioning that the philosopher's soul is invisible after death. This reveals that doing philosophy draws the soul on the continuum nearer to the extreme of what is invisible. Doing philosophy consists in pursuing the intelligible under the belief that the true reality is the intelligible. This means that the philosopher's belief about the true reality goes together with the movement of his soul on the continuum toward the extreme. Accordingly, we can consider that the soul's belief about what the true reality is accompanies the soul's movement toward the extreme of the continuum which corresponds to this belief.

The Affinity Argument shows that the soul's position on the continuum tracks its belief about what the true reality is; yet, the argument does not make it explicit whether there is a causal relation or a positive correlation between the soul's position and the belief. The Nailing Argument, esp. (3) and (4), proceeds further by implying that the soul's belief about what the true reality is determines the position that the soul has on the continuum. The argument also alludes to the point that it is the soul's experience of

bodily pleasure which makes it believe that the true reality is the perceptible.

First of all, both (3) and (4) confirm what the Affinity Argument reveals by asserting that the soul can have the nature which is fit not for itself but for the body. To be more precise, (3) indicates that the soul can be corporeal; and (4) says that the soul comes to possess the same features of the body. So, the Nailing Argument accords with the Affinity Argument in the respect that both argue that the soul can become like the body. Moreover, both (3) and (4) show that the soul becomes more like the corporeal when it believes that what is true is something corporeal. To be more specific, (3) indicates that the soul is made more corporeal because of its belief that that which is real according to the body is real; while (4) points to the fact that the soul has the same sustenance to the body by having the same beliefs as the body. Thus, the Nailing Argument gives more detail to what the Affinity Argument reveals by showing that, if the soul believes that the true reality is the perceptible, it becomes like the body. Finally, one of the most distinctive points of the Nailing Argument is that, when the soul experiences bodily pleasure, the soul comes to have the belief that the true reality is the perceptible. By combining this point with the point just mentioned above, we can contend that it is an illusory power of bodily pleasure, which suggests that its object is true and real, which makes a soul corporeal. In short, the Nailing Argument proceeds further than what the Affinity Argument reveals by showing that, when the soul experiences bodily pleasure, it comes to have the belief that the true reality is the perceptible, which causes that the soul becomes like the body.

In light of this, I claim that, when the soul has Intellectual Pleasure, it comes to believe that the true reality is the intelligible and thereby either recovers or maintains its nature. For this claim, I first maintain that the soul on the continuum can be moved not only toward what is visible but also toward what is invisible. The Affinity Argument does not argue that only the movement toward what is corporeal is possible for the soul on the continuum. Rather, we can presume that the soul can also make the opposite movement, i.e. the movement toward what is intelligible. This is because every soul, including the philosopher's soul, would eventually become corporeal if there was not movement toward the state which is proper for the soul, since it has to experience the necessary bodily pleasures which have the power to make it corporeal.

If so, we can secondly presume that, when the soul comes to believe that the true reality is the intelligible, the soul on the continuum is moved toward the intelligible and invisible, given that the soul's belief about the true reality that what is real is something material has the power to make the soul corporeal. One might consider that it is not the power of the soul's belief, but instead the power of the material realm, that makes the soul which believes that what is is corporeal, implying that the soul on the continuum is not moved by its belief that the true reality is the intelligible. Yet, it is more likely that it is the power of the soul's belief itself about the true reality which determines the position of the soul on the continuum, because the belief is an inner state of the soul which is changed by this belief. Hence, presumably, the correct belief about the true reality makes the soul recover or maintain its proper state.

In view of this, I claim that Intellectual Pleasure plays the role of moving the soul on the continuum toward the extreme of what is invisible and intelligible. There is no reason to consider that it is only bodily pleasure which causes one to suppose that its object is true and real. Presumably, the illusory power of bodily pleasure to make its object vivid comes not from its relation to the material world but from its being a pleasure, because Socrates allocates the power of producing the belief about the true reality to several emotional mental activities, including pleasure (81b1-4).²⁶ So, we can presume that Intellectual Pleasure as a pleasure has the power of compelling one into believing the true reality of its object. If this pleasure has this power, it can drag the soul to one extreme of the continuum by pushing one to believe that what is intelligible is the true reality. That is, just as bodily pleasure drags one's soul along the continuum toward what is corporeal, correspondingly Intellectual Pleasure drags the soul toward what is intelligible by virtue of its power of modifying one's belief about the true reality. Therefore, we can conclude that not only bodily pleasure but also Intellectual Pleasure has the power to suggest what the true reality is.

The philosopher encounters two opposite suggestions from pleasure about the truth while he or she is alive. Bodily pleasure suggests that what is true is the material. By contrast, Intellectual Pleasure suggests that what is true is the intelligible. It is unclear how powerful each of these two suggestions are. The only clear thing is that the

²⁶ Ἐὰν δέ γε οἶμαι μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττεται, ἅτε τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ συνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θερά- πεύουσα καὶ ἐρώσα καὶ γοητευομένη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἄλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές.

philosopher should evade the former suggestion with every effort, in order not to be persuaded by it. Yet, as a body–soul composite, the philosopher cannot help risking himself to being exposed to the illusory power of bodily pleasure. This means that he risks losing the belief about the true reality which characterizes himself. Hence, he has to offset this illusory power in order to retain his characteristic life which consists in doing philosophy. Because of the power that Intellectual Pleasure has, it is an efficient way to offset the illusory power of the bodily pleasure to have Intellectual Pleasure. Therefore, the philosopher has a sufficient reason for being enthusiastic about the power of Intellectual Pleasure

II.1.3. The Pleasure of Learning as The Intellectual Pleasure

In II.1.1-II.1.2, I argued that the philosopher has a sufficient reason to be keen on Intellectual Pleasure because it helps him to keep his life correctly aligned. That is, I located a kind of Rational Pleasure which is worth enjoying for the philosopher in his embodied life. Yet, it is not Intellectual Pleasure but the pleasure of learning for which the philosopher is eager, according to Socrates at 114e. So, at the moment, we do not have a proper answer to the question of why the philosopher is eager for the pleasure of learning. In view of this, in this section, I will claim that the pleasure of learning amounts to Intellectual Pleasure by examining the Recollection Argument.

‘Learning’ (*mathêsis*) has a very specific meaning in the *Phaedo*. The first scene which implies that learning has a narrow meaning is 67b4 where Socrates equates the genuine

philosopher (*philosophos*), literally the genuine wisdom-lover, with one who correctly loves learning. At 65c-67b, he focuses on stressing that the philosopher is one who seeks the truth, i.e. what-is (65c, 66a-b), X-itself (e.g. justice-itself and beauty-itself), being (*ousia*), or ‘what each one thing actually is’ (*ho tugchanei hekaston*, 65d-e). It is not very clear how we should understand the terms which amount to the truth, e.g. X-itself or what each one thing actually is. Yet, Socrates explicitly states that the body hinders one from perceiving the truth and wisdom (65e6-66a7)²⁷, so it is clear that the philosopher is one who seeks what one cannot perceive through one’s body. So, it is highly likely that, when Socrates equates the philosopher to one who loves learning, the learning which Socrates is concerned with is the learning of something that one cannot achieve through his body. By referring to the contrast between what is intelligible and what is bodily, as the Affinity Argument explores, we can guess that the learning in this specific passage is the learning of something which is entirely intelligible. In a nutshell, probably, the object of learning is the truth which is entirely intelligible.

The decisive scene in which we can discover the restriction of the meaning of learning

²⁷ Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσειεν καθαρώτατα ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ' ἑκάστον, μήτε τιν' ὅψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε [τινὰ] ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἑκάστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγείς ὅτι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὥτων καὶ ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν σύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὥς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐώντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν ὅταν κοινωνῇ; ἄρ' οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Σιμμία, εἴπερ τις [καὶ] ἄλλος ὁ τευζόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; (emphasis is mine.).

is the Recollection Argument (72e-75e), where Socrates enquires into the soul's activity of recollection (*anamnêsis*). The passage starts with Cebes' report that Socrates has often identified learning with recollection, which consists in a recovery of what the soul had learned before being embodied (72e3-7).²⁸ One recollects in this quite specific sense when one has thought of (*ennoêkas*) and attained the knowledge of X-itself, i.e. 'what it is' (*to ho esti*), which one had possessed before one's birth as an embodied soul but forgot (74c-d). In short, this recollection consists in the re-attaining of the knowledge of X-itself one had previously but forgot. Hence, Socrates' explicit identification of learning with the regaining (*analandanein*) of one's own knowledge (75e5-6)²⁹ reveals that learning consists in the recollection of his pre-existing knowledge.

The later part of the dialogue, esp. in 91e-92b,³⁰ confirms that learning amounts to the

²⁸ Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὃν Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἐστίν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὔσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμνησκομέθα.

²⁹ Ἄρ' οὐχ ὃ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν οἰκείαν ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν εἴη

³⁰ Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλοθι πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῆναι; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ. Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω (91e5-92a4, emphasis is mine) (.....) οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ᾧ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων συνίσταται ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται. οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς συνάσσεται; (92b4-c3)

recollection of one's own knowledge. In this passage, both Simmias and Cebes confirm the identity of learning and recollection. This allows Socrates to reject the notion that the soul is a harmony, which is incompatible with the Recollection Argument, which presupposes the pre-existence of the soul before embodiment. That is, the interlocutors deny this notion just because it is against the Recollection Argument, which has contended that learning is the same as recollection. This reveals that the dialogue keeps the equation between learning and recollection beyond the immediate dialectical context of the Recollection Argument. Therefore, learning in this dialogue has a specific meaning: the recollection of pre-existing knowledge.

When Socrates labels the philosopher as the lover of learning, he restricts the scope of learning which he is concerned with to the learning which only the philosopher is able to engage in. The Recollection Argument clearly alludes to the similar point that the recollection, which is the same as learning, cares about the knowledge of X-itself and 'what it is' which is what only the philosopher seeks. Accordingly, we can presume that the learning at issue is a sort of rational activity that only the philosopher engages in. That is, presumably, the knowledge one attains through recollection is philosophical knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of the intelligible. Let us call this understanding of the object of recollection the "Philosophical Interpretation".

By contrast, there are several scholars who interpret that it is by recollection that ordinary people acquire mundane concepts of the world of our experience, under

which we classify particulars in everyday speech and thought.³¹ Let us call this line of interpretation the “Mundane Interpretation”. For instance, on this interpretation, the knowledge of the equal-itself as treated in 74b2-3 consists in understanding the general concept of equality. One of the fundamental motivations for following the Mundane Interpretation is to suppose that the Recollection Argument must aim at proving the immortality of every human soul. Cebes asks for the proof of the immortality of the human soul in general, while being in doubt whether human soul does not exist any longer when it becomes disembodied (70a-b). It is undeniable that the argument is one of the responses to answer this doubt. Yet, if the Philosophical Interpretation is correct, the argument is concerned only with a specific sort of human soul, i.e. the philosopher’s soul, because only the philosopher participates in recollection, which might be unacceptable. Whereas, if the Mundane Interpretation were correct, the argument would sufficiently address the doubt, so this interpretation is not entirely groundless.³²

³¹ E.g. Bostock 1986, 66ff.; Kelsey 2000, pp.94-97; Franklin 2005; Reshotko 2014, pp.286-290.

³² Kahn suggests a kind of third way between the two interpretations: everyone must employ recollection in making perceptual judgments, but only the philosopher can distinguish the Forms from particulars and then know what he is doing when he recollects. To support his suggestion, he separates one recognition that every sensible equal wants to be like the Equal itself that all human beings make from another recognition that sensible equals all fall short of the Equal itself, a recognition which however only the philosopher makes (75b5-8). He believes that 74a6 cautiously prepares this separation by describing the judgment of deficiency as an additional step after the judgment of similarity (Kahn 2006, pp.123-124.). Now, I think that Kahn’s suggestion is not persuasive at all. This is first because the judgment of deficiency is described not as a mere additional step but a necessary additional step at 74a6, so the additional step has to be taken if the initial step is taken. Also, there is no hint at 75b5-8 that ordinary people make just one of the two separated kinds of recognition at issue.

However, I wish to advocate the Philosophical Interpretation, partly because, if the Mundane Interpretation were correct, there would be an unsatisfactory result: the philosopher who is keen on the pleasure of learning is eager for the pleasure that everyone can ordinarily experience, since learning is the same as recollection. By contrast, if the Philosophical Interpretation is correct, the philosopher has every reason to be eager for the pleasure of learning, since this pleasure is at least a kind of Intellectual Pleasure and thus this kind of Intellectual Pleasure helps him to keep his correct belief about the true reality. That is, only from the perspective of the Philosophical Interpretation, can we find a satisfactory understanding of why the philosopher is keen on the pleasure of learning.

A close reading of the Recollection Argument also supports the Philosophical Interpretation rather than the Mundane Interpretation.³³ Let me start by indicating that it is not necessary for the Recollection Argument to be concerned with the nature of every human soul. The advocates of the Mundane Interpretation believe that the argument is a response to Cebes' request to prove the immortality of every human soul, so it is not proper for the argument to be concerned only with the philosopher's soul. On the other hand, I maintain that it is allowed for the argument not to deal with all

³³ I find that Scott 1995, pp.53-73 contains a detailed reading of the Recollection Argument which defends the Philosophical Interpretation. I do not find it necessary to repeat what he already points to. Instead, I want to either add a few pieces of evidence to or revise his arguments that I find erroneous or weak.

human souls. Cebes asks Socrates to prove the immortality of every human soul in order to observe a proof for Socrates' hope for the good after-life (69e-70b). That is, it is apparent that he cares about the immortality of all human souls, but what he fundamentally wants to be convinced is that Socrates' soul is immortal because his ultimate interest is in whether Socrates' hope for the after-life is well-grounded. So, if the Recollection Argument proves that the philosopher's soul is immortal, Cebes will be satisfied with it, since he is persuaded by the argument that Socrates' soul as a philosopher's soul is immortal. Thus, it is not sufficient to reject the Philosophical Interpretation by remarking that this interpretation restricts the scope of this argument. Furthermore, even if Cebes really requested in the hope of being persuaded that all human souls are immortal, it would not be a big problem that one of several answers to this request has a limited goal, insofar as other answers hit the mark. In other words, it is an excessive demand that each of all arguments following Cebes' request has to treat every point which it is requested to answer, if the request is responded to by considering all arguments. Therefore, the Mundane Interpretation is not well-motivated.

I also want to argue that there is no way for the Mundane Interpretation to give a coherent reading of 74b2-3 and 76c1-3. The apparent inconsistency between these two passages is that Simmias at 74b2-3 seems to assert that 'we' including him have the knowledge which 'we' acquire by recollection when he states that 'we' have the

knowledge of Equal-itself;³⁴ whereas, he soon seems to confess his lack of knowledge which is attained by recollection when he states that not everyone knows the kind of knowledge at issue (76c1-3).³⁵ That is to say, it is an issue whether Simmias can participate in the activity of recollection or not.

The supporters of the Mundane Interpretation usually take two steps to read these two passages without any tension. First, they distinguish between two kinds of knowledge based on the fact that Socrates introduces an ability of giving an account (*logon didônai*) at 76b8-9: (i) knowledge in the ordinary sense which amounts to the knowledge of what a general concept means (the “General Knowledge”); and (ii) knowledge in the philosophical sense which involves one’s ability to ‘give an account’ of what he knows (the “Professional Knowledge”). Second, they assert that 74b2-3 deals with the General Knowledge which is recollected, whereas 76c1-3 cares about the Professional Knowledge which is not recollected.³⁶ They then conclude that there is no tension between these two passages, since each of them deals with a different kind of knowledge.

The distinction between the two kinds of knowledge mentioned above is unacceptable,

³⁴ Ἡ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς

³⁵ Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά; Οὐδαμῶς.

³⁶ E.g. Bostock 1980, p.67-68.

partly because it implies that even the General Knowledge is true in some sense. While distinguishing between these two kinds of knowledge, the Mundane Interpretation sees just a hierarchical difference between them in terms of having a capacity of giving an account. So, on this interpretation, for instance, the ordinary concept of temperance must be true although the possessor of this general knowledge is unable to give an account of temperance. Yet, Socrates explicitly asserts that there is no truth at all (*oud' alethês echêi*, 69b9) in the ordinary understanding of virtue which does not consider virtue in a relation to wisdom (69a6-c2). Regardless of how one understands what the correct relation of each virtue really is to wisdom, it is obvious that when one understands temperance just with respect to certain types of behaviour, as many people do (68c8-10), the one who does so does not possess any truth at all. Therefore, the distinction between the General Knowledge and the Professional Knowledge is not acceptable.

The distinction also results in a weird conclusion that the philosopher is characterized by his pursuit of pleasure which everyone nevertheless can experience. Learning is the same as recollection. If we hold the distinction between General Knowledge and Professional Knowledge, we have to regard that the philosopher, who is keen on the pleasure of learning, is eager to take pleasure in acquiring General Knowledge. That is, he is keen on enjoying the rational activity in which everyone can participate. It is weird that the philosopher is characterized by enjoying an inferior sort of rational activity even though there is a superior sort of rational activity that only the philosopher can engage in, i.e. attaining Professional Knowledge. Therefore, the

distinction is not satisfactory.

Moreover, the current defenders of the Philosophical Interpretation find it unacceptable that there is a drastic change of meaning of ‘knowledge’ between the two passages without any warning or notification. Thus, they insist that there are two different kinds of knowledge of the Forms, one of which Simmias possesses, whereas the other of which he does not have. That is, they consider that 74b2-3 is concerned with the knowledge of mathematical Forms, whilst the argument is broadened to involve every Form at 75c7-d5 and then 76c1-3 treats the knowledge of the moral Forms.³⁷

I agree that it is not acceptable that the meaning of ‘knowledge’ undergoes a big change without any warning. I also find it correct that the kind of knowledge of the Form which 74b2-3 cares about is different from the kind of knowledge of the Form which 76c1-3 is concerned with, since the discussion between interlocutors starts to include every Form from 75c10-d3. Yet, I argue that it is inadmissible to use the distinction between mathematical Forms and moral Forms, since this is a distinction that the dialogue does not make. Furthermore, I am not convinced whether the Form of Equal-itself, which Simmias obviously knows, represents mathematical Forms. Hence, the reading of the two passages under consideration is unsatisfactory as well.

³⁷ E.g. Scott 1995, pp.67-68.

Here is how I read the two passages without any tension. I first distinguish between two kinds of recollection: (1) recollection through the dialectical process of asking and answering (“Dialectical Recollection”, 73a); and (2) recollection through sense-perception (“Sensory Recollection”, 73c). I then distinguish between two kinds of knowledge: (1) knowledge acquired by the Dialectical Recollection (“D-Knowledge”); and (2) knowledge acquired by the Sensory Recollection (“S-Knowledge”). Obviously, the knowledge of the equal-itself is an example of S-Knowledge because it is acquired by perceiving several equal things, such as equal logs (74a-b). Thus, we can regard that the knowledge mentioned as what ‘we’ have at 74b2-3 is S-Knowledge. By contrast, I claim that the knowledge mentioned as what only a few people have at 76c1-3 is D-Knowledge. At 75c10-d3, Socrates states that he is concerned with everything that he sets a seal as ‘what it is’ while having a discussion. That is, he cares about the Equal-itself but also with the Beautiful-itself, the Good-itself, as well as the Just, the Pious, etc.³⁸ At 76c1-3, Simmias confesses that not everyone knows them. He knows the Equal-itself, so all or at least some of the remainders of the examples of the Form are conversely what not everyone knows. Except the Beautiful-itself, it is obvious that the knowledge of every remainder is not attained by Sensory Recollection, because there is no way to, say, recognize justice through sense-perception. Rather, one is able to obtain a better understanding of what justice is through discussion, as

³⁸ οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὁσίου καί, ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ “αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι” καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι (75c10-d3).

the *Republic* shows, so it is highly likely that the knowledge which Simmias does not possess is the kind of knowledge which comes from a philosophical discussion. That is, we can presume that the knowledge at issue at 76c1-3 is D-Knowledge. In short, 74b2-3 cares about S-Knowledge whilst 76c1-3 deals with D-Knowledge, because 75c10-d3 broadens the scope of the Forms that the Recollection Argument takes into account. Therefore, on my understanding, the Philosophical Interpretation succeeds in reading the two passages coherently.

In addition, the Mundane Interpretation cannot explain why it is *necessary* (*anagkaion*) for one who recollects to think about the deficiency of a particular in comparison to what is recollected (74a5-7).³⁹ On this interpretation, say, when you say that a 5 pound note is equal to another 5 pound note, what you recollect is the concept of equality, so what 74a5-7 implies is that you *must* think that your saying “equal” is deficient of this concept when you compare two equal 5 pound notes. This is odd, because you rarely think about this kind of deficiency. On the other hand, on my interpretation, one who recollects necessarily sees the deficiency of a particular because he recollects what is complete, i.e. the Form (here) of the Equal.⁴⁰

³⁹ Ἄλλ' ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμνήσκηται τίς τι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὗ ἀνεμνήσθη; (emphasis is mine)

⁴⁰ With regard to this issue, I think Scott is a bit unfair to the Mundane Interpretation when he presupposes that the comparison should be between a Form and a particular without any justification (Scott 1995, pp.60-61.).

There have been roughly two ways for my opponents to tackle the necessity at 74a5. One way is to under-translate '*anagkaion*' as something like 'it is typical'.⁴¹ Yet, I think even the standard of being 'typical' is too strong for the Mundane Interpretation, because you would not typically but *rarely* think that the equality between two 5 pound notes falls short of genuine equality or the concept of equality.

Second, one might pay attention to the specific context of 74a5-7, in which Socrates uses an example of recollecting Simmias by observing the picture of Simmias to explain what recollection is, and then consider that the necessity at issue is related not to recollection but merely to the Theory of Recollection. That is, one might insist that the context reveals that it is necessary not for one who recollects but for one who learns what recollection is, e.g. Simmias, to compare a particular and what is recollected.⁴² However, we have to note that the text itself clearly points out that one who must think about the deficiency of a particular in comparison to what is recollected is not one who learns what recollection is but one who recollects. Thus, it is not persuasive to consider that 'necessity' is associated not with recollection but with the Theory of Recollection.

Let me sum up my inquiry into the Recollection Argument so far. The specific rational

⁴¹ Sedley 2006, pp.314-315. Reshotko seems to agree with Sedley when under-translating necessity as to 'compel' (Reshotko 2014, p.287 n.44.).

⁴² Franklin 2005, p.302.

activity that 'learning' signifies in this dialogue is the recollection of knowledge. Apparently, the terms which Socrates uses to indicate the object of knowledge are reminiscent of the Forms, so recollection at issue is the recollection of the Forms. Yet, some commentators suggest that recollection is of the ordinary concepts of everything for an apparently good reason. Accordingly, I have offered a few more pieces of evidence in support of rejecting this suggestion. In conclusion, learning in this dialogue is the same as recovering one's knowledge of the Forms.

Now, let us revisit the question why the philosopher is eager for the pleasure of learning, based on this inquiry into the Recollection Argument. To answer this question, it is helpful to remind ourselves of the point that the philosopher has to take seriously Intellectual Pleasure because he is helped to keep his life correctly aligned by experiencing it. This means that the philosopher has a sufficient reason to be keen on Intellectual Pleasure.

In view of this, I maintain that it is highly likely that the pleasure of learning is the same as Intellectual Pleasure. Learning amounts to the recollection of the Forms. That is, learning is the same as a rational activity through which one can come in contact with the intelligible. So, the pleasure of learning is a kind of pleasure which is taken in learning the intelligible, which is tantamount to Intellectual Pleasure. To be more precise, it is highly likely that the pleasure of learning is the sole kind of Intellectual Pleasure. This is partly because doing recollection is the only one way of accessing the intelligible, which is given in the dialogue. More importantly, Socrates at 114e

would not specifically mention the pleasure of learning if there were other ways for the philosopher to be in contact with the intelligible. In other words, if there were other ways to get in touch with the intelligible, Socrates at 114e would mention Intellectual Pleasure rather than the pleasure of learning. Therefore, the pleasure of learning is the sole kind of Intellectual Pleasure, so the philosopher is eager for the pleasure of learning in order to keep his characteristic life as a philosopher.

II.2. The Pleasure of Learning in The Life in Hades

I shall devote this section to exploring the Life-H, i.e. the life in Hades, with a focus on the pleasure of learning in this life. More specifically, I shall claim that the dialogue implies either that (1) there is no pleasure at all in the Life-H or that (2) there is no contribution which pleasure makes toward the happiness of this life even if there is the pleasure of learning in it. For this claim, I shall first address Socrates' silence about pleasure in the Life-H, which implies that either (1) or (2) would be the case. I shall then argue that there is no decisive clue that learning in Hades is pleasant, since the fact that the pleasure of learning while alive is pleasant does not guarantee that learning is pleasant in this life. I shall add that, even in the best scenario, the Life-H is pleasant just temporarily. I shall finally visit the eschatological myth which might be misread as stating the view that the Life-H is pleasant. I shall conclude this section by contending that the eschatological myth does not support either that there is a kind of pleasure which constitutes the goodness of this life or that there is pleasure in this life at all.

Let me start by pointing to the fact that Socrates mentions nothing about pleasure in the Life-H. The purified soul which lives this kind of life is disembodied, so it is unable to have bodily pleasures. However, provided that not only the perceptible but also the intelligible is the object of pleasure, the possibility remains open that the purified soul can enjoy Intellectual Pleasure. Also, Socrates' silence about pleasure in the Life-H does not suffice either of the two following propositions: (1) that there is no pleasure in this kind of life; and (2) that there is no role for pleasure to play in this kind of life. Thus, it is too quick to conclude that the Life-H is absent of any pleasure. However, his silence would be extremely surprising if there was a relation worthy of mention between the life of this kind and pleasure in it, in view of the fact that he has said plenty much about pleasure while illustrating the Life-P. Accordingly, it is probable either that pleasure plays no significant role in the Life-H or that there is no pleasure in it at all.

To be clear on how Rational Pleasure is associated with Life-H, the initial argument I want to make is that the purified soul in Hades does not need any pleasure. To support this argument, I want first to contend that, if the soul in Hades has no reason to experience the pleasure taken in the intelligible, there is no reason for it to take any other pleasure at all. At face value, the question remains open whether the purified soul at Hades enjoys pleasure of the kind which is enjoyed by the soul itself according to itself. This is partly because the soul, when it has become isolated from body, has the capability of enjoying pleasure. This is supported by Socrates at 83c, when describing the situation in which one experiences pleasure as the situation in which

his soul experiences it. To be more precise, provided that the characteristic activity of the soul itself according to itself is to investigate what are pure, immortal, and the same, i.e. the Forms, and provided that it always stays close to the Forms (79c-d), it is an open possibility that the purified soul takes pleasure in the truth ("Soul's Pleasure."). In view of this, we can ask whether Soul's Pleasure plays any crucial role in the Life-H, because the pleasure of learning plays a significant role in the Life-P. To answer this question, I want to draw attention to the fact that if the philosopher while alive were free from an illusion that what is true is the perceptible, he would not need the pleasure of learning. In other words, I want to emphasize that the reason why the pleasure of learning is crucial for the philosopher's characteristic life is that he is a body-soul composite, and as the result of being this he cannot help being exposed to the illusion by experiencing bodily pleasures and having access to the perceptible world. This means that there is no role to play for any pleasure taken in the intelligible, if one is free from the illusion about the true reality. The purified soul is free from this illusory suggestion, both because it is free from the body and because it always observes the Forms. Accordingly, this soul does not need anything to nullify the power of this illusory suggestion. Therefore, we can presume that even if there is Soul's Pleasure in the Life-H, it does not play any significant role in the life in Hades.

Furthermore, I claim that it is not obvious whether there is pleasure in the Life-H. I do not reject that the purified soul can learn many new things in Hades. What I am not sure about is whether this learning is pleasant, because Socrates is silent about whether it is pleasant. In addition, I do not think that the fact that the learning while alive (let

me call this the experience of “Learning-A.”) is pleasant automatically guarantees that the learning in Hades (let me call this the experience of “Learning-H.”) is pleasant, since the two experiences of learning are different from each other. That is, unless the experience of Learning-H contains the factor which makes the experience of Learning-A pleasant, it is not proven that Life-H is pleasant.

In view of this, it is worth scrutinizing the factor which makes Learning-A pleasant. To speak quite frankly, it is nearly impossible to figure it out, because Socrates does not clearly indicate what this pleasant factor is. Yet, there are three seemingly probable reasons for the experience of Learning-A’s being pleasant. First, it might be the object of Learning-A which makes the experience of it pleasant. In other words, Learning-A might be pleasant since it is the knowledge of ‘what-is’ that one recollects (75d). If so, Learning-H would be pleasant as well because it consists in achieving this kind of knowledge. Second, if the actualization of something latent were pleasant, Learning-A would be pleasant. If so, Learning-H would be pleasant because the purified soul at Hades can be considered as being in a process of recovering its latent knowledge. Third, if it were pleasant to be in a process of recollecting something by virtue of something else, the activity of recollection would be pleasant. To illustrate this, if it were pleasant to be in a process of recollecting your son who is not present while you see his portrait, recollection of the Form which is not at hand would be pleasant. Yet, if this is so, the experience of Learning-H would not be pleasant because the purified soul which is just close to the Forms does not go through the process of recollecting the Forms. Accordingly, one who believes that Learning-H is pleasant since Learning-

A is pleasant tacitly supposes that Learning-A is pleasant either (a) because of its object or (b) because it consists in engaging in a recovery of what is latent.

Let us first suppose that Learning-A is pleasant just because of its object. This supposition may amount to a thought that recollection of what is other than the Forms is not pleasant. However, this thought is not persuasive, since there is no reason to consider that this recollection is conducted without pleasure. For instance, it is likely that the recollection of one's lover after seeing his clothes (73d) is pleasant because it is pleasant to be in the process of recollecting one's lover. Thus, it needs a further argument to maintain that it is the Form which renders the experience of Learning-A pleasant.

With respect to the recollection of one's lover, it is a plausible line of thought that this recollection is pleasant because its object is what the agent of recollection loves. To illustrate this, it is likely that the recollection of one's lover after seeing his clothes is pleasant because the clothes reminds one of one's lover and thus sets one's mind in a kind of contact with one's lover. If so, Learning-A is pleasant because what the philosopher recollects, i.e. the Form, is what he loves.⁴³ If this chain of thought were correct, Learning-H would be pleasant since its object is what the philosopher's soul

⁴³ Miura sees a tight relation between what one recollects and what he loves while maintaining that "the subject of recollection has a tendency to recollect a specific object because of his love for what he recollects" (Miura 2018, p.62).

loves.

However, first, I contend that this line of interpretation draws too much from the example of recollection when it confines the object of recollection to what one loves. Let me suggest the following as a good example of recollection of this kind. When I observe a self-portrait of Picasso, I am reminded of his appearance although I do not like him. It is highly likely that I have not thought of Picasso until confronting his portrait since I have no warm disposition or love toward him. This example accords well with the statement of Socrates' that the most obvious recollection is of what one has forgotten for a while because he has not reviewed it lately (*mê episkopein*, 73e3).⁴⁴ This shows that one can recollect something which one does not like. Hence, the object of recollection is not confined to what one loves.

One might still regard it as an open possibility that, at least, enjoying recollection is restricted to things which one loves. I do not argue that the dialogue presents a sure answer of this possibility; yet, there is no confirmation in the text that it is the case. Furthermore, for me, it is likely that one who dislikes Picasso enjoys one's recollection of him while finding it pleasant to identify him as Picasso. Thus, it is not persuasive to restrict the scope of the recollection in order to assert that the experience of

⁴⁴ μάλιστα μέντοι ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο; (73e1-3)

Learning-A is pleasant because of its objects.

One might want to resist my assumption that there is only one and the same factor which makes every kind of recollection pleasant. That is, one might distinguish the recollection of the Forms (“Form-Recollection”) from the recollections of other things (“Ordinary-Recollection”), and suppose that the factor which makes the process of Ordinary-Recollection pleasant is different from the factor which renders the process of Form-Recollection pleasant. If this supposition were correct, it would be still an open possibility that the latter kind of recollection is pleasant because of its object.

I admit that my assumption is not provable. Yet, since it is not disprovable either, it is not allowed to proceed against what it addresses without any justification. If the supposition of my opponent were proved to be right, it would be justified to proceed against my assumption by insisting that the factor which makes, say, the recollection of the Just-itself pleasant is its object, while what makes the recollection of Picasso pleasant is something else. However, the supposition is entirely disprovable as well, so the possibility still remains open that Learning-A is pleasant not because of its object.

Let us now examine the second probable explanation of why the experience of Learning-A is pleasant: this kind of learning is pleasant because it is pleasant to recover one’s knowledge. Recovering one’s knowledge amounts to being refilled with

one's knowledge, so the explanation under consideration corresponds well with the so-called replenishment model, according to which pleasure consists in filling one's desire with its proper content. This model is the model which both the *Republic* and *Philebus* support, as I will show. Moreover, Socrates in the *Phaedo* seems to signal a commitment to this model, specifically when he sees a tight connection between desire and pleasure when he juxtaposes them while indicating that pleasure deludes one into believing that what is bodily is real (81b, 83b-c). Furthermore, the philosopher is by its definition one who loves (*philein*) wisdom, so it is plausible that the pleasure of learning taken in accessing wisdom consists in filling the philosopher's love of wisdom which is a sort of desire.⁴⁵

There is no confirmation that the *Phaedo* endorses the replenishment model mentioned above, so I do not maintain that the chain of presumption mentioned just above is provable. Yet, I admit that I find this to be very plausible, thus it is highly likely that the filling at issue is the key factor which makes the experience of Learning-A pleasant. If so, presumably, Learning-H is pleasant, since the purified soul at Hades satisfies its

⁴⁵ To my knowledge, Alieva is the only scholar who explains Rational Pleasure in the dialogue by recourse to what I have called the replenishment model. She asserts that the corresponding lack is *apistia* whilst the corresponding replenishment is *pistis* (Alieva 2018, pp.116-117.). I take it, however, that she disregards, that it is not the filling itself which is pleasant; rather, what is pleasant is to satisfy one's desire which is compared to either a lack or a recognition of it. That is, if it is pleasant to fill what is *apistia* with what is *pistis*, what is pleasant is not the filling itself but satisfying the desire of filling the lack. So, insofar as there is no signal indicating that there is a desire for filling *apistia*, it is not persuasive to consider that Rational Pleasure in the dialogue can be explained by the replenishment model.

desire for wisdom while learning several new things. Therefore, it is highly likely that Life-H is pleasant when the soul fills its desire for wisdom.

Yet, a further issue emerges if the experience of Learning-H is a process of satisfying one's desire for wisdom and is thus pleasant: Life-H is pleasant just temporarily. It is worth noting that the soul remains the same and unchanging when it departs into Hades and this state of the soul is called wisdom (79d). That is, it is noticeable that the purified soul attains what it has desired while it is embodied, i.e. wisdom, when it arrives at Hades. So, at some point, the soul at Hades does not desire wisdom any longer, which means that the soul no longer possesses the desire whose satisfaction it finds pleasant. Hence, presumably, Life-H is pleasant for a while, but it soon becomes pleasureless because there is no desire for wisdom to fill up. Accordingly, even in the best scenario, Life-H is pleasant just temporarily. And, even in this scenario, it is highly likely that there is no significant role for the pleasure of Learning-H, since the role the pleasure of Learning-A plays in Life-P is not needed in Life-H.

Let me now visit the eschatological myth, which one might read as evidence that Life-H is pleasant. To be more specific, one might draw the following two assertions from the myth: (i) the pleasure of observing the beautiful scenery in Hades constitutes the happiness of the Life-H; and (ii) there is the pleasure of observing the beautiful scenery in Hades. The myth states that those who are happy observe the beautiful sight in Hades with improved faculties. The earth which is observed from outside is pure and beautiful, and one who lives on the earth does not know how beautiful it is (109c7-

d5). Moreover, the purified soul surpasses the soul-body composite not only in its wisdom but also in hearing and sights (111b3-4). So, it can observe the planets as they are as well (111c1-2).⁴⁶ That is, the happy soul can observe the beautiful sights which it sees to the fullest degree. In view of this, one might interpret that the purified soul takes pleasure in observing them, since it may be pleasant to observe beautiful things. In addition, Socrates explicitly says that the beautiful earth is a sight for happy observers (111a1-3).⁴⁷ Thus one might be convinced that the purified soul is happy because one observes these things.

The line of reading of the myth mentioned above is not acceptable in part because the *Phaedo* does not provide any evidence that Socrates considers it necessarily pleasant to observe something beautiful. He does not relate *kalon* to pleasure in any passage of the dialogue. Moreover, as far as I know, there is no passage in other dialogues which supports the view that the beauty of sight *necessarily* offers pleasure. For instance, even though the *Phaedrus* 250d describes a virtuous soul's observation of the Form of the Beauty which must be absolutely beautiful, the passage is silent about whether this

⁴⁶ διὰ δὲ βραδυτητά τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφιγμένος μηδὲ ἑωρακώς εἶη, ἐκδύς καὶ ἀνακύψας ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὅσω καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὢν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου ἀκηκοώς εἶη τοῦ ἑωρακότος (109c7-d5) (...) καὶ ὅψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι (111b3-4) (...) καὶ τὸν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρο ἀρᾶσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα (111c1-2).

⁴⁷ ἐκφανῇ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὄντα πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πανταχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν

observation is pleasant. Therefore, there is no sufficient evidence that the isolated soul in Hades is pleased when it observes beautiful things.

In addition, even if it were pleasant to observe the beautiful sight of heaven from a position in an elevated part of the earth, the pleasure derived from this observation would not constitute happiness. One might read 111a2-3⁴⁸ as meaning “with the result that seeing it (sc. the earth) is the sight of happy observers”, and so as a signal that seeing the earth makes those who observe it happy.⁴⁹ However, this reading is not appropriate, since the clause itself does not determine whether those who are already happy are allowed to observe the beautiful sight or whether the sight constitutes the observers’ happiness.⁵⁰ What is clear is merely that the observer is happy. Thus, even if observing the beautiful earth is pleasant, the pleasure which is derived from this observation may not constitute happiness of this life.

In conclusion, I maintain that the *Phaedo* is not clear on the issue whether Life-H is pleasant. To be more precise, I argue that it is likely that this life is pleasureless because of two points: (a) it is not proven that Learning-A is pleasant by virtue of its object; and (b) the eschatological myth says nothing about pleasure at Hades. I also argue that even if there were the pleasure of Learning-H just for a while, this pleasure would play

⁴⁸ ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν

⁴⁹ Sedley 1990, p.371, Rowe 1993, p.277.

⁵⁰ Fine 1990, p.388.

no important role in the life.

III. Conclusion

In Part 1 of the dissertation, I have investigated what kind of relation the *Phaedo* sees between two sorts of the good life and Rational Pleasure. The dialogue distinguishes two sorts of the good life. While alive, it is the best to live the Life-P as an embodied soul. By contrast, after death, it is the best to live the Life-H as the purified soul.

With respect to the Life-P, the philosopher has a sufficient reason to be keen on the pleasure of learning so as to keep his life correctly aligned. The philosopher is characterized by his correct belief about the true reality. Yet, as a body-soul composite, he risks losing his correct belief. This is because he cannot bodily pleasures which delude him, by suggesting that what is perceptible is real. Unlike bodily pleasures, Intellectual Pleasure helps him to retain his correct belief about the true reality. The pleasure of learning is the only kind of Intellectual Pleasure that the dialogue mentions. Accordingly, the pleasure of learning is instrumentally good in the Life-P in the sense that enjoying this pleasure helps one to retain this life.

In terms of Life-H, I have maintained that the goodness of Life-H is not constituted at all by pleasure. This is partly because there is no significant role for any pleasure to

play in the life at Hades, since the purified soul there can keep believing that the true reality is the intelligible without the need for enjoyment of pleasure which is taken in a contact with the Forms. In addition, this life even either lacks pleasure or is pleasant just temporarily, so far as we can understand from the text. This shows that Rational Pleasure does not have an impact on the goodness of this life, since this life as a good life would continuously have this pleasure if it had an effect on the goodness of this life.

In conclusion, in the case of the best life viable while alive, i.e. Life-P, a kind of Rational Pleasure, i.e. the pleasure of learning, plays a significant role. Yet, the role of Rational Pleasure in this life is merely instrumental. In other words, this pleasure has an instrumental value in the sense that one can keep living this kind of life with the help of this pleasure. So, this pleasure does not constitute the goodness of the Life-P. With respect to the supreme life, i.e. Life-H, we can maintain that pleasure has no impact on the goodness of this supreme life, either because that there is no pleasure at all in this life or because pleasure is something that exists merely temporarily in this life without playing any important role. Therefore, we can conclude that, according to the *Phaedo*, Rational Pleasure does not constitute the goodness of the good life in general.

Part 2: The *Republic*

One of the main questions the *Republic* wants to answer is why one should be just. Among the three proofs of the superiority of the just life to other kinds of life, the last two proofs appear to argue that the just life is the most pleasant form of the life, so it is the supreme (580d-587b). Because of this, we can expect to achieve a constructive view of how pleasure contributes to the good life by investigating these two proofs. In particular, we might hope to find a clear picture of how Rational Pleasure contributes to the good life, because these two proofs suppose that the just person is the philosopher. The dialogue defines the philosopher as one who loves to contemplate the truth (475e), or in other words, as one who knows the truth and what reflects it (502c). His life is characterized by the knowledge of the truth, thus we can presume that his life is the pleasantest because he takes pleasure in the truth. That is, presumably, his life is pleasanter than the lives of other people since he enjoys Rational Pleasure. Therefore, the dialogue is worth analyzing in order to examine how Rational Pleasure makes a contribution toward the good life.

I want to give a brief sketch of how I will go through the *Republic*. I will first identify what the good life is by proceeding through the following stages. I will first maintain that the just life is the good life. I will then argue that only the philosopher is just in a genuine sense. I will conclude that the just life has two modes since the philosopher has two main tasks: (i) the life of philosophizing; and (ii) the life of ruling the ideal-city (Chapter IV).

I will investigate how Rational Pleasure is related or contributes to the just life, i.e. the good life, by analyzing the second and third proofs of the superiority of the just life (Chapter V). I shall first visit the second proof and maintain that this proof argues the following proposition: the fact that someone who lives the just life, i.e. the philosophical life, finds his own life the most pleasant indicates that the life is arranged in accordance with the highest value. I shall then contend that the just person's preference for this pleasure to others shows that his life is arranged according to the highest value (V.1).

After this, I shall analyze the third proof (V.2). Hidden beneath the proof's general picture of pleasure is the question of how the proof understands the relation between Rational Pleasure and the good life. So, I shall first investigate the general picture of the proof and then examine the relation in question. To see this general picture, I will first scrutinize the nature of pleasure: pleasure consists in a psychological restorative process (V.2.1). I shall then argue that the proof maintains two distinct points (V.2.2). I will maintain that the proof's first point is that the just life is the best because it meets one's overall desire to the greatest possible degree, which is indicated by the fact that the pleasure which the just person mainly enjoys is pure, or to be more precise, not followed by pain (V.2.2.1). I will also demonstrate the second point that the just life is the supreme form of the life since the just enjoys the supreme pleasure of each element, which means that he meets his overall desire in the way that is conducive to justice (V.2.2.2.).

Based on the general picture of the third proof, I shall then explore how the proof understands the relation between Rational Pleasures and the two distinct modes of the good life (V.2.3.). I shall first revisit the two discrete points of the third proof and maintain that the preference for Rational Pleasures denotes a mode of living the good life (V.2.3.1). I shall then inquire into the association between Rational Pleasure and two distinct modes of the good life (V.2.3.2.). I shall first argue that there are two sorts of Rational Pleasure which one experiences while doing philosophy: (a) the pleasure of acquiring new knowledge; and (b) the pleasure of making latent knowledge obvious. I shall add that there is no evidence in the dialogue that either of them is impure (V.2.3.2.1.). I shall next claim that there are roughly two sorts of Rational Pleasure which one enjoys while ruling the ideal-city: (a) the pleasure of acquiring true beliefs; (b) the pleasure of revisiting latent knowledge. I shall add that the pleasure of achieving true beliefs is preceded by some pain when the philosopher first rules, but this is in fact no more than a harmless violation of the purity of Rational Pleasure (V.2.3.2.2.).

IV. The Just Life as The Good Life

Socrates in the *Republic* maintains that the just life is happy. The main part of the dialogue is sandwiched by Socrates' assertions that a just man lives well. In the beginning of the work, Socrates explicitly asserts that (1) it is a function of the soul to

live, (2) the just soul and the just man live well since justice is a good state of soul, and (3) one who lives well is happy (353d-354a). That is, he explicitly thinks that the just lives in a better way than the unjust man does (352d). In the very final part of the philosophical discussion, i.e. after comparing a just person to several other sorts of person, Socrates contends that the most just person is the happiest (580c). The dialogue is then concluded by Socrates' statement that the just lives well (621d). Plainly, Socrates is convinced that the just person is happy. Therefore, it is obvious that he equates the just life with the good life.⁵¹

But what is justice and why does the just person live well? This chapter will first answer this question (IV.1). This will then distinguish two distinct modes of the good life on the ground that the just person is the philosopher (IV.2).

IV.1. Why is the Just Life the Good Life?

The *Republic* regards the just human soul as the human soul in which each of the soul's three elements conducts its own job to the maximally just extent. Interestingly, the main interlocutors of the dialogue agree that things which are properly called just must

⁵¹ Like the *Phaedo*, the *Republic* not only illustrates a post-mortem life (614b-621b) but also declares that a philosopher will live well in Hades (621d). However, unlike the former, the latter neither considers that fully-fledged happiness is granted only in the after-life nor does it put much emphasis on the happiness of a philosopher's post-mortem life. So, I am convinced that the main interest of the latter dialogue is the life while one is alive, so I want to examine only this life while investigating the dialogue.

be so by virtue of the same feature (*eidōs*, 434d), and thus the just soul is similar to the just city in terms of its possession of justice (435a). To be more specific, Socrates explicitly mentions that a man who is properly called just is called just because the three elements (*eidē*) of his soul correspond to three distinct groups (*genē*) in the just city. (435b-c3). This implies that, just as the just city is just because each group conducts its own social work (*ergon*, 433a-434c), so is the just man just because each element of his soul conducts its own work.

So, what are these three elements? These elements are the reasoning (*logismos*) element, the appetitive element (*epithumêtikon*), and the spiritual element (*thumoeides*). Socrates starts his inquiry into these elements by raising the issue of whether one conducts each of the following three with one's entire soul or with a different element of the soul: namely, learning, being spirited (*thumousthai*), and having an appetite for something (*epithumein*) (436a-b). For my purposes, it is unnecessary to examine how he justifies the latter option and whether it is persuasive. Rather, it is enough to note here that, in 436a-444a, he displays the three main jobs or tasks of the soul and then allocates each job or task to a different element. Indeed, there is one element of the soul whose main job is learning, i.e. the reasoning element, there is another element whose main job is being spirited, i.e. the spiritual element, and there is the element whose main job is having an appetite for something, i.e. the appetitive element. So, basically, a just man is just because the reasoning element learns, the appetitive element is appetitive, and the spirited element is spirited.

In view of this, it is noticeable that Socrates considers human justice as the state in which each element of one's soul keeps to its own job *with respect to ruling and being ruled* (443b1-2).⁵² Just as the ruler-group of the just city rules and the other two groups are ruled (415a-d) so there is one element of the just soul which rules over the other two elements. Indeed, just as the ruler-group of the just city has the knowledge of how the city as a whole is in a good state (428c-d), so the reasoning element possesses forethought (*promêtheia*) for the soul as a whole (441e). This means that the element has to guide the other two elements (442a-c). Accordingly, human justice is a psychic harmony in which each element conducts its own job without interfering with another element (443c-444a). Hence, the main job of the reasoning element is not only learning but also ruling.

Now, we can answer why a just man is happy. Let us return to 353d-354a where Socrates maintains that (1) it is a function of soul to live, (2) a just man who has a good state of soul lives well, and (3) one who lives well is happy.⁵³ This passage alludes to the point that the just soul is the sort of soul which fulfills its own function,

⁵² Οὐκοῦν τούτων πάντων αἴτιον ὅτι αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἕκαστον τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει ἀρχῆς τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι;

⁵³ (1) Τί δ' αὖ τὸ ζῆν; οὐ ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι;

Μάλιστα γ', ἔφη. (353d9-10)

(2) Ἡ μὲν ἄρα δικαία ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἀνὴρ εὖ βιώσεται (353e10)

(3) Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γε εὖ ζῶν μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων (354a1)

i.e. living well, but the passage does not clarify why justice is the sort of virtue which is related to soul's functioning well as a whole. By contrast, my inquiry into justice so far has revealed that this virtue consists in each element of the soul conducting its own work. This first means that each element of the just soul has its own naturally good condition. Yet, the fact that each element is in a good state does not suffice to explain that the soul as a whole has its own good condition. Thus, it is worth noting that justice consists in a harmony between the three elements of the soul without which each element is unable to do its own work. That is to say, in a just soul, each element conducts its own work in a harmony with other elements, so the soul functions well as a whole. This means that the just man must live well because living well is the function of soul as a whole.⁵⁴ Therefore, the just life is the good life.

IV.2. The Two Sorts of the Just Life: The Life of Doing Philosophy and The Life of Ruling

The reasoning element as a ruler is responsible for creating justice, since it has to exercise control over the whole soul. So, obviously, this element ought to recognize or acknowledge what is good for the whole soul. Provided that learning is one of the main jobs of the element, we can consider that this learning is concerned with what is good

⁵⁴ I am more sympathetic to the standard reading that the ultimate end of being virtuous is *eudaimonia* (e.g. Annas 1981, Irwin 1995) rather than an alternative reading that the end is acting virtuously. (Vasiliou 2014, pp.605-614.). However, regardless of which reading is correct, it is obvious that one who has a just soul reaches at the ultimate end, so I can argue that the just life is the good life.

for the whole soul.

In light of this, given the distinction between knowledge (*epistêmê*) and belief (*doxa*), the issue emerges whether (a) it is sufficient for the reasoning element to have a true belief of what is good for the whole soul, or (b) it is necessary for it to have knowledge of what is good. Let me briefly explain the difference between knowledge and belief. Basically, Socrates considers both knowledge and belief as capacities (*dunameis*), which are distinct only in the case in which they are assigned to different things and in which they do different jobs. As sight and hearing are distinguished from each other because the two have different objects and do distinct jobs, knowledge and belief are differentiated by their objects and functions (477b-d). In terms of these objects, they are different from each other, since the object of the former is what-is (*to on*) whilst the object of the latter is the intermediate between what-is and what-is-not (*to mê on*). Also, with respect to consequences, they are distinguished from one another, because the former results in the true mental state that is infallible (*to anamartêton*) whereas the latter produces the state which is not (*mê to anamartêton*). That is to say, by employing the principle that that which “completely is” is “completely knowable” (*pantelôs gnôston*, 477a3) whilst that which “by no means is” (*mêdamêi ontos*, 477a8) is by no means knowable (477a2-8), it is concluded that knowledge is infallible whereas belief is merely sometimes infallible (477e).

Socrates regards that the philosopher is the only one who possesses knowledge in this specific sense. That is, he considers that the philosopher who loves every kind of

learning (474c-475c) is the only one who possess knowledge in this sense. The philosopher is described as one who loves to contemplate the truth (475e), and one who loves objects of cognition (*gnôsis*) (479e-480). That is to say, the philosopher is someone who sees (*idein*) the Form (*eidos*) of Justice and the Form of the Good, and is someone who is able to see Beauty-itself by itself, which is distinguished from beautiful things that partakes in it, like beautiful sounds and shapes (476a-c). The philosopher is one who believes and can see X-itself which is always and everlastingly the same (479a, e). He is passionately devoted to each of what-is by itself (480a).

Let me remind ourselves of the question with which I began my inquiry into the difference between knowledge and belief, namely whether the just reasoning element necessarily has the knowledge of what is good for the whole soul, or whether the element's having the correct belief of what is good for the whole soul is sufficient for its being just. Since one who possesses knowledge is the same as the philosopher, the question can be identified with another question, namely whether it is necessary for being just to be a philosopher.

My response to this question is “Yes”, since Socrates equates the just with the philosopher in Book IX (583a-b). Yet someone might consider that the reasoning element can reasonably control the whole soul without knowledge for a couple of seemingly good reasons. First, they might refer to those passages in the *Republic* which seem to imply that it is unnecessary to engage in philosophical activity in order to be just. For instance, they may want to refer to 442a-d which says that there is an

appropriate rulership in the soul of one who is trained by proper poetry and gymnastics, and then insist that this person is just in the sense that there is a psychic harmony in him or her. Also, they may want to refer to 442b-c where civic (*dêmotikê*) courage is defined as the preservation of a sort of law-inculcated belief. The ideal rulers attempt to insert civic virtue into the citizens in every way (500d-501b), so a citizen can be just in some sense by virtue of the attempt of the rulers. Therefore, it might be too strict and exclusionary to say that only the philosopher is just.⁵⁵

However, I maintain that, strictly speaking, only the philosopher deserves to be called just for two reasons. First of all, the philosopher is the only one who allows his reasoning element to fulfill its own task. Justice is defined not only in terms of psychic harmony but also in terms of each psychic element's doing its own work. I do not deny that one might have a psychic harmony in one's soul while having a correct belief of what is good for his soul. Yet, this belief comes not from his own reasoning or appreciating what is good, but rather from his obedience to the ruler or in what he is educated. Even if his understanding of goodness is not incorrect, his reasoning element would not conduct its job to the fullest extent, since it neither reasons nor appreciates what is good by itself. To do this, the element has to engage in learning the Good-itself, but it does not do that. In other words, the reasoning element of someone who merely has the correct belief of what is good neither reasons nor appreciates what is good nor

⁵⁵ A couple of scholars hold this line of interpretation. See, for instance, Kamtekar 2004 and Vasiliou 2008, pp.254-267.

does this person, through his reasoning element, learn the Form of that object. By contrast, the philosopher learns the Forms and then he appreciates what is good for his soul by himself. This means that his reasoning element conducts its tasks to the fullest extent. Accordingly, only the philosopher is just in a strict sense.

In addition, we have to note that Socrates distinguishes genuine virtue from civic virtue. This is illustrated when he sees a clear difference between genuine courage and civic courage. The former consists in the declaration of one's own reason about what is to be feared (442b-c), whilst civic courage consists in true belief about what is to be feared (430b-c). So, we can regard that genuine virtue consists in the declaration of one's own reason, whereas civic virtue consists in having a true belief by extending the difference between two kinds of courage. Accordingly, a person is just in a genuine sense only when his reasoning element has knowledge of what justice is from which he can declare his own reason of what is just. Therefore, only the philosopher who can reason what is just by himself is just in the genuine sense.⁵⁶

For Socrates, therefore, the philosopher is the only one who is just in a strict sense. This means that the just life is the same as the philosophical life. Hence, because the just life is equated with the good life, the inquiry into the good life is able to be identified with an examination of the philosophical life.

⁵⁶ For further justification of this line of interpretation, see Irwin 1995, pp.229-235 and Bobonich 2002, pp. 41-88.

In view of this, we have to note that there are two modes of the philosophical life. The first mode is the life of doing philosophy. The philosophical life consists in contemplation of the truth. By definition, the philosopher is someone who loves wisdom. To be more specific, he is someone who loves learning about everlasting essence (*ousia*, 485a-b). That is, he is someone whose desire is strongly inclined toward learning and, as a result of this focus, his other desires become feeble (485c-d). Indeed, he is a sort of person who retains his passion for what-each-thing-itself-is (*auto ho estin hekaston*) until he has grasped it and then begets knowledge (490a-b). In other words, the philosophical nature consists in the practice which is appropriate for the nature which is akin to several virtues (494a-b), i.e. the complete participation in what-is (486e). So, the philosophical life consists in the contemplation of what-is (582c). Hence, doing philosophy is the characteristic mode of this life.

Second, even though the philosopher's love of wisdom makes him uninterested in ruling, the philosopher is forced to rule the ideal city (519b-521b). Let me start my inquiry into the philosopher as the ruler of the ideal city by examining the issue of the Form of the Good. According to Socrates, this Form is the most important thing to learn about (505a). This is because it is the cause (*aitia*) of both knowledge and truth. In particular, this is in part because, epistemologically speaking, one can know other Forms only with knowledge of the Form of the Good, and, ontologically speaking, this Form is what endows to the other Forms their being and essence (508b-509b). This is why this Form surpasses essence in dignity and power (509b) and it is the very last

thing which a prisoner in the Analogy of the Cave sees (516b). In short, the Form is the ultimate object of the knowledge which the philosopher possesses. More importantly, every other thing becomes useful and advantageous by virtue of the Form of the Good (505a-b), so the knowledge of it enables one to cognize why other things like just and fine things are good (506a-b). Thus, the philosopher who has the knowledge of this Form possesses the ultimate reference point not only for what is good for his soul as a whole but also for what is good for the city. In other words, there is a clear model in the soul of the philosopher to which he can refer while establishing conventions about what is just, fine, and good (484c-d). As one who knows the Form at issue, he must know that the city is best ruled when he rules it as well.⁵⁷ The philosopher is also one who has seen the truth about fine and good things and thus knows each image for what it is (502c). Accordingly, despite his lack of interest in ruling, the philosopher has to rule his city in turn although he spends most of his time in contemplation (540a-b). Therefore, ruling is the second mode of the happy life.

V. Rational Pleasure and The Just Life

In the *Republic*, Socrates argues that the just life is happy. For this reason, the issue of

⁵⁷ Most scholars argue that knowledge of the Forms by itself provides motivation for the knower (e.g. Cooper 2004 pp.265-269; Kraut 2006). To my knowledge, the only exception is Vasiliou 2016, pp.23-29.

the relation between Rational Pleasure and the good life in the dialogue is the same as the issue of how this pleasure is associated with the just life. To be more specific, given that the just life is equated with the philosophical life which has two distinct modes, the issue emerges as to how this pleasure relates to the two modes of the philosophical life.

Book IX makes us expect that we can discover Socrates' detailed answer to this question in this book. The book contains the second (580d-583a) and third proofs (583b-588a) of the claim that the just life is the supreme life. These proofs deal with pleasure while arguing that the life viable only to the philosopher is the most pleasant. Accordingly, even though Socrates does not explicitly consider the distinction of the good life while investigating pleasure, in order to scrutinize how Rational Pleasure is related to the good life, there is every reason to read these proofs very carefully with this issue in mind.

However, before giving my reading of the two proofs, it is necessary to note that these proofs may look redundant, because, as chapter IV showed, Socrates seem to succeed in showing that the just life is good without any serious consideration of pleasure. Furthermore, many scholars have seen several points in the dialogue, which might imply that pleasure plays no significant role in the good life, although the good life includes many pleasures. Indeed, a couple of scholars have rejected accepting the second and third proofs on their own. This is first because the arguments which apparently maintain that the just life is the happiest since it is the pleasantest, seem to

be hedonistic, although, obviously, Socrates in this dialogue is not a hedonist.⁵⁸ In addition, according to the doctrine of the central books, it is clear that anything which is good is good only by virtue of its relation to the Form of the Good, and thus what the second proof argues seems inconsistent with this main claim.⁵⁹

One way to make the two proofs compatible with the main part of the dialogue is to argue that these proofs only aim at revealing that the just life does not sacrifice pleasures by showing how pleasant it is, while stressing at the same time that Socrates does not explicitly take into account how pleasures contribute to happiness.⁶⁰ That is to say, some scholars assert that the two proofs are not interested in the role which pleasure plays in a good life. However, Socrates makes it very explicit that the two proofs are intended to prove the supremacy of the just life (580c11-12, 583b1-7). Therefore, it is unsatisfactory not to see any significant connection between the good life and pleasure.

The other popular non-hedonistic reading of the proofs is to say that the proofs dialectically show that the just life is the best life, based on premises endorsed by Socrates' discussants. For instance, some scholars assert that the two proofs aim at answering the question of Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, whether justice is good

⁵⁸ Kraut 2006, p.313.

⁵⁹ Gosling and Taylor 1982, pp.101-102.

⁶⁰ Murphy 1951, p.207; Kraut op. cit.

in itself, good for its consequences, or good in both these ways (367b-e), while interpreting that the question treats goodness as if it is about what satisfies human desires.⁶¹ As I will claim below in V.2.2.1, it is correct to read the third proof as an argument that the just life is the best in meeting human desires. However, the assertion at issue is unsatisfactory partly because it is unclear how these scholars interpret that the question under consideration implies the two interlocutors' supposition that what is good is related to satisfying human desire.

Let me now introduce another way to read the proofs as Socrates' dialectical response to his interlocutors' questions. One may argue that pleasure is a part of the fundamental question of the dialogue by referring to 364a where Adeimantus reports that there is wide agreement that justice is fine (*kalon*) and difficult (*chalepon*) whereas injustice is pleasant (*hêdu*). This passage points to the fact that Socrates' opponents believe that the unjust life is pleasant whereas the just life is not, so Socrates may have to prove that the just life is the most pleasant.⁶² I agree that Socrates has to rebut his opponents' beliefs that the just life is not pleasant. Yet, Socrates does not need to spend much time revealing that the just life is the pleasantest, if he merely wanted to rebut the general agreement that the just life is laborious. This is because showing that this life is not painful suffices to refute this agreement.

⁶¹ Gosling and Taylor, p.103.

⁶² Butler 1999, pp.44-45.

I will inquire into how the two proofs succeed in revealing the supremacy of the just life by reading them very carefully. I will then claim that enjoying Rational Pleasure, rather than other sorts of pleasure, is a marker of living the good life. For the moment, let me briefly note how the two proofs show the superiority of the just life without a hedonistic commitment: first, according to the second proof of the superiority of the just life, the preference for Rational Pleasure as possessed by the just person indicates the highest value of the just life; and second, the third proof points to (a) that only a just person satisfies his overall desire almost entirely, and (b) that he is the only person who satisfies his overall desire as the way of undergirding his justice.

V.1. The Second Proof of The Supremacy of The Just Life (580d-583a)

The aim of this section is to show that, according to 580d-583a, one's life-long preference for Rational Pleasure over other kinds of pleasure signifies that he follows the highest value, namely that he lives the supreme life, whether he contemplates the Forms or rules over the ideal-city. I will first briefly go through the passage. I will then make it clear that the philosopher's praise of his own life in terms of its pleasantness reveals that this life is settled in accordance with the highest value and because of that it is the supreme life.

Let me briefly summarize the passage. The passage argues in three steps that the just life is the pleasantest: (1) each sort of person claims that his own life is the pleasantest; (2) the philosopher, i.e. the just person, is the only qualified judge of the extent of

pleasure that there is in one's own life; and (3) the just life is the pleasantest. Let us dive into the passage a little bit deeper. The passage starts with a reconfirmation of the threefold division of the human soul by Socrates: a human soul is comprised of the reasoning, the spirited, and the appetitive elements. He then makes a distinction between three sorts of pleasure, each of which belongs to a different element of the soul. The appetitive element enjoys a diversity of desires (*epithumia*), but the pleasure and love which one finds in it are characterized in terms of profit, since money is the main means of satisfying its desires. The spirited and reasoning elements of the soul also enjoy pleasures in what each of them loves and strives toward (*hormêsthai*), the former 'victory and honor', and the latter 'the truth, learning and wisdom.' So, everyone can belong to one of the three kinds in terms of which element is dominant in him: wisdom-lovers, victory-lovers, and profit-lovers. Each of these three kinds of people would assert that his own life is the most pleasant whilst looking down on the two kinds of pleasure to which he is less committed. In view of this, it is agreed that the proper way of judging who is correct is by the three following criteria: experience (*empeiria*), prudence (*phronêsis*), and rationality (*logos*). Socrates then proves that the philosopher is the only licensed judge in accordance with these three criteria: he alone has experienced all three representative pleasures; he is the only one who possesses experience accompanied by prudence; rationality is the main instrument of use by him. Therefore, the just life, i.e. the life of a philosopher, is the pleasantest, since the only trustworthy judge, i.e. the philosopher, argues that his own life is the most pleasant.

To argue that pleasure under consideration indicates what one values, let me deal with

a common rebuttal of the second proof. It may be a common intuition that pleasure is merely something subjective to which the individual has privileged access, so many scholars have doubted that there can be objective standards for judging which life is the most pleasant. That is, several scholars have regarded that there is no means of adjudicating between the disagreements across such different preferences, since pleasure is something private and individual for each person.⁶³

However, Socrates in the *Republic* sometimes uses the term ‘pleasures’ to denote pleasant activities rather than pleasant moods or feelings (505c, 581d).⁶⁴ Also, pleasure in the proof belongs to a sort of life (581c7, 583a6-7), so the assessment of it involves a long-term evaluation over one’s whole life.⁶⁵ So, the pleasure in question is not a short-term sensation or feeling which may be subjective. That is, the pleasure at issue is different from a merely agreeable feeling or sensation which is a particular kind of *quale*.⁶⁶

Yet, it is still unclear in what sense this pleasure is objective, and it also remains

⁶³ e.g. Cross and Woosley 1964, pp. 265-266; White 1979, pp. 227-228; Gosling and Taylor 1982, pp. 320-330; Taylor 2008, p. 171.

⁶⁴ Gibbs 2001, pp.9-10.

⁶⁵ Annas 1985, pp.308-309; Russell 2005, p.123; Reeve 1988, p.145.

⁶⁶ Following Crane, I use the term ‘qualia’ (single: ‘quale’) to refer to the non-intentional property “whose instantiation explains (or partly explains) the phenomenal character of” (Crane 2001, p.76.) sensory states.

questionable whether there can be object criteria for judging its degree. In view of this, I shall maintain that the pleasure in question indicates what one sort of person values the most, meaning that the degree of this pleasure amounts to the objective value of that which makes one pleased.⁶⁷

To see that pleasure at issue is a value indicator, it is necessary to observe that the pleasure in question shows what one loves and desires. At first, we can observe this by examining how Socrates introduces the particular pleasure of each element of the soul, at 580d3-581b11. This passage begins with Socrates' statement that each element has its own pleasure, desire and domination (*archê*, 580d6-7). He then names each of the three elements in accordance with its own function, i.e. that by which one learns, that by which one is spirited, or the appetitive element (580d-e). Then, with respect to the final element, he proceeds further by denoting this element as money-loving and arguing that its pleasure and love (*philos*) are concerned with profit, since money is the main means of satisfying its numerous desires (580e2-581a7). This shows that one element of the soul loves that which satisfies its own desire. It is also revealed that that which satisfies the element's own desire offers the particular pleasure of this element. In short, the particular pleasure of this element of the soul reflects its peculiar desires

⁶⁷ My reading of 580d3-583a11 is deeply indebted to Russell (Russell 2005, pp.121-127.) who first reads that the pleasure at issue is a value-indicator. Yet, he does not give a sufficient textual analysis for his consideration. Moreover, he is silent on 581e5-582a1, which seems to be incompatible with his reading of the proof. Furthermore, unlike me, he licenses the just as the sole respectful judge only in accordance with the three criteria mentioned in the second half of the proof, but he does not investigate whether they are reliable with a view to his interpretation of the proof.

and loves.

In light of this, we can read Socrates' illustration of the other two elements (581a9-b12) as alluding to the claim that the particular pleasure of one element reflects its values. From the confirmation that the spirited element always strives for mastery (*archê*), victory (*nikê*), and fame (*timê*), he draws an inference that this element loves victory and fame. Provided that everyone chooses what he believes to be good (505d-506a), then what this element will strive for is the same as what it believes to be good. So, given that the object of this element's love is the same as the object it strives for, we can presume that it loves what it believes to be good. Thus, it is highly likely that the particular pleasure of this element reflects what it believes to be good, given that, in the case of the appetitive element, this element takes pleasure in the object it loves. In view of this, it is worth noting that Socrates describes the element that loves learning and wisdom as that by which a human always inclines towards knowing where the truth lies, while caring (*melein*) least (*hêkista*) for money and fame. The use of the verb *teinesthai* (direct toward), which carries the meaning of 'pursuing' in this context, again clearly implies that what one element always pursues is the same as what it loves. This means that the calculative element loves what it believes to be good. In light of this, from the comparison of what this element inclines toward to what it cares for least, as well as from the fact that this element *always* pursues knowing where the truth lies, we can conclude that knowing where the truth lies is not simply what this element seeks: it is what it cares about the most. Thus, we can infer that what one cares about most is identical to what one values the most. Accordingly, it is reasonable to consider

that one element of the soul pursues what it values the most. Owing to this, the particular pleasure of one element reflects what it values the most.

In this context, Socrates divides every person into three distinct groups in accordance with which element of the soul is authoritative within him. It is worth noting that, at the beginning of the proof, he names each of these three elements in accordance with its own function, e.g., that by which one learns. Now Socrates labels each group of *people* according to the object that is predominant within that specific group. This gives rise to the respective groupings of wisdom-lovers, victory-lovers, and profit-lovers (581c1-5).⁶⁸ That is, each of the defining loves of the different elements of the soul represents the kind of people within whom it is hegemonic. Accordingly, because the characteristic love of an element reflects what it values the most, it is reasonable to regard that each kind of person lives his life regulated by that which is the most dominant element of the soul, which in turn gives rise to that person's values. In other words, each kind of person betrays a way of life that accords with their value-system, as determined by the most dominant element in the soul, whose beliefs about the good prevail in the person as a whole.

Socrates affirms that there are three specific kinds of pleasure, one belonging to each group of people (581c7). Each group is determined by his primary object of love, so

⁶⁸ White 1979, pp. 226-227.

the particular pleasure of each group of people is intertwined with the principle of value he follows. This principle is represented by his main object of love, thus one's answer to the question of which life is the most pleasant will reflect their main object of love, following the relationship between pleasure, love, and value as discussed. In other words, the kind of life one finds the most pleasant is an objective indicator of what one loves the most, i.e. what one values the most. So, the fact that each kind of person insists that his own life is the most pleasant (581c8-11) indicates that each kind of person finds his own life the most valuable in the sense that it follows his own highest value. In conclusion, the kind of life one finds the most pleasant reflects one's value-system, which thereby dictates the direction of one's life and patterns of striving.

This line of reading is supported by how each kind of person praises his own life as the most pleasant, while also looking down on the kinds of pleasure to which he is uncommitted. Each of the two kinds of non-philosopher counts his own life as the most pleasant because the characteristic pleasure of their lives contributes to achieving the objects of their respective affections. The money-lover praises his own life as the most pleasant while assessing the other kinds of pleasure as valueless (*oudenos axian*), insofar as he does not earn money by virtue of them (581c11-d3). The lover of fame exalts his own life as the most pleasant while discounting the other two kinds of pleasure as vulgar (*phortikê*), smoke (*kapnos*), and nonsense (*phluaria*) since they do not afford him any fame (581d5-8). This clearly shows that a non-philosopher counts his life as the most pleasant because only this life is devoted to the kind of pleasure that contributes to actualizing what he believes to be the highest value.

That is, he judges how pleasant his own life is with reference to the contribution his characteristic pleasures make towards realizing his most valued good. Accordingly, the pleasure that belongs to a certain sort of life is not subjective but objective, in the sense that the kind of life one finds most pleasant reflects one's value-system, which organizes and impels the activities of one's life.⁶⁹ Therefore, I argue that one's preference for a certain sort of pleasure constitutes an indicator of what one values the most, because one's desire and love reflect one's thought on what is best.

Whether my reading so far is right, someone might be reluctant to accept that pleasure can be a value indicator. That is to say, one might try to object to Socrates if I have correctly spelled out what he implies in the second proof. Yet, it is not absurd at all to consider pleasure in this way. Suppose that you are asked when was the most pleasant moment of your whole life. If your answer is the moment in which you first met your wife, undoubtedly, this answer clearly shows how valuable your wife is to you. In addition, you may find it more pleasant to read Plato's *Republic* than to play basketball, even though you enjoy both of them. Both activities are enjoyable or pleasant not in the sense that you find a greatly agreeable feeling in doing them, but in the sense that you heedfully focus on engaging in them without resistance. That is, if you allow yourself to enter into reading the dialogue, you will find that your activity of reading

⁶⁹ By clarifying the objective sense in which one kind of life is more pleasant than another, we can also resolve any doubts one might have regarding the claim that the one who has experienced the entire range of pleasures may not find the pleasure of the calculative element the most pleasant (e.g., Gosling and Taylor 1982, p.327; Purshouse 2006, p.122).

is pleasant. This pleasure shows that you find this dialogue worth reading, which indicates your value-system. This is because it is this system which makes you find the work precious. Accordingly, finding it more pleasant to read the dialogue than to play basketball amounts to finding the former more valuable than the latter. Therefore, the following claim is not bizarre: one's assessment of which sort of pleasure is the pleasantest stands as an indication of one's value-system.

Moreover, one might want to refute my reading above while considering that it is incompatible with 581e5-582a1,⁷⁰ in which Socrates seems to insist that value is not the issue of his second proof of the point that the just is the happiest:⁷¹ “I said that since the pleasures of each kind and the lives themselves dispute with one another – not about which life is finer or more shameful or better or worse – but about which is more pleasant and less painful, how are we to know which of them is speaking the absolute truth?”⁷² So, it is now needed to be shown if my interpretation is compatible with 581e5-582a1.

The sentence at issue distinguishes between (a) judging the just life with respect to

⁷⁰ “Ὅτε δὴ οὖν, εἶπον, ἀμφισβητοῦνται ἐκάστου τοῦ εἶδους αἱ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ βίος, μὴ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον ζῆν μηδὲ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ ἄμεινον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἥδιον καὶ ἀλυπότερον, πῶς ἂν εἰδεῖμεν τίς αὐτῶν ἀληθέστατα λέγει;

⁷¹ White 1976, p.229 and Gosling and Taylor 1982, p.102 read Socrates' question in this way.

⁷² Unless stated, my translation of the *Republic* follows Reeve 2006 with slight modifications.

what is beautiful and good and (b) judging it with regard to pleasure. On the one hand, the main interlocutors have discovered a sufficient ground for praising the just life in terms of what is fine and what is good. If there is a dispute as to which life has to take the top rank with respect to these two standards, it is obvious that the philosopher ought to adjudicate and then resolve the dispute, because he can make a correct judgment by referring to the Forms of Beauty and the Good, which he knows. Moreover, provided that the just man corresponds to the fine city (*kallipolis*, 527c2) and the best state (*aristokratia*, 544e7-8), and provided that he is recognized as the best person (580b9-c1, *ariston*), it is evident that the just life is the best in terms of these two standards. This indicates that no more argument is needed to prove that the philosophical life is the supreme life with respect to these two criteria.

On the other hand, it is not obvious who should be the judge of the dispute at issue, i.e. which sort of the life is the most pleasant, because no consensus has been established on how to deal with the issue concerning pleasure, since the judgment on pleasure is an entirely new issue. Furthermore, the fact that the pleasure in question is something objective does not automatically license the philosopher to be the decision-maker on the issue related to pleasure, because it is not evident that his knowledge of the Forms equips him to be the proper decision-maker on this topic. Hence, until the standards for judging the claims about pleasure are confirmed, Socrates cannot be convinced that whoever speaks truly among the three sorts of person, when each claims that his own life is the most pleasant. So, he can ask who really is the qualified judge of whose life is the pleasantest. Accordingly, 581e5-582a1 does not indicate that

Socrates is not interested in value any longer.

In view of this, I want to emphasize again that my inquiry into the second proof has so far revealed Socrates' interest in the question of value. That is, the second proof is interested not in which life is the pleasantest in a quantitative sense, but rather in which life is the most valuable. This is because the disagreement on which life is the most pleasant reveals a disagreement on what is really valuable way, in accordance with the way which one chooses to manage one's life. Plainly, there is an objectively correct answer to the question of which is the best way in which one should arrange one's life, so we can look for an objectively qualified judge of whose answer is true when everyone claims that his own life is the pleasantest.

In this context, in the rest of the proof, Socrates first offers three standards that enable one to decide whose claim is correct, i.e. experience, prudence, and rationality. There is no guarantee that the philosopher is well-equipped to utilize any of them,⁷³ so Socrates next goes on to show that the philosopher is superior to others in terms of being equipped with these three instruments. Finally, he concludes that the philosophical life, which is praised by the philosopher, is the pleasantest, meaning that this life is managed in accordance with the highest value.

⁷³ Russell ignores this point while merely arguing that "[t]here is a point to bringing experience, intelligence, and rational argumentation to bear on this decision." (Russell 2005, p.126.).

Let us now scrutinize Socrates' argument more carefully. First, the philosopher is the only person who has experienced all of the three kinds of pleasure (582b2-3), meaning that he is the only person who has tasted the three distinct values which constitute the three types of life. As an infant, he would have had numerous appetites, particularly the appetite for food and sleep. This signifies that he has experienced a life driven by appetitive value. The philosophers are selected out of the auxiliaries (412d2-414a7), i.e. the warriors whose highest value is victory or honor. This signifies that he also underwent a life driven by spirited value.

However, the philosophers do not *commit to* the activities and the values which constitute others' lives, and thus many scholars have been reluctant to be convinced by the second proof.⁷⁴ For instance, although the philosopher has experienced a life driven by appetitive desire, he has not been committed to extravagance to the degree that those who are tyrannical are committed to it. That is, he has never experienced appetitive pleasures in their most developed forms, which shows that he has not been committed to appetitive value to the highest degree. Thus, it seems a leery argument that the philosopher is a qualified decision-maker in terms of experience.

In view of this, it is noticeable that Socrates does not say that the philosopher has fully

⁷⁴ e.g. White 1979, p.227; Gosling and Taylor 1982, pp.328-329; Taylor 2008, p.171.

committed to every one of the three pleasures or values. What he says is merely that the philosopher is the only person who has experienced the three pleasures, and thus he has a wider base of experience of pleasure than do others (582a7-8, c2-3).⁷⁵ This merely shows that the philosopher is better equipped to judge which life is the most pleasant, *if* experience is the sole criterion for this judgment (582d2-3). That is, Socrates does not insist that the philosopher is the authoritative or perfect judge based only on his experience. Hence, clearly, whilst the philosopher has a wider scope of experience than others, he is not fully licensed to judge the highest value merely by his experience, since he has not experienced the value of the other two types to the same degree as have those for whom these values dominate and arrange their lives. What we can say is not that his judgement merely based on his experience is objective; rather, what we can say at most is that he is better than others in terms of one of the three criteria for deciding the pleasantest life, by virtue of his wider range of experience than others.

In regard to the second criterion, i.e. prudence, it is first notable that Socrates seems not to introduce prudence as an independent criterion for judging the most pleasant life. Rather, he seems to associate it with experience, by stating that the philosopher alone will have the necessary experience and prudence (582d4-5). It is at least clear that he affirms the coexistence of prudence with experience in the philosopher.

⁷⁵ τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀνδρῶν τίς ἐμπειρότατος πασῶν ὧν εἵπομεν ἡδονῶν; (.....) ἄρα μᾶλλον ἄπειρός ἐστι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονῆς ἢ ἐκεῖνος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν;

Moreover, in this statement, he stresses this coexistence of prudence by using "*mên*" and "*ge*" in front of "*meta*" and "*phronêseôs*", respectively.⁷⁶ This gives a hint that experience becomes a better criterion by conjoining it with prudence, which means that what Socrates argues is not that the philosopher is authoritative solely because of experience but that, given the experience of the philosopher accompanied with prudence, the philosopher is at least more trustworthy than others to determine the most valuable life.

So, what is the point of the conjoining of experience with prudence? Socrates does not say anything about it; however, we can presume that this conjoining provides the philosopher with the ability to reflect on the matter based on one's experience of alternatives. However wide and deep may be the philosopher's experience of two alternative values, his experience alone is significantly limited to enable him to be an appropriate decision-maker, because he is not fully informed about other values through his experience. Yet, he will be able to come to have legitimate imaginative understandings about other kinds of life and the values based on his experience if he is able to close the loopholes of his experience. Probably, prudence as a sort of rational capacity may be a tool for closing these loopholes. Prudence is first introduced as a rational capability for having a good relation to other countries (433b, cf. 428d). This implies that prudence is a sort of intellectual capacity with a practical purpose. In

⁷⁶ "He will be to only one who comes to be experienced with prudence (Καὶ μὴν μετὰ γε φρονήσεως μόνος ἔμπειρος γεγονώς ἔσται, 582d4-5).

addition, given that being prudent (*to phronêσαι*) means that one is either devoted to ends that are useful and beneficial, or useless and harmful (depending on whether the soul inclines towards reality (518d-e)), one can be prudent even when one lacks the philosopher's knowledge of reality. This also allows readers to wonder whether prudence involves a sort of rational capacity that is different from a theoretical capacity. So, it is not groundless to claim that prudence here bespeaks a rational capacity that enables one to rationally imagine or conjecture about other kinds of life, based on one's incomplete experience on them. Therefore, we might claim that the philosopher, who has the widest range of experience together with prudence, would have a good grasp of how pleasant, that is, how *valuable* each kind of life is to one who pursues it.⁷⁷

The philosopher has a proper view on each of the three different values on the basis of his wide experience and prudence. He then finally needs a capacity for discriminating three distinct values and then making a correct judgment on which life is arranged in accordance with the highest value. This capacity should be a sort of rational capacity; yet, it must be different from prudence. In view of this, I think Socrates introduces rationality as a discriminating capacity which is the main tool of the philosopher (582d). Rationality is equated with the capability of the reasoning element of deciding what to do while resisting the lure of the appetitive element (440b), so we can hold

⁷⁷ In short, I designate the sense that Annas assigns to 'experience' (Annas 1981, p.310) to the combination of experience and prudence.

that rationality compares different values which are admired by different elements of the soul, and then decides which is the most valuable. Thus, the philosopher whose rationality is fully-evolved by virtue of the fact that his reasoning element is entirely developed is equipped to judge which life is arranged by the highest value, insofar as he has a clear view on the two values pursued by the two sorts of life to which he is not committed. Accordingly, it is proven that the philosopher is the reliable decision-maker of which life revolves around the highest value.

Let me wrap up my inquiry into the second proof so far. When the just man claims that his own life is the most pleasant, what he is arguing is that his life is arranged by the highest value, since his preference for his own characteristic pleasure reflects his value-system. His argument is trustworthy because, as a philosopher, he is a qualified judge of which life revolves around the highest value. Therefore, the just life is superior to the unjust life because the former life is pleasanter than the latter life, in the sense that the value around which the former life revolves is higher than the value around which the latter life revolves.

So, what does the second proof show about the relation between Rational Pleasure and the good life? As the just person's characteristic pleasure which reflects his value-system is the pleasure of the reasoning element, his life-long preference of this pleasure to other sorts of pleasure, which belong to one of the other two elements, signifies that he lives the supreme life. The just individual is identified with the philosopher (581c); the proof considers the reasoning element as the element of

knowing the truth (581b); the pleasure of this element is repeatedly treated as the pleasure of gaining access to the truth (581d,e, 582a,c). So, the pleasure which the just individual, i.e. the philosopher, prefers is the pleasure taken in the truth, i.e. Rational Pleasure. Even when he does not pay attention to doing philosophy because of his duties as ruler of the city, he keeps this preference since he is identified by his wisdom. Thus, regardless of which mode of the just life he is living, his preference for Rational Pleasure marks that he lives well. Therefore, we can conclude that Rational Pleasure has its own place in the good life as a marker of its goodness.

V.2. The Third Proof of The Supremacy of The Just Life (583b-588a)

In the rest of this chapter, I shall now investigate the third proof of the superiority of the just life, in order to examine how Rational Pleasure is associated with, or contributes towards, the good life. For this investigation, let me first give a short summary of the proof. Socrates gives the third proof by briefly mentioning its main point that the pleasure other than that of the wise (*ho phronimos*) is neither true nor pure but illusory (*eskiagraphêmenê*). He adds that this proof itself is the most decisive (583b1-7). Roughly, the proof has two parts and an analogy which links them. The first part runs from 583b-584c. This part first distinguishes pleasure from calmness (*hêsuchia*, 583b-584a). This part then distinguishes pure pleasure from impure pleasure which is a relief (*appalagê*) from pain (584a-c). A topological analogy bridges this part with the second part by illustrating the two points made by the first part and introducing a connection between pleasure and filling-up (*plêrôsis*, 584c-

585a).⁷⁸ The second part first distinguishes true pleasure which consists in a filling-up of what-is-more (i.e. soul) with what-is-more (e.g. knowledge and true belief) from less-true pleasure, which consists in a filling-up of what-is-less (i.e. body) with what-is-less (e.g. nutrition). This part then sees that what-is-more partakes more in the pure being, what-is-always-the-same, and the truth than what-is-less does. Thus, the second part argues that the pleasure which consists in a filling-up of what-is-more with what-is-more is more really and truly pleasant than its counter-part (585a-586b). This part concludes that, unlike the unjust person who lives with pleasures being mixed with pain, the just person enjoys the supreme and truest pleasure of each element (586b-587a). Finally, the proof is wrapped up by confirming that the just life is far pleasanter and therefore better than other lives (587a-588a).

⁷⁸ Many scholars might be unsatisfied with my summary of the first part, since they regard that the part merely contrasts pleasure with calmness while believing that Socrates uses ‘cessation’ (*paula*) of pain and the relief (*appalgê*) from pain interchangeably (E.g. Gosling and Taylor 1982, p.110, 113.). However, I argue that the former is contrasted with pleasure (ἰδὲ τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγὼ, ἡδονάς, αἷ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν εἰσίν, ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις οἰηθῆς ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὕτω τοῦτο πεφυκέναι, **ἡδονὴν μὲν παῦλαν λύπης** εἶναι, 584a12-b2, emphasis is mine) whilst the latter is contrasted with pure pleasure (μὴ ἄρα πειθώμεθα **καθαρὰν ἡδονὴν** εἶναι **τὴν λύπης ἀπαλλαγὴν**, μηδὲ λύπην τὴν ἡδονῆς, 584b9-c1, emphasis is mine). I maintain that the former is not pleasure at all whilst the latter is a sort of pleasure but it is not pure. The following topological analogy (584c-585a) supports this line of interpretation. The analogy sees three different three positions: the upward (*to anô*), the middle (*to meson*), and the downward (*to katô*). The movement from the downward point to the middle point, which is compared to the relief from pain, shares the adjective *anô* (upward) with being at the upward point in the sense that it is an upward movement. This implies that both the movement and being at the upward point are compared to pleasures; yet, the former is not *anô* in the full sense because it happens in the downward realm and then is mixed with pain. For a good support of this line of reading, see Erginel 2011b, pp.290-292.

As this brief summary of the proof reveals, the proof does not pay special attention to Rational Pleasure. Yet, in V.2, I will argue that the proof involves an interesting view of how Rational Pleasure is associated to the good life. To investigate what kind of role Rational Pleasure plays in the good life, this section will first examine the general picture of the relation between pleasure and the good life. I will start the examination of this general picture by showing that pleasure consists in the process of filling one's natural desire (V.2.1.). I will then maintain that there are two main points of the proof, although the text does not make it explicit that the proof contains two discrete points (V.2.2.). To be more specific, I will first claim that, according to the proof, the fact that the just person mainly enjoys pure pleasures signifies that he gratifies human desires the most and thus his life is the supreme (V.2.2.1.). I will then argue that, according to the proof, the fact that the just person enjoys the truest pleasure of each element, points to the fact that he satisfies the supreme desire of each element, which is the most conducive to the just state of his soul (V.2.2.2.).

On the basis of this general picture, I will then investigate what kind of role Rational Pleasure plays in the good life (V.2.3.). I will first claim that the just person's preference for Rational Pleasure shows the supremacy of his life, no matter what mode of the just life he lives (V.2.3.1.). I will then scrutinize what kind of role Rational Pleasure plays in each of the two modes of the just life (V.2.3.2.). To be more specific, I will contend that there are two kinds of Rational Pleasure which are characteristic of the life of doing philosophy: (i-1) the pleasure of acquiring knowledge and (i-2) the

pleasure of making latent knowledge obvious. I will also maintain that both kinds of pleasure are pure (V.2.3.2.1.). I will argue that the life of the ideal ruler possesses two kinds of Rational Pleasure as well: (ii-1) the pleasure of filling oneself up with true belief and (ii-2) the pleasure of revisiting existing knowledge. I will also maintain that, although one sort of (ii-1) is preceded by pain, this is a harmless violation (V.2.3.2.2.).

V.2.1. Pleasure as a Psychic Filling-up process of One's Desires

In this section, I shall claim that, according to Socrates in *Republic* IX, pleasure consists in the psychic process of filling up one's desires. Let me first argue that a thing's appearance of being pleasant does not suffice to make it actually pleasant.⁷⁹ In 583b-585a, Socrates distinguishes three psychological states: pleasure, pain (*lupê*), and calm (*hêsuchia*). The first two are then understood as belonging to movement (*kinêsis*), whereas calm is a psychological stillness. Although there is a clear difference between movement and stillness, pleasure may be mistaken for calm. For instance, when one is sick, he may argue that the state of being healthy is pleasant; yet, this state is a state of calm, so his argument is a mistake. The patient sometimes makes this mistake, perhaps because the calm appears to be pleasant when his present pain is juxtaposed with it. In addition, someone might regard that the essence of pleasure is the cessation (*paula*) of pain (584b). That is, just as one who is moved to and then stands at the middle point cannot help judging that he himself is moved to and then

⁷⁹ Socrates uses the terms like "*phainethai*" (584a7) and "*phantasma*" (584a8) to express what appears to be pleasant.

stands at the upward point, so the process of coming to be calm from a previous state of pain may appear to be pleasant while being compared to one's previous painful state (584d-585a). So, we can see that calm and pleasure may share the same *qualia* in a certain situation. That is, what it is like for a subject of experience to undergo calm may be the same as what it is like for him to experience pleasure when calm is compared to pain.⁸⁰ However, the state of calm is different from that of pleasure, thus pleasure consists not in its appearance, i.e. its *qualia*.

The cessation of pain as bringing about a state of calm may appear to be pleasant when it is compared to the previously painful state. So, we can presume that pleasure *per se* must appear to be pleasant without any comparison with a previous or later state. If so, what is the core of the nature of pleasure which differentiates pleasure from what merely appears to be pleasant? That is to ask, what is the core of pleasure which makes it appear to be pleasant by itself? To answer this question, let us return to how Socrates distinguishes calmness from pleasure and pain.

Socrates explicitly states that calmness consists in a stillness, whereas pleasure and pain consist in movement (583e9-584a3). As we see above, calmness can be accompanied by a pleasant appearance, so the sort of movement which is the definitive factor of pleasure is distinguished from that which constitutes this appearance. Just as

⁸⁰ Socrates refers to pleasures and calms which are misunderstood as pleasures by using qualitative terms like "intense" (*sphodra*) and "great" (*megethos*) (Wolfsdorf 2013, p.67.).

one who stands at the middle point judges that he is at the upward point, so does one who confuses calmness with pleasure judge that his own psychological state is pleasant. Thus, the definitive movement of pleasure is different from a judgement that he himself is pleased. Also, whether or not appearing to be pleasant is the same as having an agreeable feeling, sensation, or any other cognitive experience, the movement is distinct from this phenomenon. So, what is this characteristic movement?

I maintain that Socrates implicitly identifies the movement in which pleasure consists with a sort of psychological filling-up. He first tacitly connects pleasure with a sort of filling by implying the simultaneous experience of pseudo-pleasure and filling: “(...) they [sc. those who are moved from the painful state to the middle state] firmly think that they have reached both filling and pleasure? Like people who compare black to gray without having experienced white, don’t they compare pain to painless while being inexperienced in pleasure, and so get deceived?” (585a2-3).⁸¹ One who is moved to the middle state, i.e. calm, from the painful state is likely to mistake that she is pleased and filled in some sense. Presumably, if she did not regard that her being pleased coincides with her being filled up, she would not make such a mistake. So, we can presume that she believes that her being pleased comes about with her being filled up. In addition, given that filling is a sort of movement, it is plausible that filling she believes to have in herself while not-having is the determinant movement of pleasure.

⁸¹ σφόδρα μὲν οἴονται πρὸς πληρώσει τε καὶ ἡδονῇ γίνεσθαι, ὥσπερ πρὸς μέλαν φαιὸν ἀποσκοποῦντες ἀπειρίᾳ λευκοῦ, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην ἀφορῶντες ἀπειρίᾳ ἡδονῆς ἀπατῶνται;

This is because her mistake is to believe that she undergoes a certain movement although actually she does not, provided that pleasure consists in a movement whereas calmness does not. Accordingly, it is highly likely that the movement she believes to have while not-having, i.e. filling-up, is what is determinant for pleasure.

Let us investigate what kind of filling Socrates is concerned with. Logically, an act of filling-up needs a prior empty state, so we can understand what kind of filling he cares about by examining the kinds of emptiness which the filling is related to. In 585a8-c2, Socrates describes two distinct sorts of emptiness and filling. On the one hand, he mentions bodily emptiness using the example of hunger and thirst. That is to say, one sort of filling that is regarded as coming about with pleasure is a filling of bodily needs which can be fulfilled by, for instance, bread, drink, etc. On the other hand, Socrates mentions that there is an emptiness of the soul, e.g. ignorance and folly (*aphrosynê*). So, the second is the other sort of filling which is regarded as coming to be with the other sort of pleasure: a filling of a kind of psychological emptiness which can be fulfilled by true belief, knowledge, intelligence (*nous*), and virtue. Socrates finally confirms that being filled (*plêrousthai*) with what is naturally proper is pleasant (585d11). This signifies that food, drink, etc. are naturally proper fillers of the body, a pleasure occurs when the body is filled with them; whereas, true beliefs, knowledge, etc. are naturally appropriate fillers of the soul. In conclusion, every pleasure is to be understood in such a way as to contain three components: (i) that which is filled, the empty container (e.g. the body and soul); (ii) that which is naturally appropriate to fill (i) (e.g. food or knowledge); and (iii) the filling itself (e.g. eating and learning).

Pleasure consists in a filling of a sort of container with a sort of filler. To be more precise, I argue that pleasure consists in a satisfaction of one of the three elements of the soul. Apparently, true beliefs, knowledge, etc. are introduced as the natural fillers of the soul. Yet, strictly, they are fillers of the reasoning element of the soul, because they satisfy the desire of learning in a loose sense which belong to this element which loves learning (581b). So, a pleasure is experienced by the reasoning element of the soul when its desire is met by certain fillers. Also, Socrates makes it explicit that the spirited element, which desires victory and honor (581b), necessarily experiences a pleasure when it is filled with honor, victory, and anger, which satisfy its desire of honor (586c-d). In this context, we have to note that the pleasure of eating is associated not only with one's individual bodily need but also with the desire of eating. This pleasure occurs when the desire for eating is satisfied, thus we can consider that the pleasure of eating occurs when a desire of the appetitive element is filled, because this desire must belong to the appetitive element. Accordingly, every pleasure occurs when one's desire is filled, since every pleasure belongs to one of the three elements of the soul in which human desire resides. Thus, pleasure consists in a psychological filling of one's desire. Therefore, the movement which distinguishes pleasure from calm is the psychological filling of one's desire.⁸²

⁸² A couple of commentators interpret that the definitive psychic movement of bodily pleasure is the awareness of bodily filling (e.g. Erginel 2006, p.449; Wolfsdorf 2013, p.49.). I admit that one needs to be aware of bodily filling to enjoy bodily pleasure, not only because this is intuitively convincing but also because Socrates states that this pleasure reaches the soul through the body (583e, 584c). Nevertheless, I am against this interpretation. This is partly because, on this interpretation, the

My examination of pleasure so far has shown that pleasure consists in a psychological filling; yet, this is insufficient in itself to pin down the nature of pleasure, since the term '*plêrôsis*' which I have translated as 'filling', has a twofold meaning, i.e. (1) the state of fulfilment; and (2) the process of filling. With this in mind, one might consider that Socrates is entertaining the double meaning of this word; however, he would be committing the fallacy of equivocation if this consideration were correct. Hence, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the word to have a more precise picture of what pleasure is.

Unfortunately, it is not obvious at first glance what the term exactly means in this context of the dialogue.⁸³ Yet, I argue that it is more preferable to understand '*plêrôsis*' as a process of filling, rather than as a state of being filled, for three reasons. First of all, if the term signified a 'state', we would have to find another movement in which pleasure consists, since '*plêrôsis*' with this meaning is not a movement. On the other hand, we have already seen what kind of movement pleasure consists in if the term

movement which differs bodily pleasure from calm, i.e. the awareness of bodily filling, is different from the movement which differs both the pleasures of the reasoning and spirited elements from calm, i.e. psychological fillings. I believe that the movement must be of the same sort in all kinds of pleasure, since 'movement' is the definitive feature of pleasure. More importantly, as Wolfsdorf admits (Ibid.), there must be an awareness of calmness as well, so it would be odd, on this interpretation, to consider calmness as that which is absent of any movement.

⁸³ Gosling and Taylor 1982, p.123; Erginel 2011a, p.497; Warren 2014, p.33.

indicates ‘movement’.

Second, it is highly likely that Socrates is thinking of ‘movement’ in the cases of eating and drinking (585a-b). I admit that, say, not only while eating but also after eating, one can be pleased. Yet, it is not always pleasant to have been filled completely and then, say, have no hunger at all. By contrast, we have every reason to regard that undergoing a process of satisfying one’s hunger is pleasant. Thus, in the case of bodily *plerôsis*, it is highly likely that Socrates is interested in the process of filling rather than the state of fulfilment. The filling model is confirmed by extending the analysis of the pleasures of eating and drinking while admitting that one who uses his intelligence is filled (585b). Thus, we can presume that every pleasure consists in the process of filling.

Finally, the example of a patient who mistakes a healthy state for a pleasant state confirms that ‘*plêrôsis*’ means a sort of movement in this context. In the dialogue, bodily health is compared to justice which is fitting for the nature of the soul (444d-445b). This implies that bodily health is a state of the body which is fitting for its nature. In other words, bodily health does not fall short of the natural bodily state, so there is no deficiency or lack which a body has to fill up when it is healthy. This means that this state is a fulfilled state. Yet, Socrates explicitly judges that this fulfilled state is not pleasant but calm (583d-e). Accordingly, the ‘*plêrôsis*’ which constitutes pleasure must not be a fulfilled state but a process of filling.

V.2.2. The Two General Points of The Proof

The third proof of the superiority of the just life starts by indicating that the pleasure which is other than what the prudent person experiences is neither entirely true nor pure (583b2-4).⁸⁴ This opens up the possibility that the proof deals with two distinct issues, one of which is about true pleasure and the other of which is about pure pleasure. To be more specific, I take it that the proof first maintains that only the just person enjoys pleasures which are neither preceded nor followed by pain, given that the first part of the proof names the pleasures which are neither followed nor preceded by pain as pure pleasures (584b). We can also expect that this proof argues that only the just person experiences entirely true pleasure.

For now, it is just a conjecture that the proof cares about two issues, which I want to call the ‘purity issue’ and the ‘truth issue’, respectively, since it is not apparent that Socrates is actually examining two separate issues in one proof. Moreover, even if the proof does treat these two issues, it does not become clear how the proof proves that the just person is happy. This is because it is not clear at all how one’s experience of a certain sort of pleasure, i.e. true and pure pleasure, is associated with one’s happiness. To make matters worse, the proof does not explicitly spell out how one’s experience of a certain sort of pleasure has a significant effect on one’s happiness.

⁸⁴ ἄθρει ὅτι οὐδὲ παναληθὴς ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρὰ

In view of this, I want to prove that the proof *does* deal with two discrete issues, the purity issue and the truth issue, and that each issue is associated with a separate point that, taken together, shows the supremacy of the just life. In V.2.2.1, I shall investigate the purity issue. That is, in that section, I shall claim the following: the fact that the just person mainly enjoys pure pleasures shows that the just life satisfies one's overall natural desires to the greatest possible extent. I will argue that this means that the just life is the supreme life by one of the important standards for estimating a human life, namely by answering whether it meets a basic or set of basic human needs. In V.2.2.2., I shall examine the truth issue. In that section, I shall maintain that the supreme pleasure of one element of the soul is the pleasure of this element, which is most conducive to the just state of the soul. I shall then argue that the supreme pleasure of each element is the same as the truest pleasure of it. I shall conclude the chapter by contending that the just person who enjoys the truest pleasure of each element satisfies his overall desire in the most just-retaining way.

V.2.2.1. The Just Life Which Meets Overall Human Desire to The Greatest possible degree

Naturally, each element of the soul has its own desire (580d), so it is natural for a human to have several desires. This means that it is not really possible to lead a human life which is free from desires. It is also natural for a human being to want to satisfy these desires, as long as he or she perceives them. So, without satisfying them, a human being must undergo a sort of fundamental deficiency and thus he cannot live well. Therefore, it is an important issue for a good human life whether one can fulfill one's

overall desires while living it.

In view of this, it is notable that Socrates states the following: when one's desires are strongly inclined toward something, these desires come to be concerned with the one specific sort of pleasure which is related to what the desire is inclined to, and become weakly inclined towards other things, just like a stream which is diverted from an existing water-way (485d6-8).⁸⁵ This shows that there are several ways to distribute one's overall desire, so there are many ways to satisfy one's overall desire that correspond to the different ways of a stream's diversion. For instance, one may try to satisfy one's overall desire by transforming it mainly to strive for appetitive desires and then trying to fulfill them. Also, one may attempt to satisfy one's overall desire by transforming nearly a half of it to possess a desire for the reasoning element while the other half is transformed to strive for spirited desires. Thus, the division of people into three sorts in the second proof amounts to a division with respect to how one distributes his overall desire in order to satisfy it. That is to say, for example, we can consider that a victory-lover is one who tries to satisfy his overall desire by modifying most of it to strive for spirited desires and then attempting to fill these desires. In conclusion, given that one's overall desire can be distributed across three elements of the soul, one can attempt to satisfy it by giving the most proportion to one's most beloved element.

⁸⁵ ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτω γε εἰς ἓν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν, ἴσμεν πού τι εἰς τὰλλα τοῦτω ἀσθενέστεραι, ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκεῖσε ἀπωχέτευμένον

However, can one fulfill one's overall desire regardless of the psychic element to which one distributes most of it? The answer is "No" according to the third proof, since there is no persisting satisfaction of the desires except those belonging to the reasoning element. In other words, there is scarcely an ability for someone to experience genuine satisfaction of the appetitive and spirited desires. To illustrate this point, let us think about the desire of drinking. When one quenches one's thirst by drinking something, he may satisfy his thirst just for a moment; yet, it is the same desire which he comes to have again when he becomes thirst on the next occasion. This desire is satisfied only temporarily, showing that an appetitive desire can be satiated just for a while. This is because both the body as a what-is-less is not stable enough to hold the fulfilled state and water as a what-is-less is not stable enough to remain in one body. In this respect, the desire which is associated with what-is-less is relatively insatiable because what-is-less is relatively unstable. On the other hand, the desire which is associated with what-is-more, e.g. the desire of the reasoning element, can be satisfied for a longer time than other desires which are associated with what-is-less, because what-is-more is more stable than what-is-less. In particular, it is highly likely that the desire of knowing the Form of something can be almost completely satisfied, because one rarely loses this knowledge, since the Form is stable and his reasoning element is more stable relative to the other two elements. For instance, when one learns the Form of Beauty, he rarely has the desire of learning it again because he scarcely loses his knowledge of it. Hence, whether the desire of the reasoning element is insatiable in the sense that there are unlimited objects of its desire, it is obvious that

a specific desire of this element, e.g. a desire for learning the Form of Beauty, is almost entirely satiable, unlike a specific appetitive desire, e.g. a desire for drinking, which is insatiable.⁸⁶

In this context, it is the marker of the just life as being worth living that this life is accompanied by a minimal degree of impure pleasures. Let me first note that, if a pleasure is impure, the desire which is related to this pleasure is satisfied only for a moment. Pleasure consists in a process of filling, so pain consists in either an emptying process or a state of emptiness. Thus, when pleasure is followed by pain, it is followed either by an emptying process or by an emptied state. This indicates that experiencing an impure pleasure is a signal that the related desire is not genuinely satisfied. This is because neither an emptying process nor an emptied state follows if it is satiated. To sum up, pleasure is mixed with pain only when the related desire is not genuinely satisfied. Thus, if the pleasures which one mainly enjoys are impure, this shows that one is really diverting one's overall desires to the desires which can be satisfied just temporarily, and thus one fails to satisfy one's overall desires to a high degree.

By contrast, someone who lives a life which is characterized by the pursuit of the pleasure of the reasoning element achieves the satisfaction of his overall desires to the

⁸⁶ C.f. Taylor, who considers that the pleasure of the reasoning element is insatiable as well, because the objects of knowledge are unlimited. So, he complains about 585e-586b where the unjust are described as unhappy (Taylor 2008, p.172.).

highest possible degree. One who satisfies one's overall desire by diverting it mainly to the most satiable form succeeds in filling the overall desire to the greatest possible extent. The desire of the reasoning element is satisfied with what-is-more. So, when this desire is satisfied, it is more satiated than other two kinds of desire in the sense that it is the most unlikely kind of desire that will occur again. In particular, the desire of learning the Form is the most satiable, because the Form is what-is. The pleasure of the reasoning element occurs when the desire of this element is satisfied, thus this pleasure is pure in the sense that there is no subsequent pain which occurs by virtue of a repetitive occurrence of the same desire. The same desire of the reasoning element does not tend to occur again, so one who mainly enjoys pleasure by filling oneself up with desires that belong to this element satisfies one's overall desire to the greatest possible degree. Therefore, the just life which pursues the pleasure of the reasoning element, while almost being free from impure pleasures, is the life which best meets a basic human need, i.e. a satisfaction of overall desire. This is why the fact that the just mainly experiences the pleasure of the reasoning element indicates that his life is the supreme.

V.2.2.2. The Just Life as The Life Which Fills Desires in The Most Justice-Making Way

My inquiry into the third proof has so far shown that the just life is the life which satisfies one's overall desire to the greatest possible degree, and thus this life is better than other lives on one standard. However, this claim is insufficient to clarify what Socrates wants to argue in the proof. This is first because the inquiry does not touch

on the issue of true pleasure which we expect him to be dealing with in the proof. Also, the proof is regarded as the most decisive (*kuriôtaton*, 583b6) evidence for the supremacy of this life, but my inquiry has so far said nothing about why the proof is the greatest. Finally, the inquiry does not clarify why the just person enjoys the supreme pleasure of each element of his or her soul (586e). Therefore, in this section, I will maintain that, according to the proof, the just person satisfies his overall desire in the most just-conducing way and thus he is able to sustain his characteristic life, which means that the just life is the supreme.

Here is the opening passage of the third proof (583b1-7):

These, then, are two [proofs] in a row and the just person has defeated the unjust one twice. The third is dedicated in Olympic fashion to Zeus both Olympian and the Savior. See that, apart from that of a prudent person, the pleasure of others is neither entirely true nor pure but a sort of shadow-painting, as I think I have heard from a wise person. And now, this would be the greatest and most decisive of the overthrows.⁸⁷

In the Olympic wrestling match, a wrestler has to throw his opponents three times to win the game. Thus, at first glance, Socrates' comparison of the third proof to the third overthrow shows that he finds it enough to prove something to give three pieces of evidence and thereby the third proof is the most decisive merely in the sense that it completes the investigation of the supremacy of the just life. Yet, it is unlikely that the

⁸⁷ Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτω δύο ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη καὶ δις νενικηκώς ὁ δίκαιος τὸν ἄδικον· τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὀλυμπικῶς τῷ σωτήρι τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Δίι, ἄθρει ὅτι οὐδὲ παναληθής ἐστιν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῇ πλήν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρὰ, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις, ὥς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινος ἀκηκοέναι. καίτοι τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μέγιστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτωμάτων.

question whether the supremacy at issue is decisively proven merely based on its having three proofs for it is itself sufficient for the cogency of the proofs themselves.

In view of this, it is salient to draw attention to the fact that Socrates compares this proof to a dedication to Olympian Zeus the Savior (583b2-3).⁸⁸ The ancient Greek libation at banquets performed dedications to the gods in the following order: (1) to the Olympian gods, (2) to the heroes, and (3) to Zeus the Savior.⁸⁹ So, we can see that the proof is compared not only to the third dedication, i.e. the dedication to Zeus the Savior, but also to the first dedication, i.e. the dedication to Olympian gods. This might mean that Socrates is offering the same point as the first proof while providing a fresh point. If so, the supremacy of this proof may be in the richness of its content.⁹⁰

So, what is the first proof of the supremacy of the just life? In 587a-590d, Socrates judges that the just person is the happiest while the tyrannical person is unhappy by examining how miserable the latter's life is. He then labels this as the first proof of the supremacy of the just life. Interestingly, he does not add any evidence for the goodness of this life in this passage. To be more specific, after giving the line of understanding

⁸⁸ τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὀλυμπικῶς τῷ σωτῆρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Δί

⁸⁹ Adams 1902b, p.348.

⁹⁰ C.f. Gibbs 2001, p.10., who understands Olympian Zeus at 583b as the god who is honored in the Olympic wrestling match in which the wrestler has to throw his opponent three times to win the game.

provided in IV.I, he does not add any more explicitly supportive argument for this life. Yet, in 544d-576b, he investigates four kinds of the unjust city and the unjust soul in a schematic fashion: Timocracy, Oligarchy, Democracy, and Tyranny. While investigating them, he finds that each kind of the unjust person is far from happy because each element of the unjust person's soul does not conduct its own work and then there is disharmony in his soul. So, the tyrant is the most miserable since his soul is the most lacking in harmony, as the first proof contends. This implicitly confirms that the just person lives well by virtue of the harmony in his soul, i.e. the justice in his soul. Accordingly, we can regard it as the gist of the first proof that the just person is happy by virtue of the just state of his soul.

I would like to argue that, when Socrates compares the third proof of the supremacy of the just life to a dedication to Olympian Zeus the Savior, he considers the proof to be a combination of the first proof and a new point. To be more precise, given the gist of the first proof, my argument is that the third proof is a combination of the point that the just state of the soul makes the just person happy and another new point. This argument is buttressed by the way that he concludes the proof, namely by saying that each element of the soul (i) conducts its own work and (ii) enjoys its very own, supreme, and truest pleasures when the soul as a whole follows the reasoning element (586e4-587a2). As I have revealed in IV.1, the just soul is the soul in which each element does its own job. This signifies that (i) shows that the third proof deals with the definitive character of the just soul on which the first proof is established. Accordingly, the conclusion implies that the proof is the combination of the first proof

and a fresh point, i.e. (ii).

Plainly, it is the core message of the new point of the third proof that the just life is the supreme life, since the just person experiences the supreme, truest, and its very own pleasure of each element of the soul.⁹¹ So, it is still dubious how Socrates can argue that the message is non-hedonistic and thus it is consistent with the main part of the dialogue. Hence, in order to understand how the just person's experience of the supreme and truest pleasure of each element of the soul is associated with his happiness, we have to clarify the precise identity of these pleasures. Yet, the proof leaves no explicit hint for the issue of inquiring directly into the criteria for assessing the supreme pleasure of one element; therefore, I want to start by investigating the identity at issue by scrutinizing the criterion for assessing the truest pleasure of one specific element of the soul.

⁹¹ With respect to the core message of the proof, one might assert that only the just person achieves a moderate amount of satisfaction for every element of his soul (White 1979, p.232.). However, if this were merely so, there would be no need for me to inquire into the bisection of the pleasures in terms of its truthfulness. Moreover, literally speaking, what Socrates is concerned with is not a quantity, i.e. amount, but a quality, i.e. the truthfulness and purity, with regard to pleasure. Therefore, I find this line of interpretation unsatisfactory.

Additionally, one might insist that the truest pleasure of each element of the soul is the supreme pleasure of each element in the sense that it is that which is censored by the reasoning element. One might then insist that the just person is happy while enjoying the truest pleasure since he is under the censorship of the reasoning element (Dorter 2006, p.297.). This line of insistence seems to care about the qualitative concern of the third proof. Yet, still unclear is the identity of the supreme pleasure of each element, and thus it is dubious why this proof should even stand as evidence for the superiority of the just life.

The third proof considers that every pleasure consists in a filling of a container which partakes of being to some degree with a filler which partakes of being to some degree. Thus, every pleasure lies on a continuum, such that each item or source of pleasure partakes of its own degree of truthfulness with reference to the degree to which its related filler and container partake of the what-is-always-the-same. Yet, this does not suffice to show that a pleasure which belongs to a specific element of the soul can be truer than another pleasure which belongs to the same element. Let us remind ourselves of the fact that true belief, knowledge, food, and drink are the instances of fillers, which Socrates gives to explain pleasure (585b). Given the hierarchy between belief and knowledge, it is not difficult to see that pleasure of learning some item of knowledge is truer than the pleasure of acquiring a true belief. By contrast, it is unclear how one appetitive pleasure is different from another appetitive pleasure in terms of truthfulness. This is because it is hard to see any veridical difference, say, between the pleasure of eating and pleasure of drinking since what is filled is the body in both cases and there is no ontological difference between food and water.⁹²

⁹² Some scholars regard that the issue is what is truly needed or not. That is, they equate the truest pleasure of one element with the satisfaction of what the human being needs at the time (e.g. Reeve 1988, p.149; Russell 2005, p.133.). However, if they were correct, we would be able to insist that the truest appetitive pleasure consists in the satisfaction of the appetite which is truly needed to be filled. Pleasure is understood in this conception to be a by-product of a satisfaction of one's desire, so, at first glance, it is not weird to say that, when one's true needs are satisfied, there is the truest pleasure. Nevertheless, I do not accept the equation mentioned above, in part because it does not correspond with the only criterion for the truthfulness of the pleasure. That is, the equation disregards that the proof estimates the truthfulness of pleasure with a view to the truthfulness of its filler and container. Moreover,

In view of this, I would like to emphasize that it is the Form of the Good which is the source of every reality (508e). In other words, this Form “has the privileged position of being what accounts for the existence”⁹³ of the other Forms. This means that the Form of the Good is the ultimate reference-point for judging to what extent something partakes of what-is; thus, this Form is the ultimate reference-point for judging to what extent a pleasure is true as well. If so, the fact that pleasure-X which is associated with what-is-more, is truer than pleasure-Y which is related to what-is-less, signifies that the former pleasure has a closer relation to this Form than the latter pleasure does. Also, since pleasure-X is closer to the Form than pleasure-Y, the former pleasure is better than the latter pleasure because this Form is the ultimate reference-point of goodness as well. Accordingly, we can argue that the truest and supreme pleasure of an element of the soul is the pleasure which is the closest to the Form of the Good out of every pleasure which belongs to this element.⁹⁴

To see the sense in which pleasure-X is closer to the Form of the Good than pleasure-Y, I think that it is significant to remind ourselves of the nature of pleasure: pleasure consists in a satisfaction of desire. Every pleasure consists in satisfying a specific

these scholars do not offer any proper criterion for the true need of one element.

⁹³ Denyer 2007, p.284.

⁹⁴ If so, we do not have to follow the mainstream interpretation that what makes one filling truer than another is its absolute stability or durability, which may cause the proof to be erroneous (e.g. Cross and Woosley 1964, p.267; Wolfsdorf 2014, p.72.).

desire, or what is filled, with that which fills this desire, or what fills. So, we can presume that pleasure-X is closer to the Form of the Good than pleasure-Y is, when the desire related to the former pleasure is closer to this Form than the desire associated to the latter pleasure. Thus, presumably, the better and truer its related desire, the truer and better a pleasure is. Therefore, the supreme and truest pleasure of one element occurs when the desire which is the truest and supreme among all desires belonging to this element.

So, what is the point of the supremacy and truest-ness, i.e. the state of being the closest to the Form of the Good, of the supreme and truest desire of one element? To answer this question, I think that it is necessary to highlight the distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites which is given while illustrating who an oligarchic person is. The necessary appetite is that which one cannot avoid and of which the object is beneficial (*ôphelein*) for the possessor. On the other hand, the unnecessary appetite is that which does no good to its possessor (558d-559a). First, there is a sort of appetite which one ought to fulfill in order to survive, so, presumably, a necessary appetite is necessary in the sense that it is unavoidable to survive. That is to say, it is highly likely that, for instance, the desire for eating, to the extent of being necessary for survival, is a necessary appetite. Accordingly, we can presume that the necessary appetitive pleasure consists in the satisfaction of the appetite which is necessary for being alive. Additionally, a necessary appetite which is beneficial is contrasted with an unnecessary appetite which does no good to its possessor, so we can regard that a necessary appetite is good for its possessor in the sense that it is beneficial. Thus, the

necessary appetitive pleasure consists in the satisfaction of the appetite which is beneficial for its possessor.

One might believe that a necessary appetite is beneficial merely because one can survive by virtue of its existence. However, survival alone is not an end for a necessary appetite, in part because Socrates holds that the desire for relishes, which is not necessary to be satisfied for one's human survival, can be beneficial (559b6). In view of this, we have to note that the first example of a necessary appetite is the appetite of eating to the point of health and well-being (*euexia*). In other words, we have to note that not only the appetite for relishes, but also the appetite for bread, is necessary to the extent that it offers benefit in relation to well-being (559a-b). That is to say, it is worth noting that the necessary appetite is explained with reference not to survival but to health and well-being.

The term 'well-being' first appears in the dialogue when Socrates likens virtue to be a well-being of the soul in comparison with bodily health, just after likening bodily health to justice (444d-e). So, we can presume that the well-being of the soul here signifies justice. Socrates in 559a-b also uses the term 'well-being' together with the term 'health' as he does at 444d-e. This leads us to presume that 'well-being' indicates justice again. Thus, the illustration under consideration clearly implies that a gratification of necessary appetite is beneficial in relation not merely to survival but also to justice. That is to say, clearly, this gratification is beneficial since it is conducive to justice. By contrast, it is not clear merely from the illustration whether the

gratification is beneficial in the sense that it serves the justice of the soul or whether it does not interfere with justice. Yet, it is hard to imagine how a satisfaction of an appetite for relishes makes the soul more harmonized, so we can presume that a necessary appetite is beneficial because its gratification does not interfere with the justice of the soul.

Let us return to my argument that the truest pleasure of an element of the soul consists in the satisfaction of a desire of the element which is the closest to the Form of the Good. Socrates makes it explicit that this Form makes other things useful and beneficial (505a), so we can presume that the truest pleasure of one element consists in the most beneficial desire of that element. The distinction between necessary appetites and unnecessary appetites reveals that, unlike unnecessary appetites which do not do any good to the soul, a necessary appetite is beneficial, since its gratification does not disturb the just state of the soul. Given that, plainly, the just state of the soul is the best state with a view to the Form of the Good, a necessary appetite is beneficial with a reference to this Form. Thus, we can presume that the truest pleasure of the appetitive element is the most beneficial pleasure of this element, in the sense that it consists in the satisfaction of the most beneficial appetite.

Although Socrates does not explicitly bisect our spirited desires as he distinguishes two kinds of appetitive desires, we can extend our inquiry about appetitive desires to the identity of spirited desires. When he first introduces the spirited element, he makes it explicit that this element sometimes becomes an ally of the reasoning element by

assisting it in controlling the appetitive element which stands in conflict with it (440a-e). He then adds that the spirited element sometimes stands in conflict with the reasoning element (441b-c). We can see that the desire of the spirited element is sometimes directed to a just state of the soul whilst sometimes it is not, given that one's soul is just only when every element of it follows the reasoning element (443d-e). This indicates that the gratification of a desire of the spirited element is sometimes conducive to the just soul whereas sometimes it is not, provided that every element of the soul is directed towards what it desires (581a). Unlike the gratification of a necessary appetite which merely does not interfere with the just state of the soul, the gratification of a spirited desire can assist the rulership of the reasoning element and thus bring about a state of justice in the soul. Yet, we can maintain that, just as there are appetitive desires which are conducive to justice, so too are there spirited desires which are conducive to justice. Hence, we can argue that the sense in which the pleasure of filling the spirited desire assisting the reasoning element is beneficial and then good is the same as the sense in which the pleasure of filling a necessary appetite is beneficial and good. In both cases, the gratification of desire is conducive to justice.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ Kelly goes through the passages about the spirited and appetitive elements that I examine in the passage above as well. He then asserts that the truest pleasure of each element is the pleasure which makes the *appropriate* contribution toward the realization of the overall good of the soul (Kelly 1989, pp.198-199.). His assertion is similar to mine in saying that the truest pleasure of each element is the pleasure which makes the most beneficial contribution towards the actualization of the justice of the soul. Yet, I argue that his assertion falls short of showing the main point of Socrates, since he neither clarifies the association between the truth and appropriateness in this context nor does he consider that Socrates uses not a merely positive degree, i.e. appropriate, but a superlative degree, i.e. the truest.

I want to conclude my examination of the most beneficial pleasure of each element of the soul by maintaining that the most beneficial pleasure of the reasoning element is the pleasure of knowing the Form of the Good which most serves justice. Let me return to my previous argument that the truest pleasure of any psychic element is the pleasure which comes about when that element is filled with knowledge. The Form of the Good is the ultimate object of knowledge (532b-c), so the truest pleasure of this element is the pleasure of knowing this Form. I maintained that the truest pleasure of an element of the soul is the same as the most beneficial pleasure of this element, so the pleasure which consists in the process of filling the soul with knowledge of this Form must be the most beneficial pleasure of the reasoning element.

The issue now emerges whether the pleasure of being filled with knowledge of the Form of the Good is the most conducive pleasure out of every pleasure of the reasoning element, in terms of its contribution towards one's justice. The just reasoning element has to possess a view on what is good for the soul as a whole, so the most important knowledge it has to possess is the knowledge of the Form of the Good. This means that the desire for knowing this Form is the most beneficial among several sorts of desire which belongs to the reasoning element, in the sense that it makes the greatest contribution towards one's justice. So, by inference, the pleasure of learning this Form is the supreme pleasure of this element. Therefore, we have every reason to conclude that the supreme pleasure of each element is the pleasure which is the most beneficial, in the sense that it consists in the process of filling the desire with that which, when

the soul is filled, is most conducive to justice in it.

The just person is the only person who enjoys the truest pleasure of each element of the soul. The Form of the Good is the ultimate reference-point of the truth, so the truest pleasure of each element is the supreme pleasure of each element. The pleasure is supreme in the sense that it consists in the filling of the supreme desire of the element to which it belongs. The desire is supreme in the sense that it is the best at conducting justice in one's soul. Ideally, the supreme way of satisfying one's desire in terms of sustaining his just soul is to transit one's every desire to the desire which belongs to the reasoning element and then fill this specific sort of desire. Yet, as a human being, one cannot ignore any element of the soul, because each of the three psychic elements is a bearer of necessary desires. Hence, the fact that the just person enjoys the truest pleasure of each element marks out the fact that he satisfies his overall desire in the supreme way of retaining the just state of his soul, by filling the desires which are most conducive to justice. Therefore, the just person is happy, because he preserves his justice which is sufficient for being happy by satisfying the supreme desire of each element, or in other words, by enjoying the supreme pleasure of each element.

Let me wrap up my inquiry in the second main point of the third proof by clarifying why this proof is the greatest proof of the supremacy of the just life (583b) in two ways.⁹⁶ Philosophically speaking, this proof contains the richest content among the

⁹⁶ C.f. Scott 2000, pp.16-18, who thinks that the third proof is the most decisive since it is the only

three proofs. This proof is very rich for, among other reasons, it contains two discrete points, i.e. the purity issue and the truth issue. More importantly, the proof is something which is likened to the first and third dedications in the ancient Greek banquet at the same time (583b). That is, based on the first proof that justice is sufficient for living well, the third proof proves the supremacy of the just life by revealing that the just person enjoys pleasures that are supreme with the respect to being most conducive to the justice in his soul.

Also, dialectically, the proof is the most decisive because it responds to every misunderstanding of justice at once. Let me here come back to the argument that the second and third proofs of the supremacy aim at answering Adeimantus' question. By referring to various stories from poetry, Adeimantus shows that it is a common belief that injustice is pleasant and profitable while being shameful only in opinion, and that the unjust person is actually happy (364a-365a).⁹⁷ Thus, to maintain that the just person is happy, Socrates has to show that justice is profitable, really fine and is at least not painful. The first proof reveals that justice is profitable and fine but it does not show whether justice is pleasant. The second proof shows that the just life is pleasant and fine but it does not show that this life is profitable. By contrast, the third proof maintains that justice is pleasant, profitable and fine by showing that the pleasures which the just person enjoys are profitable, in the sense that the experience

passage where Socrates revisits the metaphysics of the central books to defend justice.

⁹⁷ Butler 1999, pp.44-46.

of these pleasures feeds the person's justice, which is fine and profitable, while enjoying the pleasure. Thus, the third proof is the most decisive in a dialectical sense.

V.2.3. Rational Pleasure in The Just Life

In V.2.1.-V.2.2., I concentrated on obtaining a grasp of the general picture of the third proof of the superiority of the just life. As a result of this, in these sections, I did not pay specific attention to Rational Pleasure, thus it is not clear for the moment how Rational Pleasure is associated with or contributes towards the good life. Moreover, the general picture of the proof does not deal explicitly with the question of how pleasure is related to two distinct modes of the good life. In this vein, it is still unclear whether the proof can be applied to the two modes of the life without any trouble. Hence, in this section, I will revisit the two discrete points of the proof in order to investigate what kind of role Rational Pleasure plays not only in the good life in general but also in each mode of the good life.

V.2.3.1. The Preference for Rational Pleasure as an Indicator of Living the Supreme Life

Before revisiting the two aspects of the third proof, it is worth noting that the pleasure of the reasoning element is Rational Pleasure. The reasoning element is initially defined as that by which one learns (441e, 442c). As I mentioned above, the second proof of the superiority of the just life points to the fact that what the element loves to learn is knowledge and the characteristic pleasure of this element is the pleasure of

knowing the truth. The third proof proceeds further by confirming that every pleasure of the reasoning element is Rational Pleasure by mentioning true belief, knowledge, intelligence, and virtue as the fillers of the soul which give rise to the pleasure of the soul (585b). Undoubtedly, every filler mentioned above is true, so when the reasoning element, which is one element of the soul, is filled with one of them and brings about pleasure, this pleasure must be the pleasure of learning, knowing, and discovering what is true, i.e. Rational Pleasure.

Let me review the first point of the third proof, namely that the just life satisfies the overall human desire to the greatest degree. The just person tries to satisfy his desires by diverting it to the ones which belong to the reasoning element as much as possible, while diverting it to the spirited or appetitive desires as little as possible. This first aspect means that the pleasure which the just person mostly enjoys belongs to the reasoning element, provided that this pleasure consists in a filling of the desires of this element. This also indicates that the just person succeeds in meeting his overall desire to the greatest possible extent, since the desire of the reasoning element can be satiated almost entirely while the other desires cannot. So, just as the second proof of the superiority of the just life contends that the preference for Rational Pleasure shows that the just life is the supreme with respect to the value in accordance with which a life is arranged, so does the third proof also imply that the preference for Rational Pleasure reveals the supremacy of the just life, in the sense that this life is the best at meeting a sort of basic human need, i.e. satisfying one's overall desire. In sum, the third proof does not show that Rational Pleasure constitutes the goodness of this life;

yet, the proof reveals that this pleasure is a necessary subsidiary of the good life as an indicator of its supremacy, i.e. an indicator of its being the most successful way of satisfying one's human desire.

Let me now revisit the second point of the third proof, namely that only the just person meets his desires in such a way as to retain the just state of his soul. While enjoying the best pleasure of each element of the soul, one satisfies the most beneficial desire of each element, so only the just person satisfies his desire in the way which is most conducive to the justice in his soul. Strictly speaking, this point does not depend on a contrast between the pleasure of the reasoning element and other kinds of pleasure which belong to the other elements; rather, the issue at point is a difference in the goodness or truthfulness between the same sort of pleasure. Thus, it is a bit difficult to derive an account of Rational Pleasure from this proof.

In view of this, it is first worth noting that the criteria for the truthfulness of pleasure is what-is. This aspect indicates that the pleasure of the reasoning element is truer than any other kinds of pleasure. In particular, the least true pleasure of the reasoning element is even truer than the truest spirited and appetitive pleasures. This is because the filler of the pleasure of the reasoning element is truer than that of other two kinds of pleasures respectively. This means that every pleasure of the reasoning element is more conducive to justice than are all other kinds of pleasure. In other words, the desire which is satisfied when this pleasure comes about is more conducive than even the best appetitive and spirited desires. Accordingly, the fact that one mainly enjoys the

pleasure of the reasoning element indicates that the just person satisfies his desire in the most conducive way to feeding his justice. Therefore, the just person's preference for Rational Pleasure signifies the supremacy of his life in the sense that he satisfies his overall desire in the best way.

To sum up, the just person's preference for Rational Pleasure indicates the supremacy of his life in two ways. First, the preference shows that he meets his overall human desire to the greatest possible degree. Second, it reveals that he satisfies his overall desire in the best way, i.e. in the way that most of all is conducive to his justice.

V.2.3.2. The Rational Pleasure in The Two Sorts of The Just Life

In the previous section, I established the association between Rational Pleasure and the good life in general. Yet, we can still pose a further question about the role of this pleasure in the just life based on the distinction of the two modes of the just life, i.e. the life of doing philosophy and the life of ruling. Obviously, regardless of which mode of the just life the just person lives, he meets his overall desire in a way that is more conducive to justice than the way in which the unjust person meets his desire. This is because the experience of Rational Pleasure is a more just-retaining way of satisfying one's overall desire to gratify it, by mainly meeting the desire of the reasoning element, than it is to gratify in another way. So, evidently, whether he rules or philosophizes, the just person satisfies his overall desire in the best way.

In contrast, for now, we cannot be confident about whether the just person always meets his overall desire to the greatest possible extent, regardless of whether he philosophizes or rules the ideal city, since it seems to be not entirely persuasive that every Rational Pleasure which the just enjoys is pure. This is because it is easy to think about an instance of Rational Pleasure which seems to mix with pain, e.g. the pleasure of solving a mathematical conundrum. Also, it is hard to believe that ruling is a painless activity if you put yourself in Theresa May's shoes. Therefore, I shall investigate what kind of Rational Pleasure each mode of life enjoys. I shall also examine whether these pleasures are pure.

V.2.3.2.1. The Life of Doing Philosophy and Its Rational Pleasure

V.2.3.2.1.1. The Pleasure of Acquiring Knowledge and The Pleasure of Manifesting Knowledge

There is a famous complaint that it is impossible for the philosopher to experience pleasure any longer after he or she has become a qualified philosopher-ruler. In this section, by finding a proper answer to this complaint, I shall argue in defence of the two sorts of pleasure of doing philosophy: the pleasure of acquiring knowledge and the pleasure of recovering one's attention on existing knowledge.

Pleasure consists in a process of psychological filling, so Rational Pleasure must consist in a process of filling a sort of lack of the soul. To be more specific, given that the examples of the psychological lack that Socrates is concerned with are ignorance

and folly, we can presume that this pleasure consists in the process of filling ignorance or folly. Thus, there is no pleasure of possessing knowledge or true belief, but rather there is a pleasure which is experienced in undergoing the process of acquiring them.

In this respect, it is completely understandable that the second proof implies that the pleasure of the reasoning element is derived from learning, since learning can be understood as a filling of ignorance. The second proof reveals that the philosophical life is characterized by the pursuit of the pleasure of learning. To be more specific, Socrates first describes the reasoning element as that by which one learns (580d9, 581d6) and that which loves learning (581b10). This implies that the particular pleasure of someone who is dominated by this element, i.e. the philosopher, is the pleasure of learning, given the relation between love and pleasure in the second proof, as was shown in V.1. This proof also reveals the same point through Socrates' supposition that the attitudes of profit-lovers and honor-lovers to the pleasure of the wisdom-lovers consists in their attitudes to the pleasure of learning (581d2, d6, e1). This confirms that, for these two sorts of people, the pleasure of the reasoning element is, or is at least primarily, the pleasure of learning which consists in the filling of ignorance.

In view of this, one might argue that, when Socrates mentions the pleasure which is derived from knowledge in the two proofs, he does not mean the pleasure which is derived from the possession of knowledge *simpliciter*, but rather the pleasure which is

derived from undergoing the process of getting it. One might refer to 581d9-e1⁹⁸ to support this claim in which Socrates mentions the pleasure of “knowing how the truth is and being always in such a state while learning”, interpreting that ‘knowing’ in this context is restricted to learning, i.e. ‘the process of acquiring new knowledge’. To support this interpretation, one might stress that this passage is located just after introducing the philosophical pleasure as the pleasure of learning at 581b5-7, which may lead readers to identify the pleasure of learning with the pleasure of knowing.⁹⁹ Second, one might want to refer to 581b6-8,¹⁰⁰ in which it is stated that that by which we learn always focuses on knowing how the truth lies. The element by which we learn is mainly concerned with learning, so it is likely that knowing how the truth lies is the same as learning. Accordingly, Socrates might not care about the pleasure which is derived from the state of possessing knowledge. Third, one might want to refer to 585b6-c6 where Socrates extends the basic case of pleasure of eating or drinking which is a sort of the process of filling (585a8-b5) to the pleasure of the soul (585b6-c6). The notable point for our concern is that he starts this extension by saying that it is pleasant to retain intelligence (*ischôn noun*, 585b6-7), which may indicate that there is no sharp distinction between ‘filling’ and ‘having’ in regard to pleasure. This is because *ischôn noun* might denote a constant state of retaining knowledge.

⁹⁸ τὴν τοῦ εἰδέναι τάληθές ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοιοῦτῳ τινὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι μανθάνοντα

⁹⁹ Delcomminette 2006, p.477.

¹⁰⁰ ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧς γε μανθάνομεν, παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὅπῃ ἔχει πᾶν ἀεὶ τέταται, καὶ χρημάτων τε καὶ δόξης ἥκιστα τούτων τούτῳ μέλει

However, it is unsatisfactory that Rational Pleasure is confined to pleasure which is derived from filling ignorance for several reasons.¹⁰¹ First of all, there are a few expressions which imply that there is a pleasure of possessing knowledge or continuing to know something, which seems to be different from pleasure of coming-to-know that consists in a sort of filling. Indeed, there are at least two places where Socrates seems to be concerned with the pleasure out of the fulfilled intellectual state: “the pleasure derived from knowing” (582a10) and “the pleasure of contemplating what-is” (582c7-8).¹⁰²

More importantly, the pleasure of continuing-to-know and the pleasure of coming-to-know are not regarded by Socrates as being on an equal footing. First, the second proof seems to consider that the pleasure of the reasoning element is primarily the former pleasure rather than the latter one. According to this proof, when a wisdom-lover compares his pleasure to the other two kinds of pleasure, he examines these two kinds of pleasure by comparison not with the pleasure of learning but with the pleasure of knowing how the truth lies (581d9-e1). We have to note here that it is the philosopher who regards the latter pleasure as the philosopher’s characteristic pleasure, while the former is considered as the philosopher’s distinct pleasure by other kinds of people

¹⁰¹ Frede affirms that only learning can be pleasant among every intellectual activity according to Plato's theory of pleasure in the *Republic*. (Frede 2006, p.453.)

¹⁰² Warren 2014, p.35.

(581d2, d6, e1). The proof considers that only the philosopher is the licensed judge of pleasure, whilst others are not. This makes it obvious that the philosopher's comment on his pleasure is more trustworthy than the others' comments on it. Therefore, presumably, the philosopher's particular pleasure is not the pleasure which is derived from coming-to-know but the pleasure of knowing how the truth lies.

In addition, I want to offer my reading of the three passages which one might read as evidence that the dialogue is not concerned with the pleasure of possessing-knowledge. First, with respect to 581d9-e1, it is worth noting that Socrates does not explicitly assert that 'knowing the truth' always entails 'learning'. This means that he does not rule out the possibility of knowing the truth without a coexisting experience of learning. In other words, he implies that one can be in the state of knowing the truth after having acquired this knowledge. Additionally, strictly speaking, what Socrates indicates is that 'learning' always entails 'knowing the truth'. This may just mean that learning some item of knowledge results in the possession of this knowledge, which is more plausible than the equation of 'learning' to 'knowing'. In this context, 'knowing the truth' in this passage can be construed as 'possessing the knowledge of the truth'. Therefore, the difference between 'knowing' and 'learning' can still be retained.

Also, in regard to 581b6-8, I suggest that we should understand that the term "always focuses on" (*pros ... aei tettaí*) points to the goal which the element by which we learn always pursues. I also suggest that the main goal of the reasoning element is 'knowing' and that 'learning' is the process which one must undergo in order to attain the goal.

This suggestion is based on how the future-guardians of the ideal city are raised. They have to learn several disciplines by undergoing a long-term educational program.¹⁰³ The study of dialectic is the final stage of this program (534e). The role it plays is to know the Forms and ultimately the Form of the Good (543a-b). Thus, epistemologically speaking, the final goal of the educational program which the future-guardians should attend is to know the Forms, especially the Form of the Good. This means that the ultimate goal of learning is to know how the truth lies with respect to what the reasoning element focuses on, according to 581b6-8. So, presumably, the expression that the reasoning element “always focuses on” any certain item means that the element “always pursues” in this passage. Therefore, we need not read that the passage supports the equation of the pleasure of knowing with the pleasure of learning.

Finally, with regard to *ischôn noun*, we have to note that, literally, it means not ‘having knowledge’ but ‘retaining intelligence.’ So, without clarifying the meaning of ‘intelligence’, Socrates’ use of this term while extending the model of bodily pleasure to that of psychological pleasure, does not show that there is no distinction between the possession of knowledge and the acquisition of knowledge. Rather, provided that there is no signal that Socrates ignores the pleasure of possessing knowledge, it is more plausible not to regard the term as evidence for blurring this distinction. Furthermore, it is noticeable that Socrates believes that people are filled when they take on

¹⁰³ Socrates explicitly calls the disciplines of the educational-program a '*mathesis*' at 520c-d and 535a5-6. Also, there are many passages which clearly maintain that the disciplines are the objects of learning by their use of the verb '*manthanein*' (e.g. 404b11, 522c3, 526c1, 531d7, 535a6).

nourishment and have intelligence (585b6-7).¹⁰⁴ He juxtaposes a process of bodily filling, i.e. taking nourishment, with having intelligence, so it would be somewhat weird that ‘having intelligence’ does not have any link with any sort of filling process. Therefore, *ischôn noun* is not to be taken as standing in conflict with my argument that there is a distinction between the pleasure of learning and the pleasure of possessing knowledge.

This section has so far claimed that Socrates differentiates the pleasure of learning from the pleasure of possessing knowledge. Yet, this claim seems incompatible with the nature of pleasure, namely the view that pleasure consists in the process of filling, because there would be no filling while being in a fulfilled state. So, do we have to hold that he sees two different sorts of the philosophical pleasure?

In view of this new problem, I want to clarify why the pleasure of possessing knowledge is needed for the philosopher. To highlight the necessity of this pleasure, let me introduce a common worry that a philosopher might not enjoy Rational Pleasure after filling all of his desires of the reasoning element, if his characteristic pleasure were restricted to the pleasure of learning. That is to say, insofar as the desire of this element consists in being wise, there is no further desire to be wise after becoming wise and then there would be no more Rational Pleasure after having the knowledge

¹⁰⁴ οὐκοῦν πληροῖτ' ἂν ὃ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἴσχων;

of the Forms if possessing the knowledge of the Forms were sufficient for being wise.¹⁰⁵ This is very problematic for the philosopher, because, if he were unable to experience Rational Pleasure any longer, his life would not be the most pleasant type of life any longer. If so, the third proof would be unable to stand.

For many scholars, it seems ineffective to attempt to nullify this problem by merely insisting that a philosopher will have to relearn what he learned previously and then will continuously enjoy the pleasure of learning since he will forget the knowledge which he has acquired. This is because these scholars regard that this knowledge is imperishable partly because the permanence and stability not only of the filler, i.e. knowledge, but also of the container, i.e. the soul, signifies the same sort of permanence and stability that knowledge also displays.¹⁰⁶ It is additionally noticeable that the philosopher has an outstanding memory (486c-d), since this may guarantee the stability of his knowledge.¹⁰⁷ So, if the Rational Pleasure which the philosopher enjoys were restricted to the pleasure of acquiring new knowledge, the philosopher might not enjoy his life as providing him with pleasure after he has acquired the entirety of knowledge of the Forms.

A number of scholars have attempted to support the view that the philosopher

¹⁰⁵ Frede 1993, p.61 n.3; Gosling and Taylor 1982, pp.122-123.

¹⁰⁶ Erginel 2011a, p.499 n.28; Warren 2014, p.40.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

continuously experiences the pleasure of filling ignorance without doubting whether the philosopher's knowledge is imperishable. These attempts are not pointless, but I think all of them fail to reach their goal. Let me go through three seemingly promising attempts.

First, some scholars propose that a philosopher occupies the stage between coming to know *some* knowledge and coming to know *every* knowledge, meaning that he is on the life-long course of learning the Forms. According to this view, the illustration of dialectic at 511c1-2 "as using, only Forms themselves, going through Forms to Forms, and ending in Forms" shows that there is a constant learning of Forms even after the philosopher reaches a certain point. The scholars also regard the analogy of Cave, especially in 540b1-2, as good evidence for Socrates' proposal that there are still lots of things to learn even after acquiring the Form of the Good, since there must be many things outside the Cave to which the prisoner does not have the ability to see before looking at the sun.¹⁰⁸ Additionally, these scholars suggest that there may be a lot of remaining Forms that a philosopher might come to learn even after he comes to be a qualified ruler, since knowing a certain number of moral truths might be enough to rule over the ideal city.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ E.g. Ibid., pp.498-499.

¹⁰⁹ Warren introduces this line of suggestion as that which was made by some anonymous reviews of his book (Warren 2014, pp. 44-45.).

I think that it is sufficient to rebut this proposal by pointing out that it is unclear whether there is a sufficient number of Forms to learn in a time across one's whole life.¹¹⁰ In addition, the specific points which the advocates of this proposal make are not persuasive. In what follows I will refute each of them in turn.

First, the reading of 511c1-2 mentioned above is unacceptable, because, interpreted literally, the passage says nothing about learning. The passage states merely that dialectic is conducted with reference not to any sensible things but only to Forms. There is no sign that dialectic consists just in learning new Forms. Rather, apparently, the passage characterizes it just as an activity in which the philosopher is in a contact with the Forms. Thus, this reading is not persuasive.

The interpretation of the analogy of the Cave mentioned just above is also problematic, since the analogy is silent about whether there is supposed to be further learning after learning the Form of the Good which is the final (*teleutaios*) object of knowledge (516b4, 517b8-9). Strictly speaking, what 540b1-2, which was cited above, maintains is not that there is something left to learn after acquiring the knowledge of the Form of the Good, but that a philosopher should engage in doing philosophy even after coming to know this Form. Insofar as it is unclear whether doing philosophy is restricted to learning, the passage does not suffice to support the proposal. Indeed, it

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

leaves open the possibility that the philosophical activity which a philosopher engages in after acquiring knowledge of the Form of the Good is different from the activity he participates in in the original process of learning several Forms. Hence, the interpretation under consideration is not acceptable.

Moreover, the fact that the Form of the Good is the final object of knowledge brings to light the problem of the suggestion that the ruler of the ideal-city needs just a certain number of moral truths. The analogy explicitly points out that the philosopher comes to be a qualified philosopher-ruler after contemplating the Form of the Good (516b4-e2). So, given that this Form is the final intelligible object the philosopher learns, it is hard to justify that there is still some unspecified number of things which one who knows this Form is still ignorant of. This means that the philosopher-ruler is not equipped merely with a specific number of moral truths. Hence, the suggestion is not powerful enough to defend the philosopher's continuous enjoyment of Rational Pleasure.

Let me move on the second sort of assertion which tries to argue for the eternally pleasant philosophical life. The assertion is that even if the philosopher were unable to experience the pleasure which is derived from acquiring new knowledge, his life is pleasant since there are various fillers of the reasoning element except knowledge. That is to say, the philosopher can enjoy the pleasure out of learning lesser things than

the Forms, such as empirical facts, so he can live a continuously pleasant life.¹¹¹ True belief and all virtues are given as the examples of the psychological fillers which Socrates explicitly mentions (585b11-c2), thus it might be absolutely admissible that the filling of ignorance Socrates has in mind is not limited to learning new knowledge of the Forms. Therefore, obviously, the philosopher is able to enjoy Rational Pleasures even after acquiring every item of knowledge.¹¹²

I think the assertion mentioned above is on the right lines when it does not constrain the filling of ignorance to learning. Yet, I do not accept this assertion, since the Rational Pleasure which the philosopher experiences even after acquiring every item of knowledge must be his particular pleasure, i.e. the pleasure of contemplating the Form. It is first notable that Socrates implies that a philosopher would like to remain in the pure realm after arriving at this realm, meaning that he would like to keep contemplating the Forms (520d7-9). Even the passage which is cited to warrant the assertion at issue, i.e. 540b1-2, alludes to the same point. In this passage, Socrates comments that a philosopher spends most of his life doing philosophy. So, the

¹¹¹ Erginel 2011a, p.500. Warren reports that Plutarch was in favor of a version of this interpretation while criticizing the Epicureans (Warren 2014, p.45 n.38.).

¹¹² Warren resists this assertion by insisting that the pleasure which characterizes the philosophical life has to be a kind of pleasure which cannot be enjoyed by others, but rather the pleasure that is derived from being filled with true beliefs or virtues can be enjoyed by non-philosophers (Warren 2014, pp.45-46.). I agree that the pleasure which can be enjoyed by others cannot characterize the philosophical life. Yet, it leaves open that the philosopher is the only person who can continuously obtain the pleasure under consideration, so Warren's insistence is not enough to refute the assertion at issue.

philosopher spends most of his life contemplating the Forms, given that the core of doing philosophy is to undertake this contemplation. The main job of a philosopher after reaching the Form of the Good is to preside in continued contemplation of the Forms. Thus, it is more natural that the main pleasure which he enjoys is derived from this contemplation rather than its being derived from being filled with lesser things, such as empirical facts and true beliefs. Hence, it is not appropriate for the philosopher to mainly enjoy the pleasure which is derived from filling lesser things.

Let us sum up the two problems of Rational Pleasure which have been raised so far. First, Socrates is concerned with the pleasure of possessing knowledge, which seems to oppose the nature of pleasure, i.e. the view that every pleasure consists in the process of filling a sort of psychological lack. Second, if Rational Pleasure were limited to the pleasure of filling ignorance with something new fillers such as knowledge, true belief, etc., it would be impossible to give a consistent illustration of how the philosophical life constantly enjoys its characteristic pleasure.

In view of this, I find extremely persuasive what Warren has argued to be the constantly pleasant life of philosopher. In his wonderful analysis of the *Philebus* 34b-c, he sees a distinction between having forgotten something and something's merely becoming latent in the soul of an individual. This distinction leads to another distinction between the soul's two activities: (i) the re-learning of something that has been forgotten and (ii) the recovering of something which one still knows while merely not having that something to mind. Ignorance or folly which has to be filled with new

intellectual fillers is not the only kind of psychological lack; when one's knowledge becomes latent, there is every reason to consider it as a kind of lack in the soul. The lack can be described as a lack of the obviousness of, or attention on, the knowledge in question. So, a philosopher engages not merely in learning new knowledge, true belief, etc. but in taking up something which is stored in his or her mind by revisiting and reviewing what he or she already knows. Hence, there is no dichotomy as to whether there is a filling or not between the philosopher's 'knowing' and his 'learning'.¹¹³ Rather, we can see that the real difference at issue concerning Rational Pleasure is between the two distinct fillings of the reasoning element: the recovery of latent knowledge, on the one hand, and the filling of one's ignorance, on the other hand. In this respect, I argue that contemplation of the Forms really consists of two activities: (a) learning new knowledge of the Forms, and (b) re-manifesting one's knowledge of the Form which one has already learned (and so already knows). Thus, the main philosophical job after reaching the Form of the Good, described in 511b7-c2,¹¹⁴ is not the learning of new Forms but the recovery of the Forms in one's mind by revisiting and reviewing them. Therefore, it is highly likely that a philosopher can

¹¹³ Warren 2014, pp.47-49. Warren's claim is based on the two distinctions which are drawn from Plato's other dialogue. Yet, I think there is no problem of taking them into account while examining the *Republic*, because these distinctions are too obvious to deny.

¹¹⁴ ἀψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἔχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνει, αἰσθητῶ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος, ἀλλ' εἶδεν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἶδη. (Having grasped this principle (sc. the first principle of everything (= the Form of the Good)), it reverses itself and, keeping hold of what follows from it, comes down to a conclusion, making no use of anything visible at all, but only of forms themselves, moving on through Forms to Forms, and ending in Forms).

live a constantly pleasant life by experiencing his distinct pleasure, since Rational Pleasure as derived from recovering latent knowledge is allowed only to him and he can enjoy it constantly.¹¹⁵

For me, Warren's argument is persuasive;¹¹⁶ nevertheless, one might wonder how this argument is compatible with the first point of the second proof. A philosopher cannot focus on every item of knowledge which he possesses at every moment. Therefore, he cannot help losing attention of his knowledge of, say, the Form of Just at some point in his cognition. Even when he recovers his attention of this Form, he soon loses it again. This means that the same desire for manifesting this knowledge comes about again and again. In other words, this means that the desire for recovering this knowledge is insatiable. If this is so, the first point of the second proof might be disproved, since one may fail to meet one's overall desire to the greatest extent, while

¹¹⁵ At the conference "Plato's Pleasures: New Perspectives" (16, Aug., 2018), by expanding on Warren's move, Dr. Joachim Aufderheide argued that being aware of the satisfaction of one's desire is pleasant and requires a mental activity to be aware of it, so a philosopher who has every item of knowledge takes pleasure as a motion from his fulfilled state. His argument is fascinating, but I am not convinced by it for two reasons. First of all, even when one misunderstands his intermediate state as being pleasant, he is aware of his mental state, and thus being aware of one's own mental state is not a decisive *kinêsis* of pleasure. Second, for me, the state in which the desire is satisfied is not pleasant although it appears to be, since health which must be a fulfilled state, is used as a representative of the intermediate state at 583c-d.

¹¹⁶ By insisting that Warren's introduction of the recovery of a latent item of knowledge is based on a mis-interpretation of Aristotle, Price criticizes the argument (Price 2016, p.184 n.17.). It is true that Warren refers to Aristotle at some point to support his interpretation (Warren 2014, p.48.); yet, as my summary above shows, it can stand without referring to him.

mainly enjoying pleasures that are derived from regaining the knowledge which has lost the philosopher's attention.

To tackle this problem, it is necessary to distinguish between a perceived desire and an unperceived desire. The reason why it is necessary to fulfill one's overall human desire is that it is a basic human inclination that one cannot be in a satisfied state when one recognizes that one's desire is not met. The desire for re-manifesting a specific latent knowledge is unperceived, because one cannot perceive the lack of this knowledge until recovering one's attention on it. So, one is not aware of the fact that this desire is not met when it is not satisfied. Thus, it is not a problem at all that this desire occurs repeatedly, because it is not against the basic human inclination that this unperceived deficiency is in an unsatisfied state.

Again, I admit Warren's argument that it is pleasant to re-manifest one's latent knowledge. However, I do not see how this argument is consistent with another of his claims that the philosopher's knowledge is imperishable. He first points to the permanence of the object of Rational Pleasure and the soul to support the argument.¹¹⁷ On his reading, insofar as the object and the soul are changeless, it would be surprising if knowledge were forgettable. However, if this were so, it is unclear why one's knowledge could become latent, since becoming latent is a sort of change. Warren

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p.40.

might answer that what becomes latent is a sort of second-order knowledge. Yet, this answer is not satisfactory, because if the first-order knowledge is changeless in virtue of the permanence of its object, i.e. the Form, and its container, i.e. the soul, this second-order knowledge should be changeless as well since its object, i.e. the first-order knowledge, and its container, i.e. the soul, are permanent. Hence, if Warren holds that knowledge of the Form is unforgettable, he is unable to maintain that the philosopher enjoys the pleasure of revisiting what he already knows.

I admit that it is highly likely that knowledge is hardly forgotten because of the stability of the Form and the soul; nevertheless, I do not think that it is plausible that knowledge is unforgettable. First, we have to note that, if the stability at issue guaranteed that the knowledge of the Forms is unforgettable, it would be problematic that the soul, especially the reasoning element, can be filled up. This is because even though the soul is regarded as a sort of eternal thing (585c), it undergoes a change while learning. This shows that the stability and eternity of the soul do not guarantee its changelessness. What is guaranteed is at best the fact that the reasoning element is rarely changed.

In this context, it is noteworthy that the philosopher has an extraordinary memory. Strictly speaking, the philosopher's special memory does not suffice to demonstrate that his knowledge is unforgettable. At best, this memory justifies that a philosopher *rarely* forgets what he has already learned, since an outstanding memory is not the same as a perfect memory which does not forget anything. So, a philosopher can forget

what he has learned, even though this happens very rarely. In other words, the knowledge which the philosopher possesses is not unforgettable; it is just scarcely forgotten. He cannot hold his knowledge eternally, so it is unacceptable that there is no pleasure of learning the Forms after reaching the phase of learning the Form of the Good. It is an open possibility that a philosopher enjoys the pleasure which is derived from learning what he has learned previously but does not remember any longer, even though this pleasure may occur rarely. Indeed, the possibility also seems to be open that a philosopher enjoys the pleasure that is derived from learning what he does not know, even after his initial learning of the Form of the Good.

Let me sum up my argument so far. Every Rational Pleasure consists in the process of filling a sort of desire. If we focus on the sort of Rational Pleasures which a philosopher enjoys while doing philosophy, there are two sorts of the pleasure of doing philosophy. The first kind of Rational Pleasure is a pleasure which is derived from filling ignorance. This pleasure comes from acquiring knowledge of each one of new Forms which the philosopher contemplates. This pleasure also comes from re-learning what he has learned previously but has forgotten; yet, this rarely happens, given the permanence of the soul and the Form as well as the outstanding memory of the philosopher. On top of that, the second kind of Rational Pleasure is derived from re-manifesting one's latent knowledge. In this case, what is filled is not a kind of psychological lack which should be filled up with new intellectual fillers. Rather, this lack consists in a sort of dormancy of one's existing knowledge. This pleasure may come about when one conducts dialectic while going through the Forms.

V.2.3.2.1.2. Is The Pleasure of Doing Philosophy Pure?

In this section, I shall maintain that Rational Pleasure which is enjoyed while doing philosophy is pure. If we focused on Book IX alone, especially 583b-587a, there might be no doubt that this pleasure is pure. That is to say, as I showed in V.2.1., the dialogue's metaphysical consideration of this pleasure seems successfully to conclude that this pleasure is pure. However, if we adopt a distance from the text, it seems more plausible to say that this pleasure is actually mixed with pain. For instance, one might solve a mathematical conundrum after long frustration, so we can presume that the pleasure of solving it is often mixed with pain.¹¹⁸ To make matters worse, the other books of the dialogue display many signals that this pleasure may be accompanied by serious pains. Therefore, it is not easily acceptable to conclude that the philosopher takes pleasure in doing philosophy without actually experiencing any pain.

There are several passages where we can find it expressed that the pleasure of learning may be attended great pains. First of all, Socrates at 494d5-8 points out that it is necessary to work like a slave to achieve the intelligence that one lacks. Second, he explicitly mentions that the future-guardians should be tested in the form of toils (503e1-504a1). Third, a prisoner in the Cave should suffer pain when he is forced to stand up (515c8, e2) as well as when he is dragged to the upper world (515e8-516b3).

¹¹⁸ Purshouse 2006, p.123.

Fourth, the ideal educational program which the future guardians attend, especially the course of learning arithmetic and dialectic, is painful (526c1-2, 535c1). Fifth, the real lover of learning has a nature to struggle toward what-is, which results in a toil (490a8-b7).¹¹⁹ All these passages might lead us to conclude that for Socrates, intellectually speaking: No pain, no gain.

The pleasure which Socrates in Book IX cares about consists in the filling of a psychological lack, so the pain which is the counterpart of pleasure must be associated with the process of filling *this* lack. Hence, I am sure that there is no need to be concerned with the passages which do not deal with the pain in question. This shows that, among the five passages mentioned above, we can ignore the following passages because the pains in these passages are not those which come about from a lack, the process of the filling of which brings about the accompanying Rational Pleasures: 494d, 503e1-504a1, 515c-e, and 535c1. Therefore, I want to focus on another group of passages, namely 490a8-b8, 515e-516b, and 526c1-2.

Let me first visit the scene of the analogy of the Cave in which the prisoner is forced toward the outside world (515e5-516b2).¹²⁰ To support the purity of Rational Pleasure,

¹¹⁹ Gibbs puts the first four passages on the table (Gibbs 2001, pp.18-20.).

¹²⁰ εἰ δέ, ἥν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐντεῦθεν ἔλκοι τις αὐτὸν βίᾳ διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους, καὶ μὴ ἀνείη πρὶν ἐξελκύσειεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἄρα οὐχὶ ὀδυᾶσθαι τε ἂν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἐλκόμενον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔλθοι, αὐγῆς ἂν ἔχοντα τὰ ὄμματα μεστὰ ὀρᾶν οὐδ' ἂν ἐν

one might interpret that the pain which the prisoner experiences in this scene is caused merely by enforcement, and thus this pain is not the pain which makes the accompanying pleasure impure.¹²¹ However, the pain which a prisoner in the analogy experiences is not restricted to the pain that is caused by enforcement. Let me draw particular attention to the last compulsion which a prisoner in the cave undergoes. This compulsion is not only of seeing the sunlight outside but also a compulsion felt from climbing up a steep path. This climbing must be painful without any enforcement, so there is at least one sort of pain which is not caused by enforcement. This is supported by the fact that it is highly likely that Socrates here refers to Hesiod's *Works and Days* 289-292¹²² where the poet illustrates the steep path to *aretê* which it is toilsome to

δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν;

¹²¹ Warren 2014, pp.29-32. Warren argues that the prisoner is compared to one who is not educated in the ideal-city, so one who is raised through the ideal educational program of the ideal city does not experience the pains in the analogy, since this program does not enforce a pupil to make a rapid transition. However, on my interpretation, the prisoner is compared to a person who is trained to be a philosopher-ruler. This is not merely because of the wide context at which this analogy is located, i.e. in illustrating who a philosopher, being proper to be a ruler of the ideal city, is. More importantly, Socrates explicitly states that the analogy is a comparison with one's nature concerning education and lack of it (μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ, εἶπον, ἀπείκασον τοιοῦτῳ πάθει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας, 514a1-2), which prohibits understanding a prisoner as being in a sort of special condition. That is, the process of climbing up the cave and observing real things outside is a comparison not just with that which someone who is not nurtured in the ideal city goes through, but rather a comparison with that which everyone who has finally reached the pure realm should undergo. Thus, it is not justifiable to see a stark difference between one who participates in an ideal education and a prisoner in the analogy.

¹²² τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροισεν ἔθηκαν/ ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν/ καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται,/ ῥηιδίῃ δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπὴ περ ἐοῦσα.

climb up.¹²³ That is to say, just as the steep path of the *Works and Days* denotes a path towards a sort of higher state, so is the path in the analogy - the road from a sensible realm to an intelligible realm - toilsome. This line of interpretation in the analogy copes well with 526c1-2,¹²⁴ where arithmetic is described as the most stressful discipline. The path at issue in this analogy is the transitory stage between the cave and the outer world. Likewise, the arithmetic is the first discipline which draws one's soul from the world of becoming toward the world of what-is (521d4-5). This shows that the path is compared to arithmetic. So, just as going up the path itself is more painful than the path at other stages in the cave, so is arithmetic the most stressful discipline.

So, is the pain offered by the steep path caused by the lack the filling of which results in the pleasure of learning arithmetic? There is no decisive clue to interpret this pain in this way. Yet, we can presume that studying arithmetic exposes one to a need of studying the world which is beyond the perceptible and thus makes him recognize his ignorance of this world. This ignorance can be at least partially filled by studying this discipline. Thus, we can also presume that the pleasure which one experiences while studying this discipline is impure, since one must take pain in this study.

¹²³ Plato often refers to the same passage (*Republic* 364c; *Protagoras* 340d; *Laws* 718e).

¹²⁴ καὶ μὲν, ὥς ἐγώ μαι, ἃ γε μείζω πόνον παρέχει μανθάνοντι καὶ μελετῶντι, οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὖροις ὥς τοῦτο.

However, this pain makes no serious violation of the third proof of the superiority of the just person, in which the purity of Rational Pleasure is an issue. The first point of the proof argues that the just person meets his overall desire to the greatest possible degree. To be more precise, the point argues that it is the philosopher who meets his overall desire to the greatest extent while mainly enjoying Rational Pleasure. Obviously, the pleasure of studying arithmetic is the pleasure which the philosopher has already experienced when he was in the process of becoming a philosopher, but does not experience any longer after becoming the philosopher. This means that this pleasure is not a kind of pleasure which the proof cares about. Therefore, 515e-516b and 526c1-2 do not disprove the third proof.

In turn, let me visit 490a8-b8. One might assert about this passage that the philosopher who has attained the goal of the desire of his reasoning element is relieved from pain, while admitting that the process of being raised as a philosopher might be painful. One might then chalk the pain of this process up to the compulsion which a prisoner experiences.¹²⁵ However, I prefer to resist this way of reading the passage, on the ground that the pain in the passage must be different from the pain which a prisoner of the analogy of the cave suffers. Let me first give the text 490a8-b7.

So, won't it be reasonable, then, for us to plead in his defense that a real lover of learning naturally strives for what is? He does not linger over each of the many things that are believed to be, but keeps on going without losing or lessening his erotic-desire, until he grasps what the nature of each thing itself is with the element of his soul that is fitted to grasp a thing of that sort because of its kinship with it. Once he has drawn near to it, has intercourse with what really

¹²⁵ Warren 2014, pp.30-31.

is, and has begotten intelligence and truth, he knows, truly lives, is nourished, and – at that point, but not before – is relieved from his toils (*ôdis*)?¹²⁶

This passage is situated in the context of explaining the nature of the philosopher (485a-497c). To be more specific, the passage is a part of the argument that a philosopher who is licensed to be a ruler is not completely wicked (*pamponêros*, 489d-490e). So, it is noticeable that the passage mentions the toil which seems unavoidable, since this may mean that there is a kind of impure pleasure which a philosopher ought to experience.

Obviously, the toil under consideration is caused not by others' enforcement but by one's own erotic desire. One way of understanding the meaning of this toil is to consider its literal meaning, i.e. 'birth-pains' (*ôdis*). This passage mentions 'begetting', thus it might be a promising way to unfold the meaning of it, and indeed many scholars adopt this meaning.¹²⁷ However, we have to bear in mind that a birth-pain ceases upon the completion of the process of begetting. By contrast, the toil at issue is abated not when a soul begets intelligence but when it achieves knowledge and lives truly. That

¹²⁶ ἄρ' οὖν δὴ οὐ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὄν πεφυκὼς εἶη ἀμιλλᾶσθαι ὃ γε ὄντως φιλομαθῆς, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμένει ἐπὶ τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι πολλοῖς ἐκάστοις, ἀλλ' ἴοι καὶ οὐκ ἀμβλύνοιτο οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἐκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἄψασθαι ὃ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου—προσήκει δὲ συγγενεῖ— ὃ πλησιάσας καὶ μιγείς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῶη καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὠδίνος, πρὶν δ' οὕ;

¹²⁷ Rosen 1965, p.472.; Grube 1997b, p.1113; Griffith 2003, p.193.

is to say, we have to note that there is an additional step to take in order to be free from the toil at issue after giving a birth. So, this toil must not be understood as a sort of birth-pain.

In view of this, I contend that the toil under consideration amounts to the pain which comes from the erotic desire in question. This is because this desire does not cease until a soul attains a state which makes the toil abate, meaning that the desire and the toil cease at the same time. If this is so, the toil comes from a sort of internal drive, and thus it is different from the pain which a prisoner suffers because of an external enforcement.

Now, one might consider this passage as clear evidence that there is one kind of Rational Pleasure which is impure. This is because the passage explicitly states that there is one kind of desire which a philosopher naturally has *qua* philosopher and which is painful. That is to say, the passage might imply the link between the desire of knowing and the realization of one's ignorance that might be painful.¹²⁸ Therefore, it is necessary to inquire into the passage a little further.

I think that it is necessary to note that the passage does not clarify the object of the 'erotic desire'. This means that it is too quick to believe that the object of it is

¹²⁸ Warren 2010, pp.6-8.

knowledge, learning, etc. Thus, the desire might not be a desire of the reasoning element, so the toil at issue might not be a sort of pain which Socrates is concerned with in terms of the purity of Rational Pleasure. Hence, it is required for us to examine what the object of this desire is.

It is worth noting that there is a cessation of the erotic desire not merely when one achieves knowledge but also when he starts to live truly. Possessing knowledge is a precondition of living justly which would be the same as living truly, so we can consider that the desire ceases when one starts to live justly. Thus, we can consider that *eros* as a desire is satisfied not with attaining knowledge or true belief but with living a just life. This line of thought can be buttressed when we carefully consider the specific context of the passage under consideration. While explaining the nature of the philosopher, Socrates is asked to answer whether a philosopher is altogether wicked and whether he is useless (487b-d). He first answers that it is not weird for a philosopher to be viewed as being useless by others (487e-489d). Socrates then rebuts a public opinion that a philosopher is altogether wicked (489d-490e). So, what the passage at issue, i.e. 490a8-b7, which is situated at the middle of this rebuttal, has to deal with is not whether a philosopher really pursues the truth. Rather, the passage ought to talk about whether he is virtuous, i.e. whether he lives virtuously. Therefore, presumably, the erotic-desire in question is a desire which can be satiated with living a just life.

So, does this erotic desire belong to the reasoning element of the soul? Even though

becoming just is not a matter merely of this psychic element, it is evident that that which has this desire is the reasoning element, because being just amounts to arranging the state of the soul in accordance with what this element pursues. Thus, there is no doubt that the pleasure of satisfying this desire is a clear example of impure pleasure of the reasoning element of the soul.

If this is so, one might worry whether the first point of the third proof is invalid to some extent, because the passage gives an example of an impure Rational Pleasure although the first point supposes that every Rational Pleasure is pure. However, the proof is not invalid because the desire of living justly is not a desire which one has while living a just life. That is to say, the just person has already satisfied this desire and then does not have it anymore. So, the pleasure of living this life is not a Rational Pleasure which the philosopher enjoys while living a just life, i.e. a good life.

In conclusion, even though there are several passages in the dialogue which seem to imply the impurity of Rational Pleasure, actually none of them provides evidence for the impurity of Rational Pleasure which one who lives the supreme life enjoys. To be more specific, first of all, most of the passages at issue do not deal with the pain which is caused by the psychological lack, the filling of which is consisted in by Rational Pleasure, so these passages do not offer a big problem. Second, the following three passages deal with the kinds of Rational Pleasure which are impure: 490a-b, 515e-516b, and 526c1-2. Yet, the pleasures in these three passages are not enjoyed by the just person, so the impurity of this pleasure does not mar the third proof. Accordingly,

there is no passage which indicates that the philosopher enjoys impure Rational Pleasure while doing philosophy.

V.2.3.2.2. The Life of Ruling and Its Rational Pleasure

V.2.3.2.2.1. The Pleasure of Recovering Knowledge and The Pleasure of Acquiring True Beliefs

In this section, I shall investigate what kinds of Rational Pleasure the philosopher-king enjoys while ruling the ideal city. I shall first maintain that the philosopher, when he is ruling, can obtain pleasure in taking up the knowledge stored in one's mind. I shall also argue that there are two sorts of pleasure which are derived from filling one's reasoning element with true beliefs while ruling: the pleasure of identifying city-affairs; and the pleasure of having a grasp of what has to come about in the ideal city.

Socrates does not illustrate in detail how the philosopher-ruler lives while ruling the ideal city. So, it is difficult to see what it is like to live as a ruler. Yet, the analogy of the Cave provides us with two obvious features of this life: (1) the ruler cannot do philosophy while ruling the city, because ruling is conducted in the Cave which is likened to the perceptible realm (517a-b); and (2) ruling must be conducted with reference to the ruler's knowledge of the Form, because he is licensed as a ruler by virtue of this knowledge (520c). These features do not give a clear picture of the life of the philosopher *qua* ruler. However, I find them to be sufficient starting-points to examine what kind of pleasure the philosopher-ruler enjoys in ruling.

(1) reveals that, while ruling the city, there is no pleasure derived from learning new knowledge by observing the Forms. Yet, this does not mean that there is not any pleasure which is associated with knowledge in the ruler's life. This is because the ruler has to use his knowledge to rule, as (2) indicates. To be more specific, first of all, the ruler ought to reconsider the several things which he already knows in order to rule well. We can draw the following point from Socrates' comparison of the ruler to the painter (501a9-b7): the ruler has to swing his attention from his existing knowledge-bank to the city and vice versa just as the painter looks back and forth between his model and his picture while working.¹²⁹ That is, the philosopher can be a great ruler only by referring to the knowledge he has not paid attention to when managing city affairs. Thus, by revisiting his latent knowledge to instantiate it in the city or to make a judgment about an affair of city, this knowledge becomes manifest. That is, by virtue of shifting his attention between the knowledge at issue and things in the city in the business of ruling the city, his latent knowledge becomes obvious. This must result in pleasure, since we can consider it to be a sort of filling of a psychological lack to make one's latent knowledge manifest. Therefore, just as the philosopher obtains pleasure in taking up one's knowledge again while doing philosophy, so is he pleased by

¹²⁹ οὐκοῦν μετὰ ταῦτα οἷε ὑπογράψασθαι ἂν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας;/ τί μὴν;/ ἔπειτα οἶμαι ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἐκατέρωσ' ἀποβλέποιεν, πρὸς τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, συμμειγνύντες τε καὶ κεραννύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρεῖκελον, ἀπ' ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον

recovering his attention of his latent knowledge while ruling the city.¹³⁰

Additionally, the philosopher-ruler takes pleasure in being filled with true beliefs while identifying each thing in the perceptible realm. It is noticeable that ruling consists not in one's contact with the intelligible realm but in his contact with the perceptible realm. In this respect, it is first worth noting that the philosopher who returns to the cave would be initially confused by the identity of a shadow in the Cave (517d4-e1);¹³¹ then he would come to familiarize himself with the darkness and see everything in the Cave better than others do, since he knows what each image is in it (520c3-4).¹³² This implies that, when a ruler starts to rule, he is not good at discerning, say, which current affair of the City is just and which one is not; he begins to discern which one is just and which one is not as time goes by. This means that he does not have a sort of true belief, i.e. of which current affair of the city is just, when he starts ruling. So, we can presume that the philosopher-ruler has a sort of ignorance when he

¹³⁰ Warren 2014, pp.49-50. Strictly, Warren does not admit that the ruler revisits his *knowledge* but that he turns his attention “to the Forms” (ibid., p.49.). I think that it is incorrect to say that the ruler is able to gain access to the Form while ruling. Yet, for me, the gist of Warren’s argument is correct insofar as we understand ‘a ruler’s attention to the Forms’ as really amounting to his attention to his knowledge.

¹³¹ τόδε οἶε τι θαυμαστόν, εἰ ἀπὸ θείων, ἧν δ’ ἐγώ, θεωριῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπειά τις ἐλθὼν κακὰ ἀσχημονεῖ τε καὶ φαίνεται σφόδρα γελοῖος ἔτι ἀμβλυώττων καὶ πρὶν ἱκανῶς συνήθης γενέσθαι τῷ παρόντι σκότῳ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἐν δικαστηρίοις ἢ ἄλλοθι που ἀγωνίζεσθαι περὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί, καὶ διαμιλλᾶσθαι περὶ τούτου, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὑπολαμβάνεται ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῇν δικαιοσύνην μὴ πώποτε ἰδόντων;

¹³² συνεθιζόμενοι γὰρ μυρίῳ βέλτιον ὄψεσθε τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ γνώσεσθε ἕκαστα τὰ εἰδωλα ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὧν

first starts to rule, and then he is filled with true beliefs as he becomes more accustomed to ruling. True belief is one of the fillers of the soul (585b), so it is correct to say that one way of taking Rational Pleasure to have a true belief of the perceptible realm is to obtain a correct judgment on what is happening in the ideal city.

After obtaining true belief about what each thing is in the Cave, the philosopher-ruler can enjoy the pleasure of having another kind of true belief about the perceptible realm by instantiating his knowledge. Analogously, just as a painter can enjoy the pleasure of acknowledging what should be developed in his picture with reference to its model, so is the ruler able to take pleasure in acknowledging the direction to which the ideal-city should develop with reference to the Forms. For instance, the ruler ought to acknowledge, say, what is the just thing which should happen in the ideal city. Before managing the city, he is ignorant of the current state of the city. So, he is ignorant of the ideal next step of the city which he, as ruler, should take for the city, as well. While analyzing the ideal-city's current affairs, he starts to have the kind of true belief of what has to happen in the city. In short, while ruling the city, the philosopher-ruler's ignorance of what has to come about in the city is filled with true belief about this issue. This is a sort of filling of a psychological lack, so this must be pleasant.

To sum up, there are three kinds of Rational Pleasure which are derived from ruling. First, it is pleasant to revisit and recover the attention of one's latent knowledge which is evoked by identifying each particular perceptible thing in the city. Also, it is pleasant to be filled with true beliefs of the identity of each particular thing. Finally, the ruler

can be pleased while formulating a policy for the city by being filled with the true beliefs about what has to come about in the city.

V.2.3.2.2.2. Is The Pleasure Of Ruling Pure?

In this section, I shall first argue that most kinds of Rational Pleasure of ruling are pure. I shall add that although the pleasure of identifying the things in the Cave is not pure, this is not a big problem for Socrates' overall argument in defence of the superiority of the just life.

Let us begin with the two kinds of Rational Pleasure of ruling which are agreed to be pure. The first kind of pleasure is that which is derived from revisiting one's knowledge while ruling. As I argued in V.2.3.2.1.2., the philosopher is not in a state of pain when his knowledge becomes latent. This means that the pleasure of recovering knowledge is both preceded and followed by a sort of emptying process which is painless. Thus, the pleasure of recovering one's knowledge while ruling is pure.

The second kind of pure pleasure of ruling is that which occurs while the philosopher-ruler establishes a new policy. If this kind of pleasure were preceded by pain, this pain would be triggered at the moment of recognizing one's ignorance of this policy and then from the eagerness which one feels to fill it. However, I argue that there is not this sort of moment, based on the fact that the process of instantiating his knowledge is compared to the process of painting a picture in front of its model, at 500d-501b.

That is to say, presumably, that just as a painter should not struggle with finding out what is the missing part of his picture, because the model he is imitating is in front of him, so a ruler should not have to be eager to fill up his ignorance of what has to happen, which must be painful, since he has the model which he has to imitate in his head. In addition, the kind of pleasure under consideration must not be followed by any pain, since he will never possess the same ignorance again. This is because it is odd to suppose that the ideal-city will return to the very same situation in the future. Also, even if the city did return to be in the same state as it was previously, the philosopher would be highly likely to have the true belief about what he has to do, although this belief might be latent. Accordingly, the pleasure of making a policy is pure.

By contrast, the pleasure of identifying the things in the Cave must be impure. This is simply because a prisoner who returns to the Cave would be first confused by the identity of a shadow inside (517d-e), which causes pain. That is to say, while having a confusion, the philosopher who has just reentered the Cave must see that he lacks a true belief on what each shadow is. He returns there in order to rule, so he must desire to fill this lack, which is painful. This is because he cannot rule properly without having identified, say, which affair is just and which one is unjust, respectively.¹³³ Thus, this kind of pleasure is preceded by pain. On the other hand, we can consider

¹³³ Socrates does not explicitly talk about the necessity of this identification. Yet, he implies its necessity by indicating that the city can be managed properly after a prisoner who has returned from outside recovers his eyesight (520c).

that there is no pain which follows this pleasure, since he would not lose his eyesight again while ruling. Hence, the pleasure of identifying the things in the perceptible realm is impure in the sense that it must be preceded by pain.

Now, we have also identified a kind of pleasure as derived from ruling which stands against the message of the second proof that every Rational Pleasure the just person enjoys is pure. That is to say, the pleasure of identifying the things in the perceptible realm is not pure, which seems to represent a violation of the proof. So, is the second proof now disproved?

I argue that the violation which is inflicted by identifying this kind of pleasure is harmless, because the point of the impurity of pleasure is not about whether it is preceded by pain but about whether it is followed by pain. Let us return to the first point of the third proof. The point is that the just person who mainly enjoys pure Rational Pleasure, succeeds in satisfying one's overall desire better than do others. This is because the impurity of pleasure is the signal of just a temporary satisfaction of the related desire, which indicates that the desires related to pure pleasures are satisfied almost entirely. This shows that, strictly speaking, it is not the most fundamental issue whether Rational Pleasure is neither preceded nor followed by pain. Rather, the real issue is whether the desire of the reasoning element is entirely satisfied or not. So, it is not a big problem for the proof that the pleasure of identifying a shadow in the Cave is preceded by pain, since the desire related to it is almost completely satisfied because the philosopher-ruler will not have the same desire again after filling

it. Rather, he himself is good evidence for the argument that the just life is the life which meets one's overall desire to the greatest degree. This is because he succeeds in ending the specific desire for identifying the things in the perceptible realm. Thus, since it is a harmless violation that there is one kind of Rational Pleasure of ruling which is preceded by pain, we can still argue that the just person is better at meeting his overall desire than the unjust person is.

VI. Conclusion

I have devoted Part 2 to examining what kind of role Rational Pleasure plays in the good life according to the *Republic*. This dialogue regards the just life as the good life. As a second step, the just life is then identified with the philosophical life. So, it is plausible to expect that Rational Pleasure makes a significant contribution towards the goodness of the good life. However, the dialogue sees no constitutive role which Rational Pleasure plays in the life. Rather, the dialogue allocates an important and interesting role to play in this life to Rational Pleasure: one's preference for Rational Pleasure over other kinds of pleasure indicates the supremacy of one's life.

From a bird's eye perspective, the general picture of why Rational Pleasure is important in the good life is valid. Yet, we have to inspect it from a worm's eye perspective as well, since we can distinguish two different modes of the philosophical

life: (i) the life of doing philosophy; and (ii) the life of ruling the ideal-city. I have found that there are several kinds of Rational Pleasure which this dialogue takes into consideration. I have also found that some of them seem troublesome to the general picture under consideration at first glance. However, I claim that if we restrict the scope of Rational Pleasure to what the philosopher experiences while doing philosophy and ruling the city, there is no serious problem at all in the picture presented.

Part 3: The *Philebus*

Among all of Plato's dialogues, the *Philebus* offers the most detailed analysis of pleasure as a part of a discussion which is about the state (*hexis*) or disposition (*diathesis*) of the soul which provides a happy life to all humans (11d4-6).¹³⁴ The dialogue also makes it explicit that a good human life must contain certain kinds of pleasure (63e, 66c). Yet, unfortunately, the dialogue rarely deals with Rational Pleasure in an explicit manner, so it is not easy to clarify what kinds of role the dialogue presents Rational Pleasure as playing in the good human life. The only explicit investigation of this pleasure in the dialogue is found in 52a-b, where Socrates briefly comments that the pleasure of learning is a pure pleasure. He presents a high ranking among human possessions to the pure pleasure of the soul itself (66c), thus the pleasure of learning must have its own place in the good human life. However, it is not clear why this kind of pleasure is admired so much, and thus it is unclear why it is worth being included in this kind of life. Therefore, it is difficult to unfold the dialogue's constructive view on the association between Rational Pleasure and the good human life.

I think that the *Philebus* provides an interesting view on why Rational Pleasure is included in the good human life, which is significantly different from the views offered

¹³⁴ (ΣΩ.) Ὡς νῦν ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἔξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν ἀποφαίνειν τινὰ ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον εὐδαίμονα παρέχειν. ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως;

in the other two dialogues studied in this dissertation. To inquire into how Rational Pleasure is associated with the good human life in the case of the *Philebus*, I shall first of all distinguish two sorts of the good life, i.e. the best lived kind of life for humans and the best life for the gods. I shall contend that the former includes both pleasure and wisdom, whereas the latter merely includes wisdom (Chapter VII).

Based on this distinction, I shall first investigate how Rational Pleasure contributes to the good human life (Chapter VIII). This investigation will consist of two steps. The first step shall consist of an inquiry into whether pleasure is good in its own right, as many scholars insist (VIII.1). This insistence is worth thinking about, because, if it were correct, Rational Pleasure would be included in the good human life as being good in its own right. In my discussion, I shall first examine 20c-23b, a passage that a number of scholars read as evidence for pleasure's being good in its own right. I shall argue that the passage at issue does not determine whether pleasure is good in its own right or not (VIII.1.1). More positively, I shall then reject the claim that pleasure is good in its own right, by arguing that, according to the rest of the dialogue, every pleasure consists in a restorative process, so every pleasure as a *genesis* is not good in its own right since every *genesis* is for the sake of something else and is therefore not good by itself (VIII.1.2.).

The second step shall consist in establishing a constructive view on the association between Rational Pleasure and the good human life (VIII.2). I shall first turn to 53c-55c and claim that this passage compares pleasure to a means for something which is

good by itself (VIII.2.1.). I shall then clarify the sense in which Rational Pleasure can be compared to a means for the good human life by investigating 59e-65d (VIII.2.2.). I shall first argue here that Rational Pleasure deserves to be contained in the good human life as a necessary harmless ingredient of this life by scrutinizing 61d-63e (VIII.2.2.1.). I shall then inspect the rest of the dialogue and maintain that Rational Pleasure is a key motivator for engaging in the two disciplines whose study causes one's life to be good (VIII.2.2.2.).

In the next chapter, I shall inquire into the good life of the gods. (Chapter IX). I shall claim that this life is free from Rational Pleasure, but it is good in the same categorical sense in which the good human life is good.

In conclusion, I shall claim that, according to the *Philebus*, Rational Pleasure does not constitute the goodness of the good life in general; yet this pleasure plays a multiplicity of significant roles in the good life viable to human (Chapter X).

VII. The Two Sorts of The Good Life: The Human Good Life and The Divine Life

In this chapter, I shall present a brief sketch of the two sorts of the good life which are

distinguished in the *Philebus*: (a) the good human life; and (b) the good life which is lived by gods. As I shall show, interestingly, the latter kind of the good life, which is viable only to gods, includes no pleasure but wisdom in isolation; in contrast, the former kind of the good life, which is lived only by humans, consists of a mixture of both pleasure and wisdom.¹³⁵

Let me start by indicating that the dialogue's main interest is not in the good *per se* but in what is good in a qualified manner, i.e. what is good for human beings in particular. The text starts by reporting two distinct positions on what is good for certain beings. Philebus is reported to hold that pleasure and its kin are “good for all living beings (*pasi zôiois*)” (11b4-5).¹³⁶ By contrast, Socrates asserts that wisdom and its kin are at least better than pleasure and are indeed the most beneficial of all things for all beings who are capable of engaging with them (11b7-c2).¹³⁷ Protarchus takes over the Phileban position and then agrees to discuss, of these two candidates, what is the state

¹³⁵ The sketch that follows may be thought not to be very informative for two reasons. First, arguably, the whole dialogue is devoted mainly to identifying the good human life, and thus I cannot help postponing the task of seeing the full picture of it for later parts of the dissertation. Second, Socrates does not spend much time illustrating the good life for gods. Only after having a clear picture of the good human Life, can we understand what the good life for gods looks like in an indirect way.

¹³⁶ Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φησι τὸ χαίρειν πᾶσι ζώοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τούτου σύμφωνα

¹³⁷ τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμφισβήτημά ἐστι μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ μεμνησθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ συγγενῇ, δόξαν τε ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθεῖς λογισμούς, τῆς γε ἡδονῆς ἀμείνω καὶ λῶω γίνεσθαι σύμπασιν ὅσαπερ αὐτῶν δυνατὰ μεταλαβεῖν

or disposition of the soul that can provide the life which is happy to all humans (11d4-6).

We have first to note that the two initial positions which are set up in dispute are not about the good *per se*. I want to stress in this connection that Philebus insists that pleasure is good *to every living being*, whereas Socrates asserts that wisdom is good *to those which can engage with them*. Philebus' insistence is itself neutral between the assertion that pleasure is (a/the) good full stop, and the assertion that pleasure is (a/the) good to a certain kind of being, since the scope of every living being is not clear.¹³⁸ On the other hand, in the case of Socrates' assertion, it is more evident that he does not deal with the good full stop. He just mentions that wisdom is the most beneficial thing to a certain sort of being, i.e. those which can engage with it. The most beneficial thing may be, to Socrates, different from the good. Yet, even if the two are the same, we would have to notice that there is a clear qualification: "to those which can engage with them", versus for "all living beings". Therefore, it remains an open possibility that the following discussion is not about the good *per se* but is rather about what is good to a certain sort of being.

In light of this, we have to note that the two main interlocutors at 11d4-6 come to a consensus that what they want to investigate is the state of disposition of the soul in

¹³⁸ C.f. Harte, who sees only that the Philebus' position is neutral between the two positions: (i) pleasure is *the* good; (ii) pleasure is *a* good (Harte 2014, p.4.).

association with human happiness. First of all, it is important to notice that the two interlocutors want to focus on *human* happiness. As I mentioned just above, Philebus' position deals with every living being, which likely involves both human and non-human animals. On the other hand, Socrates thinks about that which can engage in wisdom, which means that he is not taking into account what is good for animals or plants which lacks wisdom. This shows that the main interlocutors still have to fix the scope of their discussion. Hence, they tacitly reach an agreement on the scope of living beings at issue, by agreeing that they care about *human* happiness. That is, it is impliedly conceded in the conversation that the discussion should be exclusively about humans.

Second, we have to notice that the two interlocutors want to focus on human *happiness*. The ultimate issue is therefore neither a small-scale criterion of life nor whether pleasure or wisdom in isolation is good to human beings. The fundamental interest is in human happiness. So, the two discussants seek to debate not only about a human life as a whole, and the place which is allocated to happiness within it, but also about how whatever is recognized as (a/the) good as fitted into a human life.¹³⁹

By virtue of my exploration of the dialogue so far, we can better understand the passage at 20c-23b (Let me denote this passage as the "Choice Argument"). The main

¹³⁹ I am inspired by Vogt 2017, pp.21-22 when reading the progression of the dialogue until 11d4-6 in this way.

message of this passage is that the good life is a mixed life of pleasure and wisdom, so we can be convinced that neither pleasure nor wisdom is the answer to the initial question of the two discussants, i.e. what is the state or disposition of the soul that can provide the happy life to all human beings. The Choice Argument does not make it explicit that it is itself concerned about a happy *human* life. Yet, given the initial issue of the two discussants, we can understand its conclusion as a claim that a good *human* life lacks neither of the two candidates. Also, I maintain that we can justify the argument's notable change of question from 'What is the good to [a] human being?' to 'What is the good life?' only when considering the argument as to the question 'What is the good life to [a] *human being*?'

A careful reading of the Choice Argument itself shows that what is agreed by the two interlocutors is not agreed about the good life full stop, but specifically about the good *human* life. That is, I claim that the mere consensus from the argument is that the good human life is a mixed life of wisdom and pleasure.

Let me support my claim by focusing on some salient features of the Choice Argument. This argument begins by providing three criteria of what is good (*to agathon*): the perfect (*teleon*), the sufficient (*hikanon*), and the choice-worthy (*haireton*) (20c-d).¹⁴⁰ Socrates then suggests a comparison between the two kinds of unmixed life, i.e. the

¹⁴⁰ The exact place where Socrates captures the third criterion by the notion of choice-worthiness (*hairetos*) is 22b1.

unmixed life of pleasure and the unmixed life of wisdom (20d-21a). Prior to analyzing how these two kinds of life are estimated, I want to spell out how Socrates explains the last criterion, i.e. choice-worthiness: “[E]verything that has any recognition of it (sc. what is good) hunts for it and desires to get hold of it and secure it for its very own”¹⁴¹ (20d8-9).¹⁴² What is notable in this explanation is that this criterion regards what is good as something which can be desired and then attained by an agent. This opens up the possibility that what is good for one living being is different from that for another living being, since some desideratum X may be attainable for one being while entirely unattainable and then unchoice-worthy for another being. If so, the possibility remains open that the good life for one being is significantly different from the good life for another being because the choice-worthiness criterion is agential.

In view of this, it is worth noting how each of two interlocutors sums up the argument. First, Protarchus comments that everyone/every living being (*pas*) would certainly select the mixed life (22a5), and that the two kinds of unmixed life are neither sufficient nor choice-worthy to humans and living creatures (*zōion*, 22a9-b2). It is a notable feature of this argument that Protarchus adopts the role of touchstone with which to test the two distinct kinds of life.¹⁴³ That is, it is Protarchus himself who says that he cannot experience pleasure without certain cognitive capacities and who would

¹⁴¹ Unless stated, my translation of the *Philebus* follows Frede 1993 with slight modifications.

¹⁴² πᾶν τὸ γινώσκον αὐτὸ θηρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται βουλόμενον ἐλεῖν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ κτήσασθαι

¹⁴³ Οὐκοῦν ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα βασανίζοντες ταῦτα; c.f. Harte 2014, p.8.

then find the unmixed life of pleasure unchoice-worthy (21b-d). It is also Protarchus himself who judges that the counterpart is not choice-worthy as well, when he states that “*to me* at least neither of the two kinds of life seems worthy of choice” (21e3-4).¹⁴⁴ Hence, what he can commit to his final comment is at most that the mixed life is sufficient and choice-worthy to humans and living creatures who share the same agential condition with him.

Second, Socrates assesses that neither of these two kinds of unmixed life is sufficient, perfect, and choice-worthy such that it can sustain them throughout their life (22b3-6).¹⁴⁵ In particular, I wish to draw attention to the fact that his final assessment contains a clear qualification: “[for any of the plants and animals] that can sustain them throughout their life”. This implies his thought that the argument is not about the good life *per se* but about the good life to those living things which can maintain this life. In other words, according to this thought, the argument is not about the life which is good to animals and plants, which are kinds of living being whom Protarchus might take into consideration. This is because both animals and plants cannot sustain the life of wisdom which is characterized by having intelligence and memory of everything (21d9-10),¹⁴⁶ since it is highly unlikely that plants and animals have these intellectual

¹⁴⁴ Οὐδέτερος ὁ βίος, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε τούτων αἰρετός, οὐδ' ἄλλω μὴ ποτε, ὡς ἐγώ μιν, φανῇ.

¹⁴⁵ Μὴ οὖν οὐκ ἦδη τούτων γε πέρι δῆλον ὡς οὐ-δέτερος αὐτοῖν εἶχε τάχαθόν; ἦν γὰρ ἂν ἱκανὸς καὶ τέλος καὶ πᾶσι φυτοῖς καὶ ζώοις αἰρετός, οἷσπερ δυνατὸν ἦν οὕτως ἀεὶ διὰ βίου ζῆν

¹⁴⁶ Εἴ τις δέξαιτ' ἂν αὖ ζῆν ἡμῶν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πᾶσαν

capacities. So, we can have a clearer understanding of the conclusion of the argument by slightly revising what Protarchus's final comment commits him to: the mixed life is good to humans and living creatures which have the required intellectual capacity.

Now, in light of this, what is the scope of living creature who possesses these intellectual capacities? To be more specific, is a god, who must have an intellectual capacity, a kind of *living being* which has an intellectual capacity, and is a god thus a living being whose good life is a mixed life of pleasure and wisdom as well? This question is worth thinking about because the response to it shapes the issue we have to tackle. If a good life which is lived by a god were a mixed life of pleasure and wisdom, it is questionable whether the association between Rational Pleasure and this life that a god enjoys is different from the association between Rational Pleasure which a human experiences in relation to the good human life, since the god's intellectual capacity must be superior to the human intellectual capacity. Conversely, if a good life which is lived by a god is not a mixed life, in other words, if this life is an unmixed life of wisdom, it becomes an issue why Rational Pleasure plays a specific value in the good human life while not in the other sort of the good life, i.e. the good life which is lived by a god.

To answer this question, we have to note that, according to Socrates, the life of the

divine intelligence (*theios nous*) without pleasure does not have the defect (*egklêma*) which the unmixed life of Socrates' own intelligence, i.e. human intelligence, possesses (22c3-6). As I mentioned above, the unmixed life of human intelligence is estimated as being neither sufficient nor choice-worthy to humans. This shows that, presumably, the defect of human intelligence under consideration is that, taken in isolation, it is neither sufficient nor choice-worthy to a human being. So, we can presume that the divine intelligence, taken in isolation, *is* both sufficient and choice-worthy to that which has this intelligence, namely gods. This means that the life of the divine intelligence without pleasure is a strong candidate for the good life which is lived by gods, since it meets at least two criteria for what is good.

It soon becomes clear that this good life is the unmixed life of intelligence. At 33b, the two interlocutors agree that one who selects the life of wisdom without any pleasure or pain deserves to be judged to live the most divine life, because it is improper (*aschêmaton*) for gods to experience pleasure or pain. The most divine life must be the supreme life to god. So, it is clearly revealed that the good life which is lived by a god is not a mixed life of wisdom and pleasure. This life is an unmixed life of divine wisdom.

We can now distinguish between two kinds of the good life. The first kind of the good life in this context is the unmixed life of divine wisdom that god can live (let me denote this as the "Divine Life"). The second kind of the good life is a mixed life of wisdom and pleasure that humans can live (let me denote this as the "Human Good Life").

The two kinds of the good life are different from each other partly in whether these lives contain pleasure or not. So one might wonder whether the goodness of a good life is not influenced by pleasure. Yet, we have to note that these two kinds of the good life are distinguished from each other by the agential factor as well. In other words, we have to consider that the agent who lives the first kind of the good life is different from the agent who lives the second kind of the good life. So, if one's agential condition determines the best life viable to oneself, pleasure can make a significant contribution towards one sort of the good life, while having no influence on the other sort of the good life. Thus, it should be asked what kind of effect one's agential condition actually has on the relation between pleasure and the good life one can live. In other words, provided that the Human Good Life must include pleasure whilst the Divine Life must not, we should ask why the human agential condition makes it necessary for the Human Good Life to include pleasure. More specifically, given the main interest of this dissertation, and given that this life must contain Rational Pleasure, we should ask what kind of influence human agential condition has on the relation between Rational Pleasure and this life. By answering this question, we can see why the Divine Life is the supreme kind of life, even though it lacks pleasure as well, since we will have already clarified the difference between two agential conditions in order to answer the question. Therefore, the following chapter shall focus on investigating the Human Good Life in order to respond this question, and then I will proceed to examine the Divine Life with the help of the response to the question at issue.

VIII. Rational Pleasure and The Human Good Life

In Chapter VII, I distinguished between two sorts of the good life: the Human Good Life and the Divine Life. Both sorts of life are good, but there are two important differences between the two: (1) the former has pleasure whilst the latter does not; (2) the former is exclusively viable to humans whilst the latter is exclusively viable to god. These two differences lead us to ask what kind of influence one's agential condition has on the relation between Rational Pleasure and the good life one can live.

To answer this question, I want to first examine the Human Good Life, partly because the dialogue is, arguably, devoted to establishing a clear picture of this life, and thus we can draw a clearer picture of it than we can draw a picture of the Divine Life. At the same time, I am convinced that, only with the help of having seen what the Human Good Life looks like, we are licensed to speculate about the Divine Life. Hence, I shall devote Chapter VIII to examining the Human Good Life.

VIII.1. Is Rational Pleasure Good in its own right?

The initial question of the *Philebus* is, out of two rival candidates, i.e. (a) pleasure and its kin and (b) wisdom and its kin, which is the state or disposition of the soul that provides with the happy human life (11d4-6). Then, early in the dialogue, the Choice Argument contends that neither pleasure nor wisdom is the good (20c-23b). This argument is not directly concerned with Rational Pleasure; yet, for my purposes, it is necessary to visit this argument because of a line of influential interpretation which

has insisted that the argument implies that pleasure is good for its own sake. In other words, on this interpretation, pleasure is intrinsically good in the sense that it is good not because of its relation to another thing, but only of what and how it is in itself. If this line of interpretation were correct, Rational Pleasure would have its place in the Human Good Life at least as a good. To be more specific, given that this life is good to humans whilst the Divine Life is good to gods, if pleasure were a good *for human*, we would be able to insist the following two points: (1) Rational Pleasure is contained in the Human Good Life as a good to humans; and (2) the reason why Rational Pleasure is not included in the Divine Life may be that this pleasure is not a good to god.

VIII.1.1. Is Pleasure Good for its own sake?

In VIII.1.1, I shall examine the issue whether the Choice Argument supports the interpretation that pleasure is good in its own right. To examine this issue, let me first briefly introduce the Choice Argument. As I mentioned above, the interlocutors agree on the following three criteria for the good (*to agathon*, 20c-d): that it is perfect, sufficient, and choice-worthy. Socrates then proposes to examine whether either of the two lives satisfies the criteria, i.e. the life of pleasure without any mixture of wisdom and the life of wisdom without any mixture of pleasure, by employing Protarchus as a touch-stone (20e-21a). Socrates first gets Protarchus to answer that he would have no further need if he lived his whole life enjoying the greatest pleasure. He then shows that the life in which one enjoys the greatest pleasure needs for one to possess cognitive abilities by revealing the three consequences of the absence of these abilities,

concerning the past, present, and future respectively. His interlocutor thus confesses himself speechless on whether this life is choice-worthy (21b-d). With respect to the life of wisdom without any pleasure, Protarchus considers that it is not choice-worthy either (21d-e). Accordingly, he admits that neither pleasure nor wisdom is the good since neither of the two lives under consideration is sufficient or choice-worthy. Therefore, he declares that everyone would choose a life in which both pleasure and wisdom are mixed together (21e-22a).

It is obvious from the Choice Argument that each of the two unmixed lives is not choice-worthy. This is because each of them omits something that a mixed life includes. In particular, in the case of the unmixed life of wisdom, it lacks pleasure and thus the life is not choice-worthy. So, what is it about pleasure which prevents this life from being good, by virtue of its omission?¹⁴⁷ In other words, provided that the Human Good Life must be a certain kind of mixed life, what is it about pleasure which makes this life choice-worthy by virtue of its inclusion?

Some scholars offer a line of reading which offers an apparently promising answer to

¹⁴⁷ Evans argues that an unmixed life is not livable since pleasure is to some extent cognitive whilst cognition is to some extent pleasant (Evans 2007, p.340.). It is clear that Socrates is concerned with the point that pleasure is to some extent cognitive at 21b-c. By contrast, with respect to cognition, I depart from Evans, since I think that it is unclear whether Socrates regards it as impossible to suppose that every act of cognition is pleasureless. This is because Protarchus offers no further explanation why he believes that the unmixed life of wisdom is not choice-worthy (21d-e).

this question: pleasure is a good and thus the life which is absent of it is not choice-worthy since it omits a good (Let me call this the “Intrinsic Reading”).¹⁴⁸ Let me give a brief sketch of the reading. The life of pleasure at issue is a life which partakes in the greatest pleasures (21a9, b3-4), so there is no room for the person who lives this life to experience more pleasure. This signifies that wisdom cannot be an instrument for making the mixed life more pleasant in any sense. So, the value the inclusion of wisdom adds to the mixed life is not anything derivative from the value of pleasure, and thus wisdom is good in itself. This can be extended to understand the value of pleasure. The unmixed life of wisdom comprises several sorts of intellectual capacities (21d-e), so the value which the involvement of pleasure adds to the mixed life is not anything derivative from the value of wisdom. Therefore, pleasure is good in itself.¹⁴⁹

The Intrinsic Reading insists that pleasure is intrinsically good. In addition, as I claimed above, what is agreed in the Choice Argument is that an unmixed life of either pleasure or wisdom is not choice-worthy to *humans*. So pleasure would be intrinsically good for *humans* if this reading were correct. Moreover, if this reading were correct, we would be able to maintain the following two points: (1) Rational Pleasure is good in its own right to human beings and thus it should be contained in the Human Good

¹⁴⁸ E.g. Irwin 1995, pp.332-338; Cooper 1999, pp.186-206. Irwin focuses on the Choice Argument when arguing that pleasure is intrinsically good. Cooper proceeds further by referring to the cosmogony of the dialogue. That is, by showing that the pleasures which are allowed to be included in the best life are mixtures of *peras*-*apeiron*, he asserts that only these are good in themselves.

¹⁴⁹ E.g. Irwin 1995, pp.332-335.

Life; and (2) the Divine Life lacks Rational Pleasure, possibly because this pleasure is not good for its own sake to gods.¹⁵⁰ The chain of thought which is drawn from the reading is somehow persuasive at first glance, so it is worth investigating it in further depth.

Defenders of the Intrinsic Reading believe that the Choice Argument reveals that a kind of pleasure which is mixed into a choice-worthy life (to humans) is good in its own right (to humans). However, I resist this belief for a number of reasons. First of all, the Intrinsic Reading takes its first step without caution. In other words, it is somewhat hasty to be convinced that it is stipulated in 21b3-4 that the unmixed life of pleasure contains the greatest pleasure. Rather, the possibility remains open that, in 21b3-5,¹⁵¹ Socrates instead asks Protarchus to examine whether such a life really possesses the greatest pleasures.¹⁵² Regardless of which of these two interpretations of 21b3-4 is the case, there is no problem in reaching the same conclusion, i.e. that

¹⁵⁰ Evans considers it the main philosophical problem of the Intrinsic Reading that, on this reading, the Divine Life lacks a good since this life is characterized as the life exhaustively devoted to wisdom (Evans 2007, pp.357-358.). However, given that there is a significant difference between human intellect and divine intellect (22c), it is problematic to equate the life of wisdom, taken in isolation, which is allocated to a human being with the Divine Life which is assigned to the gods. Also, Evans seems to believe that, on this reading, pleasure is a good without any qualification. Yet, insofar as the Choice Argument depends on the choice of Protarchus who is a human being, a supporter of the reading at issue can be happy to admit that pleasure is good in its own right merely *for humans*.

¹⁵¹ (ΠΡΩ.) πάντα γὰρ ἔχοιμι' ἄν που τὸ χαίρειν ἔχων. (ΣΩ.) Οὐκοῦν οὕτω ζῶν ἀεὶ μὲν διὰ βίου ταῖς μεγίσταις.

¹⁵² Lear 2004, pp. 54-55 n.14.

only a mixed life can be good to humans. By contrast, the Intrinsic Reading can be established only when the two interlocutors initially agree that the life that is devoted only to pleasure is the most pleasant. This is because the reading supposes that the value of wisdom added to the mixed life is not derivative from pleasure, since the value of pleasure is fully actualized in the life of pleasure alone. Therefore, the Intrinsic Reading is on a weak starting-point.

Even if the life devoted to pleasure alone contains the greatest pleasure, it does not automatically follow the obvious point that the value which pleasure attaches to the mixed life is not derivative from the value which wisdom has. When the Intrinsic Reading regards that there is no value that is derivative from pleasure which is added to the mixed life when wisdom is mixed into the unmixed life of pleasure, this reading supposes that pleasure, taken in isolation, has its own value. Yet, it is plausible to suppose that pleasure and wisdom are valuable in an extrinsic sense. In other words, they may be valuable only insofar as they are mixed with each other.¹⁵³ For instance, the value which emerges when pleasure is mixed into the unmixed life of wisdom may not be derivative of the value of wisdom that the unmixed life already contains, since the added value may emerge only by virtue of its mixing with wisdom.¹⁵⁴ Therefore,

¹⁵³ C.f. Evans 2007, p.347, who asserts that the intrinsic reading rules out the possibility that the mixed life possesses some features which are not goods but which are necessary for it to be a human life.

¹⁵⁴ C.f. Aufderheide, who maintains that each candidate for the human good, pleasure and wisdom, may only have a value only insofar as they are ingredients of the best life (Aufderheide 2011, p.29 n.17.).

it is not legitimate to insist that pleasure is good in its own right because the value which emerges when it is mixed with wisdom does not itself derive from wisdom.

In addition, even if wisdom is good for its own sake, it is not obvious that pleasure is good for its own sake too. This is because it is not clear that the characterization of the kinds of the unmixed life in the Choice Argument is symmetrical. The Intrinsic Reading insists that there is no room for the unmixed life of pleasure to contain more pleasure, based on the fact that this life already includes the greatest pleasures (21a-b). Likewise, this reading interprets that there is no room for the unmixed life of wisdom to contain more wisdom. Yet, this interpretation is not well-grounded, since Socrates in 21d9-e2¹⁵⁵ does not state that this life contains the greatest wisdom. He just makes it explicit that this life includes several sorts of wisdom. So, unlike the life which is devoted only to pleasure, which not only is unmixed but also contains its sole ingredient to the highest degree, the life of wisdom alone is characterized merely as an unmixed life of wisdom. Thus, it is not entirely plain that there is no room for this life to take on any more wisdom. This means that a mixed life of pleasure and wisdom may contain more wisdom than the unmixed life of wisdom does. Therefore, it remains an open possibility that pleasure in a mixed life has an instrumental value in the service of increasing the extent of wisdom in that life.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵ Εἴ τις δέξαιτ' ἄν αὖ ζῆν ἡμῶν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πᾶσαν πάντων κεκτημένος, ἡδονῆς δὲ μετέχων μήτε μέγα μήτε μικρόν, μηδ' αὖ λύπης, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν ἀπαθὴς πάντων τῶν τοιούτων.

¹⁵⁶ C.f. Fletcher, who insists that the Choice Argument leaves open that wisdom functions merely as a

Finally, there are two remarks in the conclusion of the Choice Argument which implicitly rebut the Intrinsic Reading. It is shown that neither pleasure nor wisdom is the good to humans, so Socrates suggests deciding which has to get the second prize. To make a decision, he raises two questions: (i) Is one of them a cause for the mixed life? And (ii) Is wisdom more akin to (*suggenesteron*) and more similar to (*homoioteron*) that which makes the life choice-worthy and good? (22c-e). For me, these two questions raised by Socrates undermine the Intrinsic Reading.¹⁵⁷

By raising two distinct questions, at first glance, Socrates seems to be thinking about two different ways of understanding the cause of the goodness of the Human Good Life. That is, first, he suggests the possibility that either of the two candidates for the good is the single cause at issue by raising (i); he also proposes the possibility that neither of the two candidates, but *something else instead*, is the ultimate cause of the goodness of the life by raising (ii). Yet, he immediately removes his attention from (i) after raising (ii), and asserts that it is not pleasure but wisdom which is more akin to the ultimate cause (22d7-8).¹⁵⁸ Without leaving any hint that supposes only one cause of the mixture, he supposes both that there is an ultimate cause and that the two

means to pleasure although pleasure is not allotted a similar instrumental role. She then contends that pleasure and wisdom are not symmetrical in the Argument (Fletcher 2012, p.20 n.36.).

¹⁵⁷ I am indebted to Aufderheide in this point, who shows that the intrinsic reading is troubled by the two questions (Aufderheide 2011, pp.30-32.).

¹⁵⁸ οὐχ ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ νοῦς τούτῳ συγγενέστερον καὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι

candidates are causes in an indirect sense, depending on how much they are akin to the ultimate cause.

I argue that the Intrinsic Reading is not compatible with Socrates' supposition that wisdom is more akin to the ultimate cause. On this reading, both pleasure and wisdom are good by themselves. On the other hand, this supposition reveals that one of the two is better than the other. This means that, on this reading, one good is better than the other while the lesser good is still good in its own right. For this reading has to explain why wisdom is better than pleasure while pleasure is good in its own right. I do not wish to assert that there is no way of answering the question. What I rather want to highlight is just that the Choice Argument itself is silent on the answer to this question. Insofar as we do not have a proper answer, the reading is not proven. Thus, it is too quick to accept the Intrinsic Reading merely based on the Choice Argument.

The Choice Argument does not explicitly rule out the possibility that the Intrinsic Reading is correct. Yet, as I mentioned above, there are a couple of reasons why we cannot admit this reading merely based on this argument. So, we need to investigate the rest of the dialogue to judge whether the reading is right or not.

VIII.1.2. Pleasure is not good for its own sake

In VIII.1.2., I will claim that the '*Genesis* Argument' (53c-55c) which understands every pleasure as a *genesis* rejects the Intrinsic Reading, since it is based on

recognizing it to be the nature of pleasure that every pleasure consists in a restorative process. Accordingly, I maintain that Rational Pleasure is not included in the Good Human Life as a good for humans, even if this pleasure has its own place in this life.

VIII.1.2.1. Pleasure as A Psychological Restorative Process

To scrutinize the *Genesis* Argument in the next section, this section is devoted to examining the nature of pleasure. In short, this section aims at arguing that, according to the *Philebus*, every pleasure consists in a psychological restorative process.

Unfortunately, Socrates does not offer a unified account of pleasure in a decent manner in the *Philebus*. In other words, he does not provide a substantive account of pleasure which picks out some non-disjunctive pleasure-making property that belongs to all pleasures alone. Yet, I believe, he regards that the basic model, i.e. the restoration model, which he establishes based on a certain kind of pleasure, is extendable to include every pleasure. However, first, it is very difficult to see how every pleasure can be subsumed under this model. To make matters worse, he does not attempt to extend the model in an explicit way. Accordingly, there have been several scholars who deny that all pleasures can be explained by one model.¹⁵⁹ In particular, they

¹⁵⁹ Socrates does not openly describe the unified nature of pleasure, so some scholars believe that he is not committed to a one unified account of all kinds of pleasure (e.g. Gosling and Taylor 1982, p.140.). I do not deny that this belief is plausible. Nevertheless, it also seems persuasive that Plato, the author, wants to encourage his readers, esp. his students in the Academy, not to just follow what is declared but to do philosophy while reading the *Philebus*, so he does not give an entirely clearly

believe that the pleasure of learning, which is the only Rational Pleasure the dialogue explicitly treats, is not explained by this model.¹⁶⁰

I claim that we can establish a unified view on pleasure from the dialogue that every pleasure consists in a restorative psychological process.¹⁶¹ Let me start by introducing a number of passages which imply Socrates' conviction that every pleasure shares a substantive feature.¹⁶² First of all, there are a couple of passages which show his supposition that every pleasure is one in genus. For instance, from the analogy between the complexity of pleasure and the complexity of color and shape (12e3-13a3), we can draw the following inferences: just as colors are not different to the extent that they are colors (12e3-4), and just as every shape is one in genus (12e7), so are all kinds of pleasure one in genus even if they are opposed to one another. Also, Socrates plans to use the 'Promethean Method', with which one can identify sub-kinds that exist

unified picture of the nature of pleasure (Evans 2004, pp.21-22). As I will implicitly show in the following chapters, Socrates' doctrine on the nature of pleasure is not the only theory in this dialogue which is not explicitly spelled out. In other words, it is a salient feature of this work that there is a great room for readers to critically engage in it so that they would reach an evaluative view on the claims displayed in the dialogue. Thus, it is a right of Plato's reader to go beyond what the text explicitly states and then to formulate what the text implicitly argues. If so, we are licensed to formulate a unified account of every pleasure.

¹⁶⁰ Gosling and Taylor 1982, pp.153-154; Hampton 1990, p.73; Carone 2000; Fletcher, 2017.

¹⁶¹ A couple of scholars regard it too narrow that every pleasure consists in a restorative pleasure, since it may be pleasant that one is not suffering pain any longer and that one is free from pain (e.g. Gosling and Taylor 2002, pp.450-451.).

¹⁶² This paragraph is entirely indebted to Evans (Evans 2004 pp.14-15, 17) and Aufderheide (Aufderheide 2011, p.36.).

between a genetic unity and its instances, in order to examine pleasure (18a-b). This shows his basic thought that pleasure is a genus to which the method can be applied.¹⁶³

One might suspect that all pleasures can be classified under one single genus without sharing some non-disjunctive property. For instance, one might suppose that the family-resemblance relation constitutes a way in which all pleasures are subsumed under one single genus. Yet, I argue that, when Socrates supposes that every pleasure is subsumable under one genus, he believes that every pleasure shares in a common substantive property. This is supported by the principle that the same name is applied to many different things only when they share a substantive feature, which is repeatedly stated in the dialogue. For instance, Socrates asks to Protarchus who insists that all pleasures are good to clarify the same thing that all of them share (13a8-b5). That is to say, he supposes that there should be a common feature of all pleasures which makes them all good if every pleasure is good. He also alludes to this same

¹⁶³ Fletcher insists that it is a secondary aim of the method to discover whether something has a generic unity to start with, asserting that Socrates applies the method to pleasure in order to rebut his interlocutor's assumption that pleasure is a unity by revealing that it is not a unity (Fletcher 2017, pp.186, 195-202.). I do not find this convincing that the method has a secondary goal, but I want to put aside this issue because it would take me too far afield. Hence, I satisfy myself merely with indicating the two points. First, Fletcher mistakenly believes that Socrates adopts the "discovery procedure", i.e. the procedure which grasps several instances first, organizes them into sub-kinds, and then collects them in to a genus, when he applies the method to pleasure (Ibid., p.190.). She disregards his statement in which he implies that he will adopt the "learning procedure" which starts from a unity to explore both pleasure and knowledge (18e-19a). Second, if Socrates used this method to examine whether pleasure is a unity or not, it would be quite out of blue. Even when discussing the dissimilarity between pleasures, he explicitly says that no argument dispute that every pleasant thing is pleasant (13a).

principle in asking to know the same feature of a number of distinct desires which allows them to be called by a single name (34e3-4). Therefore, subsuming every pleasure under one genus shows his thought that all pleasures are understood to share a common feature.¹⁶⁴

Let us now turn to examine this unified account of pleasure. Socrates begins his inquiry into pleasure by stating that, if an animal undergoes a destructive process of its natural harmony, it is in pain, whilst if it undergoes a restorative process of the harmony, it enjoys pleasure (31d4-10).¹⁶⁵ This statement is founded on the ‘Four-fold Classification’ (23b-31b) which sees a division of ‘all that which is now in the universe’ into four classes: Limit (*peras*), Unlimitedness (*apeiron*), the Mixture (*meikton*) of the two, and the Cause (*aitia*) of the mixture, viz. intellect (*nous*). That is to say, Socrates commences his scrutiny of pleasure by describing that pleasure comes about when a natural mixed state of Limit and Unlimitedness is restored. This is the initial description given by Socrates of how pleasure works.

A number of scholars restrict the scope of this description to bodily pleasures, mainly because Socrates illustrates this description by using the example of eating and

¹⁶⁴ Evans 2004, pp.15-17.

¹⁶⁵ Λέγω τοίνυν τῆς ἁρμονίας μὲν λυομένης ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἅμα λύσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀλγηδόνων ἐν τῷ τότε γίνεσθαι χρόνῳ (.....) Πάλιν δὲ ἀρμοττομένης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἀπιοῦσης ἡδονῆν γίνεσθαι λεκτέον, εἰ δεῖ δι' ὀλίγων περὶ μεγίστων ὅτι τάχιστα ῥηθῆναι.

drinking (31e-32b), while he is silent on how this description is applied to a “different kind” (*heteron eidos*, 32c3-4) of pleasure, namely, the pleasure of anticipation which is cognitive. In other words, he explicitly applies this description only to “one kind (*hen eidos*) of pleasure and pain (sc. bodily pleasure and pain) what comes to be respectively in these two experiences” (32b6-7), so many scholars consider that not every kind of pleasure is explained by a restorative process.¹⁶⁶ These scholars assume, I believe, that the two kinds of pleasure are different from each other in whether they consist in a restorative process in general. However, the text leaves open the possibility that the difference between these kinds of pleasure lies in whether a certain pleasure consists in a *bodily* restorative process or not, because the two kinds of pleasure are distinguished from each other in terms of whether they are experienced by soul itself (*autês tês psychês*, 32b9) or not. More importantly, Socrates explicitly explains why he uses the example of eating and drinking: this example is easy to construe (31e3-4).¹⁶⁷ This shows that he intends not to restrict the scope of what the description covers. Rather, it is highly likely that he expects his interlocutor to extend this description to include other kinds of pleasure, since he has provided a clear explanation of how pleasure comes about with the help of an easy example. So, if every pleasure can be explained by a psychological restorative process, we can maintain that it is a basic description that every pleasure consists in a restorative process.

¹⁶⁶ E.g. Gosling 1975, p.101; Gosling and Taylor 1982, pp.135-136; Fletcher 2017, pp.198-199.

¹⁶⁷ Οὐκοῦν τὰ δημόσια που καὶ περιφανῆ ῥᾶστον συννοεῖν

Let me return to Socrates' illustration of bodily pleasures to see that even bodily pleasure comes from a psychological restorative process. He states that hunger is an emptying and a pain; by contrast, eating is re-filling and as a result a pleasure (31e-32b). This statement is notable since it seems to identify pain with a disintegration of one's natural harmony, whereas pleasure is identified with the corresponding restoration. Yet, he soon modifies this identification (a) by indicating a distinction between big changes and small and measured ones, and then (b) by contending that only a change which is of a sufficient size produces (*apergazesthai*) pleasure and pain. Pleasure is not identified with but is rather made (*poiein*) by a restorative change, because we are oblivious to those changes which are of an insufficient size whilst perceiving (*aisthestai*) sufficiently large ones, so a restorative change does not suffice to bring about pleasure (43a-c). It is not entirely clear what the point of 'making' (*poiein*) is here, so it is not evident whether pleasure is identified with a perceived restoration or with one's perception of restoration. Yet, plainly, there is a bodily pleasure only when a bodily restoration is perceived. Accordingly, we can make a rough general statement that bodily pleasure *consists in* a perceived bodily restorative process towards one's natural harmony.

The basic picture that bodily pleasure consists in a perceived bodily restorative process can be examined further by appealing to how Socrates understands perception. Perception is defined as the motion (*kinesis*) that arises 'when the soul and body are

affected and moved together by the one affection (*pathos*)' (34a3-5).¹⁶⁸ This understanding of perception signifies that bodily pleasure, which consists in a sort of perceived bodily process, occurs when there is one affection which the soul and body share.¹⁶⁹ So, what is this one common affection? We can find a hint of the answer from 33d4-6, where Socrates states that the affections which are perceived 'penetrate through both the body and the soul and initiates something like an upheaval which is both peculiar and common to each'.¹⁷⁰ This passage leads us to see that, if the soul can undergo some sort of restorative process, undoubtedly this affection is a restorative process which is peculiar to each of the two parts of the human being, i.e. the soul and the body. In other words, bodily pleasure is about a bodily restorative process, so it is highly likely that the same affection which the body and soul share is a restorative process. The only and salient difference is that the body undergoes a bodily restoration, whereas the soul undergoes a psychic one.

So, does the soul experience a psychic restoration when it experiences pleasure? To solve this question, let me draw attention to Socrates' example of pleasure derived from hunger. Hunger is considered as a sort of psychological disintegration, because

¹⁶⁸ Τὸ δ' ἐν ἐνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνόμενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δ' αὖ τὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοι' ἄν

¹⁶⁹ I depart from Evans' reading of 34a4 which indicates that perception is "the single motion that affects them both [sc. the body and the soul]" and thus a bodily motion which is strong enough to influence the soul is a perception (Evans 2004, p.37.).

¹⁷⁰ τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα καὶ τινα ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα ἴδιόν τε καὶ κοινὸν ἑκατέρῳ.

it is a sort of disintegration (31e), and it is clearly agreed that hunger as an appetite (34d) is not of the body but of the soul (35d). In other words, hunger is something which has a contact with filling through memory (35b-c), and it is an *attempt* or *striving towards* (*epikheirêsis*) the state which is opposite to its own state, i.e. the state which belongs essentially to it (35c). Indeed, hunger is a *desire* towards the state which naturally belongs to the soul.

Let us now turn to eating, which is the corresponding replenishment of hunger. Eating is related to pleasure (31e). To be more specific, one takes pleasure in filling, which is a change that is opposite to emptying (35e). That is, a process of emptying, as in hunger, is a psychological disintegrative process, so there is a bodily pleasure even in a psychological restorative process. In sum, the basic model described by bodily pleasure is that pleasure consists in a psychological restorative process towards a natural psychic state.¹⁷¹

¹⁷¹ Fletcher points to the fact that Socrates never illustrates the soul as a mixture of the Unlimited and the Limit. She then identifies the soul with the Limit of a living organism. Accordingly, she believes that the soul cannot undergo a restorative process (Fletcher 2014, pp.117-118.). It is correct that Socrates is silent of whether the soul belongs to the Mixture-Class. Yet, to speak precisely, he never explicitly assigns the soul to one of the four classes, and thus his silence does not support Fletcher's belief that the soul belongs to the Limit-Class. In addition, it is unclear how the two passages she refers to, i.e. 35d and 64b, warrant her belief.

Fletcher also insists that Socrates never allots any purely psychic properties to the Unlimited-Class (Ibid., p.118). I think that she disregards 52c-d in her interpretation, in which Socrates understands malicious pleasure, which is a purely psychic pleasure, as belonging to the Unlimited-Class while allotting the mixed pleasure to this class.

I think it unnecessary for my purposes to justify that every pleasure consists in a sort of psychological restorative process by proving how the basic model explains several pleasures, including false pleasures which are not explicitly accounted for in this model. I want to put aside this issue, because my interest in the nature of pleasure stems from another interest in Rational Pleasure, namely the way that Rational Pleasure contributes to the Human Good Life.¹⁷² For this reason, I shall limit myself to examining the basic model and then extending it merely to the kinds of pure pleasure that involve the pleasure of learning, which is the only kind of Rational Pleasure that Socrates is explicitly concerned with in the dialogue (51e-52b). I shall first argue that pure pleasure consists in a psychic restorative process. I shall then argue that the pleasure of learning consists in the same sort of process as well.

Here is the text of 51b1-7, where the four kinds of true and pure kinds of pleasure are first introduced.

¹⁷² I allow here for Evans' interpretation that pleasure is intentional in the sense that it has content which specifies conditions of restoration, i.e. the psychic natural state. I argue that it is a great advantage of his interpretation that it can successfully explain how the unified account of the nature of pleasure mentioned above is applied to several sorts of pleasure. In particular, I think that this interpretation clearly shows why false pleasures are analogous to false judgments (40d7-e4): the propositional content of false pleasure is false (Evans 2004, pp.40-52, 83-133). However, again, I have to spill too much ink to support this line of interpretation, so I want to put aside this issue as well.

Protarchus: But, Socrates, what are the kinds of pleasures that one could rightly regard as true?

(Ἀληθεῖς δ' αὖ τίνες, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς τις διανοοῖτ' ἄν;, 51b1-3)

(ΣΩ.): Τὰς περί τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδεΐας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπτους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδεΐας [καθαρὰς λυπῶν] παραδίδωσιν (51b3-7)

There is a large scholarly debate on how to understand Socrates' statement in 51b3-7. More specifically, there is no entire agreement on how to deal with the *hosa*-clause. Some scholars believe that the *hosa*-clause keeps us from committing to the thesis that every kind of pleasure mentioned above consists in a filling. For instance, Carone takes the succession of *kai ... kai ... kai* at 51b3-7 as a simple enumeration of examples, insisting that the pleasures of perception mentioned above are not related to filling.¹⁷³ I do not think that her translation is impossible, but I find that the *kai* alone is too weak to make such a remarkable distinction. In the case of Fletcher, she translates *hosa*-clause as “however many are based on imperceptible and painless lacks”, while insisting that only the pure pleasure of smell involves a restorative process.¹⁷⁴ Her translation is possible, yet not very likely. I do not see why Plato would elect to use this misleading expression in such a critical moment of the discussion. The main ground for her insistence is that Socrates does not assure his interlocutor that there is no pain mixed with the pleasure of observing beautiful colors and shapes.¹⁷⁵ Yet, we need not regard that what Socrates indicates is that every pleasure that is derived from beautiful shapes or colors is pain-free. Rather, he seems to imply that, just as the

¹⁷³ Carone 2000, p.267 n.19.

¹⁷⁴ Fletcher 2014, pp.122-123.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, p.122.

majority of smells give rise to pure pleasures, so does a certain range of observable things bring about pure pleasures. It is intuitively obvious that there would be some colors and shapes which give rise to pure pleasures, so Socrates does not need to prove that some of the pleasures derived from observing beautiful things are pain-free.

I maintain that the *hosa*-clause illuminates the features of the four kinds of pleasure mentioned above. Admittedly, this is not the one and only grammatical option for construing the *hosa*-clause at issue as conveying a general explanation of the kinds of pleasure displayed above. Yet, it is rather odd to consider that one feature of the kinds of pleasure illuminated by the clause, i.e. purity, is shared by the other four kinds of pleasure enumerated altogether, whilst the other feature, i.e. being related to a filling-process, is not shared by the others. Hence, 51b3-7 can be translated as follows.

Socrates: Those that are related to so-called fine colours and to shapes and to most smells and sounds and in general all those (*hosa*) that are based on imperceptible painless lacks, while their fillings are perceptible and pleasant.

Now, let us investigate the main points of 51b1-7. There are four kinds of pure pleasure: the pleasure derived from fine colors; the pleasure derived from shapes; the pleasure of smell; and the pleasure of sound. They share a common substantive feature: they are all related to that which offers perceptible fillings while having an unperceived lack. First, the lack which these kinds of pleasure are associated with is not perceived, so these kinds of pleasure are free from pain. More importantly, these pleasures are associated with perceived fillings of this unperceived lack, so they consist in a sort of psychic process of filling a lack. This is because they are related to a perception which is characterized by the same motion that the body and the soul share, as I mentioned

just above. The basic model of pleasure describes that a bodily pleasure consists in a restorative process, and thus ‘filling’ here either is identified with or is the same as a sort of restoration. This is also supported by 42c-d, where Socrates indicates that emptying gives rise to a destruction. This is because this passage implies that filling, which is a counterpart of emptying, brings about a restoration towards a psychic fulfilment which must be a sort of natural psychic state. Accordingly, every kind of pure pleasure mentioned above consists in a restorative process.

Let us now examine directly the pleasure of learning. Here is the text of 51e7-52a7, which is worth having a look at.

Socrates: Then, let us add the pleasure of learning to them, if indeed we regard that these pleasures have neither hunger for learning nor pangs which initially come about because of the hunger for learnings.

Protarchus: I think so as well.

Socrates: So what? If after such filling with learnings, people come to lose it again through forgetting, do you notice any pain in them? (51e7-52a7).¹⁷⁶

Socrates explicitly adds the pleasure of learning to the other kinds of pleasure, i.e. the four kinds of pure pleasure mentioned above, and thus there is no doubt that he regards it as pure. Yet, it is counter-intuitive to think that this pleasure is free from pain, since, for instance, solving a mathematical conundrum must be accompanied by distressing

¹⁷⁶ (ΣΩ.): "Ἐτι δὴ τοίνυν τούτοις προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡδονάς, εἰ ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὗται πείνας μὲν μὴ ἔχειν τοῦ μανθάνειν μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πείνην ἀλγηδónας ἐξ ἀρχῆς γιγνομένης. (ΠΡΩ.): Ἄλλ' οὕτω συνδοκεῖ. (ΣΩ.): Τί δέ; μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν ἔαν ὕστερον ἀποβολαὶ διὰ τῆς λήθης γίνωνται, καθορᾶς τινος ἐν αὐταῖς ἀλγηδónας;

failures and the pangs of being perplexed. In view of this, it is important to see that Socrates registers certain conditions by which this pleasure is pure: (i) having no hunger for learning; and (ii) forgetting what one learns is not painful. Regardless of how you interpret these conditions, the two conditions significantly restrict the scope of learning which he is interested in. That is, the scope is very narrow, as he clearly states that this pleasure belongs only to the few (52b).

So, does this somewhat mysterious pleasure of learning consist in a psychic restorative process? Absolutely. This is first because this pleasure is an example of the pure pleasures consisting in this process. In addition, Socrates clearly mentions ‘filling with learning’ at 52a5.¹⁷⁷ That is to say, insofar as it is plausible to construe ‘filling’ here as either equivalent to or as itself a kind of restoration, there is no doubt that this pleasure consists in a psychic restorative process, i.e. a process of restoring one’s learning.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ As Carone indicates, ‘*plêrôsis*’, which I translate as ‘filling’, can also be translated as ‘fulfilment’, so what Socrates cares about might be not ‘filling with learning’ but ‘the state of being filled with learning’ (Carone 2000, p.267 n.19.). Yet, if this is so, he commits the fallacy of equivocation, since ‘*plêrôsis*’ is understood as a motion when it is construed as an affection which can penetrate the body and the soul (33d4-6) although the state of fulfilment is a state of rest.

¹⁷⁸ Fletcher sees an illegitimate extension of the sense of ‘perception’ in the line of interpretation I take, asserting that the scope of perception is explicitly restricted to the affection related to body at 33e and 34a. She also claims that there are still two more problems even if Socrates extends the meaning of perception. First, it is unclear how to distinguish the perceived psychic change and that which is unperceived. Second, there is no lack or emptying that corresponds to ‘filling with learning’ (Ibid., pp.124-125.).

There is no proper ancient Greek word to cover merely one’s inner recognition, as distinct from a

In conclusion, even though Socrates does not give a unified account of all pleasures, it is highly likely that every pleasure consists in a psychic restorative process. In particular, given that Socrates uses the term ‘filling’ to explain the pleasure of learning, we can presume that Rational Pleasure consists in a psychic restorative movement.

VIII.1.2.2. Pleasure as a *genesis* is not intrinsically good

From the point that every pleasure consists in a restorative process, the *Genesis*¹⁷⁹ Argument draws a claim that every pleasure is not good in its own right. Again, the *Genesis* Argument is not concerned specifically with Rational Pleasure; yet, it suffices that the Human Good Life includes this pleasure not because it is good in itself but for another reason.

recognition of an external word, i.e. sense-perception, so I think we have to give Socrates an excuse for having used the verb ‘*aisthanesthai*’ in a somewhat confusing way. Indeed, I suggest understanding that Socrates cannot help using the term in one sense, at one point, and in another sense at another point. With respect to the first additional problem, I think it sufficient to offer the example in which I might not recognize that I forgot my mobile number unless I need it, which reveals that there is an unperceived psychic process of loss. In regard to the final problem, I have no idea why she does not regard the two expressions as signals of loss or emptying: ‘*apobolai*’ (those who lose, 52a5-6) and ‘*sterêtheis*’ (having been deprived, 52b1).

¹⁷⁹ Most scholars translate *genesis* here as ‘becoming’; yet, I want to leave it untranslated, since (3) below shows that Socrates assign the term *genesis* to other than process as well (Aufderheide 2013, p.821.)

Before analyzing the *Genesis* Argument, we need to refute the interpretation that it is inappropriate to evaluate every pleasure from the perspective of this argument. The advocates of this interpretation first maintain that Socrates does not fully endorse the *Genesis* Argument based on the following points: (a) Socrates puts the argument into the mouth of others (53c4-7); (b) he treats pleasure as a *genesis* in a conditional manner (54e);¹⁸⁰ and (c) there is no place where Socrates explicitly agrees with the argument, although he extols the source of it twice, which may mean that he endorses this argument.¹⁸¹ Some scholars add two more points on the basis of the bisection of pleasure between intense ones and pure ones (52c3-d1): (d) the argument is suited only to intense pleasures which possess disproportionality (52c3-4); (e) pure pleasures are good since they participate in the three aspects of the good (51b1, 52d1, 53c2) whilst the argument asserts that pleasure is not good at all.¹⁸²

I leave my comment on (b) and (e) for my analysis of the argument below, but it is worth giving some immediate responses to the remaining points. With regard to (a), I want to indicate that there are even two places in the dialogue where he distances himself from the source of the doctrine he commits to, i.e. the “Promethean method” (16c1-6) and the “Dream Solution (20b6-7), so (a) does not necessarily mean that Socrates does not endorse the argument under consideration. In terms of (c), it is worth

¹⁸⁰ Carone 2000, pp.265-270.

¹⁸¹ As noted by Fletcher 2014, p.134.

¹⁸² Carone 2000, op. cit.

indicating that Socrates does not explicitly disagree with or disqualify the *Genesis* Argument as well.¹⁸³ Also, I find no persuasive reason for putting more emphasis on [1] the fact that Socrates does not explicitly agree with the *Genesis* Argument than on [2] the fact that he praises the source of the argument two times (53c, 54d), when we judge whether he commits to the argument or not. In regard to (d), the argument immediately follows Socrates bisection of pleasure into intense ones and pure pleasures, so it is reasonable to consider that the argument is concerned with both types of pleasures.¹⁸⁴

Here are the main points of the first part of the argument in order (53d3-54c4).

- (1) There are two things: that which is itself according to itself (*auto kath'hauto*, i.e. X) and that which always aims at (*ephiemenon*) something else (Y) (53d3-4);
- (2) X is always naturally the most majestic (*semnotaton*) thing, whilst Y is inferior to it (*ellipes ekeinou*, 53d6-7).
- (3) We have observed beautiful and good boys and their manly lovers (53d9-10).
- (4) There is that which is always for the sake of something among beings, whilst there is that for which that which comes to be for the sake of something else always comes to be in every case (53e4-7).

¹⁸³ Evans 2008, p.127. n.12; Murgier 2016, p.80.

¹⁸⁴ Evans op. cit.

(5) One is a *genesis* of everything, whilst the other is a being (*ousia*) (54a5).

(6) Question: Is a *genesis* for the sake of being or is a being for the sake of a *genesis*? (54a7-9)

(7) Protarchus' modification of the question: Is being for the sake of *genesis*? (54a10-11)

(8) Protarchus' illustrative modification of the question: Is ship-building for the sake of a ship rather than *vice versa*? (54b1-4)

(9) Instruments (*pharmaka*), all tools (*organa*) and materials (*hylê*) are supplied to everyone for the sake of *genesis*. Each *genesis* comes to be for the sake of a being. *Genesis* as a whole comes to be being as a whole (54c1-4).¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵ (1) (ΣΩ.): Ἐστὸν δὴ τινε δύο, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, τὸ δ' αἰεὶ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου. (ΠΡΩ.): Πῶς τούτῳ καὶ τίνα λέγεις;

(2) (ΣΩ.): Τὸ μὲν σεμνότατον αἰεὶ πεφυκός, τὸ δ' ἐλλιπὲς ἐκείνου. (ΠΡΩ.) Λέγ' ἔτι σαφέστερον.

(3) (ΣΩ.): Παιδικὰ που καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τεθεωρήκαμεν ἅμα καὶ ἐραστὰς ἀνδρείους αὐτῶν. (ΠΡΩ.): Σφόδρα γε.

(4) (ΣΩ.): Οὐδέν τι ποικίλον, ὦ Πρώταρχε· ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος ἐρεσχηλεῖ νῦν, λέγει δ' ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἕνεκά του τῶν ὄντων ἔστι' αἰεὶ, τὸ δ' οὐ χάριν ἐκάστοτε τὸ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον αἰεὶ γίγνεται.

(5) (ΣΩ.): Ἐν μὲν τι γένεσιν πάντων, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν ἕτερον ἔν.

(6) (ΣΩ.): Ὅρθότατα. πότερον οὖν τούτων ἕνεκα ποτέρου, τὴν γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα φῶμεν ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι γενέσεως ἕνεκα;

(7) (ΠΡΩ.): Τοῦτο δ' προσαγορεύεται οὐσία εἰ γενέσεως ἕνεκα τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅπερ ἐστὶ, νῦν πυκνάνη;

(1) suggests a division between X which is by itself and Y which aims at something else. This seems to imply that X is self-sufficient whilst Y is not, because Y is in need of something else, namely the thing which it aims at, whereas X is not. (2) sees a hierarchy in value between X and Y: X is more valuable than Y. (3) first reveals in an illustrative manner that there is a certain relation between X and Y. Note that boys who are loved are not named as the beloved whereas those who love them are named as the lovers at 53d9-10. That is, we should note that the latter are identified by the relation in which they stand to the beloved boys, whilst the former are not identified in this relation when they are named merely as beautiful and good boys. In other words, the boys are self-sufficient in the sense that they do not need others to have their own identity, while the lovers are not self-sufficient in the sense that they need others to be identified as lovers. Thus, X is self-sufficient in the sense that its identity is determined by itself; whereas, Y is not self-sufficient in the sense that its identity is determined by its relation to X. Furthermore, given (2), that which has its own identity by itself is more valuable than that which has its identity because of a relation to something else.

In (4) and (5), Socrates captures the relation between X and Y as the “for the sake of” relation between being (*ousia*) and *genesis*. On the one hand, it is linguistically reasonable to understand the contrast between being and *genesis* as a contrast between that which is in a stable state and that which is in a state of becoming. On the other hand, provided the identity issue which has been granted so far, it is also reasonable to understand this contrast as a contrast between that which has its own identity by itself and that which has its own identity in relation to something else. That which has

its own identity in relation to something else is in a state of becoming in the sense that its identity is determined in accordance with the relation in which it stands to something else. On the other hand, that which is identified by itself is in a stable state in the sense that its identity is self-determined and persistent. So, we can answer to the question raised in (6)-(7) as follows: *genesis* is for the sake of being just as Y is for the sake of X, because Y is in a state of becoming in terms of its identity, whilst X is in a stable state with respect to its identity. (8) and (9) explains the “for the sake of” relation between *genesis* and being in an illustrative manner.

In a nutshell, the *Genesis* argument so far sees a distinction between X and Y, i.e. a distinction between (i) that which is identified by itself and then has a certain value even when it stands a relation to something else, and (ii) that which is identified by virtue of the fact that it is for the sake of something else and as a result lacks the value in which the other has when standing in a relation to it.

Based on the distinction made in the *Genesis* Argument so far, Socrates evaluates pleasure in the second half of the argument. In short, pleasure is considered as something which is not good by itself.

(10) (ΣΩ.): Οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσις ἐστίν, ἔνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνοιτ' ἄν. (54c6-7).

(11) The thing that for the sake of which something comes to be belongs in the part (*moira*) of the good, while that which comes to be for the sake of something else belongs in another part (54c9-11).

(12) Since pleasure is a *genesis*, pleasure does not belong in the part of the good (*tên tou agathou moiran*) to which the thing for the sake of which something comes to be belongs (54d1-2)

(13) Pleasure is not the good (54d6-7).

(14) One who find one's end (*apoteloumenôn*) in *genesis* is ridiculous, since he chooses generation (*genesis*) and destruction (54e1-55a8).

(15) It is irrational both (a) that there is nothing good in everything except soul and (b) that virtue is not good. It is irrational both (c) that one is bad when he is in pain and (d) that one is distinct in virtue to the extent to which he rejoices (55b1-c1).¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ (11) (ΣΩ.): Τό γε μὴν οὐ ἔνεκα τὸ ἔνεκά του γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνεται ἄν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι· τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἔνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὧ ἄριστε, μοῖραν θετέον.

(12) (ΣΩ.): Ἄρ' οὖν ἡδονὴ γε εἴπερ γένεσις ἐστίν, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὀρθῶς θήσομεν;

(13) (ΣΩ.): δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελᾷ.

(14) (ΣΩ.): Καὶ μὴν αὐτὸς οὗτος ἐκάστοτε καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς γενέσεσιν ἀποτελουμένων καταγελάσεται. (ΠΡΩ.): Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποίων λέγεις; (ΣΩ.): Τῶν ὅσοι ἐξιώμενοι ἢ πείνην ἢ δίψαν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, ὅσα γένεσις ἐξιάται, χαίρουσι διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἅτε ἡδονῆς οὐσης αὐτῆς, καὶ φασὶ ζῆν οὐκ ἂν δέξασθαι μὴ διψῶντές τε καὶ πεινῶντες καὶ ἄλλα ἃ τις ἂν εἴποι πάντα τὰ ἐπόμενα τοῖς τοιούτοις παθήμασι μὴ πάσχοντες. (ΠΡΩ.): Ἐοῖκας γοῦν. (ΣΩ.): Οὐκοῦν τῷ γίγνεσθαι γε τούναντίον ἅπαντες τὸ φθείρεσθαι φαῖμεν ἄν. (ΠΡΩ.): Ἀναγκαῖον. (ΣΩ.): Τὴν δὴ φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν αἰροῖτ' ἂν τις τοῦθ' αἰρούμενος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν τρίτον ἐκεῖνον βίον, τὸν ἐν ᾧ μήτε χαίρειν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι, φρονεῖν δ' ἦν [δυνατὸν] ὥς οἷόν τε καθαρώτατα.

(15) (ΣΩ.): Πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστι μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μηδὲ καλὸν μήτε ἐν σώμασι μήτ' ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις πλὴν ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡδονὴν μόνον, ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ νοῦν ἢ τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα ἀγαθὰ εἴληχε ψυχὴ, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον εἶναι; πρὸς τούτοις δὲ ἔτι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα, ἀλγοῦντα δέ, ἀναγκάζεσθαι φάναι κακὸν εἶναι τότε ὅταν ἀλγῇ, κἂν ἢ ἄριστος πάντων, καὶ τὸν

Before investigating the part of the *Genesis* Argument which I just quoted above, we need to examine one of the remaining issues of whether the argument is endorsed by Socrates, i.e. (b): whether Socrates treats pleasure as a *genesis* merely in a conditional manner. Some scholars read (10) as a conditional sentence and then deny Socrates' commitment to the *Genesis* Argument.¹⁸⁷ However, grammatically, there is no compulsion to understanding the *eiper*-clause as a conditional clause. The table of conditional forms in Smyth's grammar does not contain the form in which the protasis has *ei* with the present indicative and the apodosis has *an* with the optative.¹⁸⁸ This means that it is not an ordinary type of conditional sentence in which the protasis has *ei* with the present indicative (*eiper genesis estin*), while the apodosis has *an* with the optative (*gignoit' an*). On the other hand, the possibility remains widely open that the *eiper*-clause at issue is causal. Accordingly, it is likely that the sentence is not conditional but causal. Also, we can read the *Genesis* Argument in a consistent way when we understand the clause as causal. Thus, Socrates is exonerated from the accusation of treating pleasure as a *genesis* in only a conditional manner. Therefore, it is acceptable to translate the sentence as follows: "Thus, pleasure, since it is a *genesis*, necessarily would come to be for the sake of some being."

(10) identifies pleasure as *genesis*. Protarchus then immediately admits that pleasure

χαίροντα αὖ, ὅσω μᾶλλον χαίρει, τότε ὅταν χαίρη, τοσούτῳ διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετήν.

¹⁸⁷ E.g. Hackforth 1945, pp.105-106; Carone 2000, p.265; Fletcher 2012, p.149. n.252.

¹⁸⁸ Smyth 1956, p.516.

is *genesis* without a further justification by concurring with (10), although it has never been explicitly shown why pleasure is a *genesis*. Yet, this immediate admission is not surprising because it is already confirmed that pleasure consists in a psychic restorative process towards a natural psychic harmony. This signifies that pleasure consists in a psychic process which is for the sake of a harmonious psychic state. So, pleasure is a sort of *genesis* which is characterized by its restorative movement and whose being is a harmonious psychic state, provided that *genesis* can be construed as a movement which is opposite to being which is in a stable state. Accordingly, it is not weird that Socrates calls someone who introduces the argument so far as one who indicates that pleasure is not being but *genesis* (54d4-6).

(11) confirms that X belongs in the part of the good whilst Y belongs in another part. Following from this, (12) says that pleasure as Y does not belong in the part of the good. (13) declares that pleasure is not the good as well, since it does not even belong to the part of the good. Socrates' use of the term 'the part of the good' (*tên t'agathou moiran*) is noteworthy, since the term echoes the exact expression which he had used in the Choice Argument to introduce the criterion of *teleiotês* at 21d1-2.¹⁸⁹ Protarchus makes it explicit that this argument does not test whether pleasure is *teleon* or not by merely admitting that neither the unmixed life of pleasure nor the unmixed life of wisdom is sufficient and choice-worthy (22a-b). So, we can consider that, for Socrates, the *Genesis* Argument is concerned with whether pleasure is *teleon* when regarding

¹⁸⁹ Τὴν ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον ἢ μὴ τέλεον εἶναι;

someone who finds an end in *genesis* ridiculous, as is noted in (14). Accordingly, given his use of the term and the *genesis* argument so far, which sees Y as something pursuing an end, what Socrates contends in (11) and (12) is that pleasure does not satisfy the criterion of the good at issue, i.e. being *teleion*.

Pleasure is not *teleon*. This means that pleasure is not the good, since it fails to hit one of the three criteria for it, i.e. being *teleion*. Yet, even though pleasure is not the good, the possibility may remain open that it is intrinsically good. Moreover, (2) and (3) seem to leave open that Y is intrinsically good. Let me first return to (2). (2) explicitly regards that X is the most majestic whilst Y is not. We have to note that no signal is given that Y is not majestic at all. X is described by a superlative adjective, and thus it is plausible that Y is majestic in some sense although it is not majestic in full stop. This implies that pleasure as Y would be intrinsically good although it has a critical value-deficiency. Next, with regard to (3), it is worth noting that the lovers are called ‘manly (*andreioi*) lovers’. Obviously, the term ‘*andreios*’ is a term of praise, so the lover under consideration is praiseworthy. In other words, he is manly and then may be good in his own right. So, presumably, the possibility is not ruled out that Y can be intrinsically good.

Yet, we have to note that (2) and (3) illustrate not the ‘for the sake of’ relation which a *genesis* has to its being, but the relation introduced in (1), i.e. the relation between that which is itself according to itself and that which always aims at something else. The ‘for the sake of’ relation is a kind of the relation illustrated in (2)-(3), but the two

relations are not the same. So, it is too quick to believe that pleasure as a *genesis* is intrinsically good. In other words, it is more appropriate to investigate in what sense pleasure is good by examining Socrates' illustration of the 'for the sake' of relation. In view of this, we have to pay attention to (8)-(9), in which this relation is compared to two relations: (i) the relation of the act of producing to instruments, tools, and materials; (ii) the relation of the product to the act of producing. As I interpreted above, what the steps (1)-(9) stress is that Y as *genesis* is identified only in the fact that it is for the sake of its being, i.e. X. This means that when one sees Y as *genesis*, he evaluates it with a view to X, given the correspondence of the identity-issue to the value-issue in the relation of X to Y. To illustrate this, the question whether a hammer is good or not is evaluated only with a view to whether it serves producing well; similarly, the only criterion for evaluating an act of ship-producing is whether its outcome, i.e. the ship, is well-made. Thus, we can expect that pleasure can be evaluated as being good or not solely by looking to its being, or in other words, that which it aims at.¹⁹⁰ Pleasure as a *genesis* is good in a derivative sense when that which it is for the sake of is good. Therefore, pleasure is not that which has its own value by itself, because it pursues another end which has its own value by itself.

¹⁹⁰ Evans 2008, p.128; Aufderheide 2013, p.821. Yet, I depart from Aufderheide when he sees an implication of the value-dependency of Y to X in (2)–(3) too. First, in regard to (2), the very fact that Y lacks something which X has and as a result of which Y is inferior does not itself guarantee any dependency. Second, with regard to (3), the beloved is already highly estimated and lovers are not distinguished in terms of their beloved. Thus, I think that it is impossible to see any value-difference between lovers merely in the terms of whom they love in (3).

I want to put aside further inquiry into (14) and (15), because the examination of the *genesis* argument so far is sufficient to show that pleasure is not good by itself.¹⁹¹ Accordingly, I argue that the Intrinsic Reading is entirely refuted. Hence, there is no evidence at all that Rational Pleasure is included in the good life as a good (to human beings). Therefore, the remaining task is to find the reason why this pleasure should be included in this life.

VIII.2. The Human Good Life and The Two Contributions of Rational Pleasure to this Life

Pleasure is not good in its own right. So why does the Human Good Life contain pleasure? In particular, why does this life include Rational Pleasure? In VIII.2., I shall argue that there are two reasons why this kind of life includes Rational Pleasure: (a) Rational Pleasure is an unharmed ingredient of the Human Good Life; and (b) Rational Pleasure motivates one to study philosophical mathematics and dialectic which are crucial for living this kind of life. For this argument, in VIII.2.1., I shall first revisit the *Genesis* Argument and maintain that there are three sorts of the ‘for the sake of’ relation in which pleasure as *genesis* might stand in the Human Good Life: (i) as an ‘ingredient-product’; (ii) as a ‘tool-product’; and (iii) as an ‘instrument-product’.

¹⁹¹ For Evans, (1)-(15) does not suffice to show that pleasure is good in its own right, since he is convinced that we need some independent reason of why “nothing worth pursuing as an end in itself could be “for the sake of” something else.” (Evans 2008, p.134). I do not see why an example of X cannot be a Y in a different relation. For instance, a beloved would become a lover in a different relation. I think it enough for Socrates to show that pleasure is not good in its own right if he succeeds in proving that, at least sometimes pleasure is not an end in itself.

In VIII.2.2., I shall next examine the final part of the dialogue which displays two distinct lists involving pleasures which are allowed to be mixed into this life. I shall claim that the kinds of pleasure on the first list (“List-1”, 63e3-6)¹⁹² bears the relation-(i) to this life. I shall then contend that these kinds of pleasure are contained in this life because they do not damage its harmony. Following from this, I shall maintain that Rational Pleasure deserves to be contained in this life, since it is not harmful to be included in this life. I shall also argue that the pleasure on the second list (“List-2”, 66a-c)¹⁹³, i.e. the pure pleasure of the soul itself, is a sort of Rational Pleasure and bears the relation-(iii) to the Human Good Life. To be more precise, I shall first maintain that studying philosophical mathematics and dialectic is crucial for living the Human Good Life, since these two disciplines best instantiate measure and thereby make one’s life good. Yet, I shall contend, people are hardly encouraged to study them since it is hard for people to find the real value of them. Hence, I shall maintain that Rational Pleasure on List-2 is included in this life since enjoying it motivates one to study them.

¹⁹² ἀλλ' ἄς τε ἡδονὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς [ἄς] εἴπεις, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νόμιζε, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τὰς μεθ' ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ συμπάσης ἀρετῆς ὁπόσαι καθάπερ θεοῦ ὁπαδοὶ γιγνόμεναι αὐτῇ συνακολουθοῦσι πάντη

¹⁹³ Most scholars tend to consider the list as the ranking of goods (e.g. Hackforth 1945, pp.137-139; Hampton 1990, pp.84-87; Frede 1993, pp.lxiv-lxvii; Lang 2010; Aufderheide 2013). However, Socrates “does not call the items on the list of ‘goods’” (Vogt 2007, p.254.), so I do not want to call it ‘the list of goods’ or ‘the ranking of goods’ prior to investigating the list.

VIII.2.1. The Three Sorts of the ‘for the sake of’ Relation

As I argued in VIII.1.2.2., pleasure as a *genesis* can be good in a derivative sense. That is, I contend that pleasure can be good in an indirect way when its object is good. So, we can presume that, when that which Rational Pleasure is for the sake of is good, this pleasure is derivatively good. However, I do not believe that this line of reasoning suffices to show that this life should have Rational Pleasure merely because it is derivatively good, since it is not proven that this life ought to include every derivatively good thing which might indeed be a very large number of things.

In view of this, let us remind ourselves of step (9) of the *Genesis* Argument: instruments, all tools, and materials are supplied to everyone for the sake of *genesis*; each *genesis* comes to be for the sake of being; and *genesis* as a whole comes to be being as a whole. It is worth taking especial care with step (9), because it illustrates a little further the ‘for the sake of’ relation which Socrates is concerned with. This means that we can establish a more detailed picture of derivatively good things which Socrates cares about by examining (9), because something can be derivatively good in the relation which is illustrated in it. So, by revisiting it, we may be able to maintain that the specific kind of ‘for the sake of’ relation which Rational Pleasure bears to the Human Good is the relation that Socrates cares about, and thus that pleasure is contained in the Human Good Life.

Apparently, (9) envisions two sorts of the ‘for the sake of’ relation: (i) the relation of

producing to instruments, tools, and materials; (ii) the relation of product to the act of producing. Yet, we can add the following sort of relation to them, because the set of instruments, tools and materials are indirectly associated with product by virtue of its association with their common association with producing, which is associated with the product: (iii) the relation of the product to the set. All three relations illustrate the ‘for the sake’ of relations, so there are three distinct sorts of ‘for the sake of’ relation: (a) the set is for the sake of producing; (b) the set is for the sake of the product; (c) producing is for the sake of the product.

Pleasure is considered as something which is for the sake of something else, so it can be compared either to the set of instruments, tools, and materials or to producing. One might believe that pleasure is analogous only to producing, which exemplifies a sort of process, since pleasure is regarded as a *genesis* consisting in a restorative process. Yet, I find it necessary to compare pleasure to the set mentioned above as well, partly because it is Socrates who mentions the set in order to illustrate the ‘for the sake of’ relation. He would not introduce this set if he thought that the comparison of producing to *genesis*, which is introduced by Protarchus in (8), is enough to illustrate pleasure, so it is reasonable to believe that he wants to say something about this relation by introducing the set. Thus, it is worth paying attention to the set when we examine this relation.

Moreover, the Human Good Life and intelligence can be compared to an end-product and to producing respectively, so, presumably, pleasure as a *genesis* can be compared

not to producing but only to the set. After the *Genesis* Argument, Socrates twice illustrates this life as an end-product: first, by identifying it as a craftsman's product (59d-e) and second as a wine made by a wine-pourer (61c-d). It is intelligence which is the canonical member of the genus, which renders everything that is well-mixed (30b-d), and thus it is appropriate not for pleasure but for an activity of intelligence to be compared to the process of producing when the life is likened to a well-mixed end-product. Accordingly, we are entitled to liken pleasure to the set of instruments, tools and materials.

To clarify what it means to liken pleasure to the set of stuffs that are utilized to produce an end-product, I want to draw attention to the exact terms he uses, i.e. instrument (*pharmakon*), tool (*organon*), and material (*hylê*). I think that it is clear what 'material' indicates here. The relation of the ship to the (raw) material signifies the relation between the product and the material out of which it is made. Whether the product is good or bad, there is no product without its material. Hence, if the relation between the Human Good life and its pleasure were such a relation, then pleasure is a basic ingredient of this life.

Let us examine the notion of 'tool'. It is not odd to suppose that every device used for ship-producing can be categorized in some way. So, it is not odd that Socrates differentiates between two distinct kinds of productive device: a tool and an instrument. Yet, he offers no hint as to how a tool is different from an instrument, so it is not clear what both 'tool' and 'instrument' mean here. Yet, we can narrow down the meaning of

‘tool’ by referring to the passage where Socrates investigates knowledge (*epistêmê*, 55c-59d). While maintaining that the craft of building is superior to the crafts of farming, navigating, etc. because of its frequent use of measures and tools (*organa*), he explicitly states that this frequent use gives the craft a high accuracy by specifying that shipbuilding and housebuilding use a straight edge, compass, gadget, etc. (56b-c). The first notable point here is that tools are those which are utilized in the construction of units. In addition, provided his juxtaposition of tools with measures, we can presume that tools are devices which use measures. Hence, presumably, tools in the dialogue indicate the specific devices which use measures in utilizing units. In view of this, the relation between tool and end-product which Socrates cares about amounts to the relation of a product to a specific sort of device which introduces measures in its process of production.

Let us next turn to ‘*pharmakon*’ (instrument). Socrates uses this term only once in the dialogue, and thus it is difficult to grasp what the term ‘instrument’ stands for here. Yet, we can at least presume that instruments involve devices which are not tools, or in other words, what neither use units nor introduce measure, e.g. a hammer, a nail, etc. This still leaves the scope of instrument to be very wide, so we have to take further steps to narrow down this scope.

Referring to the original meaning of ‘*pharmakon*’, i.e. medicine, may be a fruitful step to take. First of this, by referring to this semantic dimension of the term, one may presume that, just as a medicine helps you to restore your health, so does an instrument

help what it is for the sake of to restore its beautiful condition, given that health is an exemplar of something beautiful (26b). Yet, this line of interpretation is not entirely satisfactory, because it does not correspond well with the example of shipbuilding that Socrates presents. That is, the example implies that an instrument is for the sake not of restoring an original state but of producing, or in other words, creating something new. Second, one may presume that, just as medicine heals your weakness, so too does instrument help what it is for the sake of to overcome its weakness. This line of inference is supported by Plato's use of the term '*pharmakon*' in other dialogues, esp. *Phaedrus* 274e4-7,¹⁹⁴ where the term is used to indicate an enhancer of human intelligence and memory which cannot remember something forever. One might not find this inference very persuasive, since there is no ground for asserting that the meaning of instrument is the same in the two dialogues. Yet, I think that it fits better with the ship-building example at 54b than the interpretation mentioned above. We can consider that instrument is compared to, say, a waterproof-liquid, which helps to overcome the natural limitation of a wooden ship, namely, being vulnerable to debilitation or destruction by water. Hence, it is likely that an instrument is that which helps what it is for the sake of to overcome its limitations.

¹⁹⁴ “Τοῦτο δέ, ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὸ μάθημα,” ἔφη ὁ Θεῦθ, “σοφωτέρους Αἰγυπτίους καὶ μνημονικωτέρους παρέξει· μνήμης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας **φάρμακον** ἠϋρέθη.” (Theuth said: “O King, here is something that, once learned, will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memory; I have discovered a potion for memory and for wisdom.”, tr. Nehamas and Woodruff, emphasis is mine.)

VIII.2.2. The Two Roles which Rational Pleasure Plays in the Human Good Life

With a view to the three ‘for the sake of’ relations I have dealt with just above, in VIII.2.2, I shall argue that Rational Pleasure as *genesis* stands in two distinct relations to the Human Good Life: (i) as the material–product and (ii) as the instrument–product. That is, I shall claim that Rational Pleasure contributes toward the Human Good Life in two ways: (1) Rational Pleasure is an unharmful ingredient of the Human Good Life; and (2) Rational Pleasure is an instrument (*pharmakon*) for the Human Good Life.

VIII.2.2.1. Rational Pleasure as a Harmless Ingredient of The Human Good Life

In this section, I shall argue that Rational Pleasure is contained in the Human Good Life as an unharmful ingredient of it by investigating List-1. Let me start my inquiry into this list by contending that both knowledge and pleasure are basic ingredients of the Human Good Life. This argument is first warranted by the Choice Argument, which maintains that the Human Good Life is a mixture of pleasure and wisdom. The same point is repeatedly illustrated just before introducing List-1. First, Socrates compares his interlocutor and himself, who are about to mix pleasure and knowledge, to craftsmen who are about to make something out of these two materials (59d10-e3). That is, he compares the Human Good Life to a craftsman’s product, on the one hand, and pleasure and knowledge to his materials, on the other hand. Second, Socrates compares the producer of this life, who mixes pleasure with wisdom, to a wine-pourer who mixes honey with a sobering portion of healthy water (61c-d). That is, just as honey and water are the main ingredients of wine, so are pleasure and wisdom significant ingredients of the Human Good Life. Thus, the relation between this life

and the pleasure and knowledge which are included in it amounts to the relation between a mixture and its ingredients. Hence, Socrates regards pleasure and knowledge as basic ingredients of the life. This shows that, presumably, the relation of the Human Good Life to pleasure is the same as the relation of a ship to wood as its material which is the exemplar of one of the ‘for the sake of’ relations at issue, i.e. the ‘material-product’. So, we can presume that both pleasure and knowledge are for the sake of the Human Good Life in the sense that they are basic ingredients of this life.

However, is every kind of knowledge and pleasure included in the Human Good Life? Socrates prompts the same question and Protarchus answers “Probably (*isôs*)” (61d). Yet, the fact that List-1 and List-2 involve only certain kinds of pleasure shows that not every kind of pleasure is accepted into the constitution of the well-mixed life. By contrast, Socrates lets every kind of knowledge come into this life (61d-62d). Presumably, this is because every kind of knowledge satisfies the conditions for being involved in the Human Good Life, whereas the same cannot be said of every kind of pleasure. This leads us to ask what kinds of condition an ingredient of the human life should meet in order to be included in the Human Good Life. In other words, we are led to ask what kinds of condition every kind of knowledge satisfies, in order to be accepted into this life.

When stating that he would like to include every pleasure in this life if it were advantageous (*sumpheron*) and unharmful (*ablabes*), just as this life should include every item of knowledge since it is beneficial (*ôphelimon*) and unharmful (63a1-5),

Socrates makes it explicit that every item of knowledge is mixed into the Human Good Life because the knowledge of all disciplines (*technai*) is unharmful and beneficial. Thus, obviously, if a kind of pleasure is unharmful and beneficial, it should be mixed into this kind of life just as every kind of knowledge should be contained in the same life because it is beneficial and unharmful.

So, is being beneficial and unharmful at the same time a necessary condition for a kind of pleasure to be contained in the Human Good Life? I do not think that this is so, since Socrates and Protarchus tacitly reach an agreement that a kind of knowledge is sufficient to be mixed into this life if it is safe to be included in this life. First, when commenting on mixing pleasure and knowledge, the two interlocutors tacitly concede that it is not appropriate to mix every kind of pleasure and every item of knowledge in terms of security. That is, when beginning to mix together pleasure and knowledge, Socrates makes it explicit that it is not secure (*asphales*) to mix every pleasure with every item of knowledge. The two interlocutors then first agree to mix the truest kind of knowledge with pleasure, since this is a less risky way (*akindunoteron*) to mix knowledge with pleasure (61d1-9).¹⁹⁵ It is noticeable that Socrates regards security as the prime factor that he has to consider in order to render a good mixture. We also have to note that Protarchus agrees with this condition when he first allows for the mixing

¹⁹⁵ (ΣΩ.) Φέρε δὴ πρότερον· ἄρα πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν πάσῃ φρονήσει μειγνύντες τοῦ καλῶς ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιτύχοιμεν; (ΠΡΩ.) Ἴσως. (ΣΩ.) Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσφαλές. ἥ δὲ ἀκινδυνότερον ἂν μειγνύοιμεν, δόξαν μοι δοκῶ τινα ἀποφύνασθαι ἅν. (ΠΡΩ.) Λέγε τίνα. (ΣΩ.) Ἦν ἡμῖν ἡδονή τε ἀληθῶς, ὡς οἴομεθα, μᾶλλον ἐτέρας ἄλλη καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα;

the truest kind of knowledge not because it is the truest sort of thing but because it is a less risky way of making a mixture. Accordingly, since the truest kind of knowledge is not harmful to be included into this life, this kind of knowledge is permitted to be mixed into the Human Good Life.

It is also worth noting that Socrates does not add any further reason for having the truest kind of knowledge in the Human Good Life when he allows for every kind of knowledge to come into the life. After deciding to mix the truest kind of knowledge into this life, the two interlocutors locate the reason why the life should have every other kind of knowledge in it as well. A craft of using imprecise tools and shapes is introduced in order to find a way to one's house. In addition, 'if in fact our life would be at least some sort of life' (62c3-4) music should also be included into this life. The two interlocutors then allow all kinds of knowledge to come into this life (62a-c). What I want to stress here is that Socrates sees no need to discuss further whether there is any *additional* reason for having the truest kind of knowledge in this life when he allows for this kind of knowledge to be mixed into this life. That is, he considers that the kind of knowledge at issue is sufficient to be included in this life just because it is safe to be mixed into it.

Finally, Protarchus implicitly confirms that, if it is harmful to mix some certain kind of knowledge into the Human Good Life, this kind of knowledge is not permitted to come into this life. He comments that the possession of every kind of knowledge other than the truest kind does not harm (*blaptein*) one who has it, insofar as one has the

primary knowledge when he is asked to allow every kind of knowledge to come into this life (62d1-3).¹⁹⁶ This comment implies that he would not permit a certain kind of knowledge to be included in this life if this kind of knowledge harms the life which possesses it. In other words, this comment affirms that being unharmed is a constraint for a certain kind of knowledge to be included in the Human Good Life.

If a certain kind of knowledge is unsecure to come into the Human Good Life, this kind of knowledge is not permitted to be mixed into this life. So, provided that both knowledge and pleasure are basic ingredients of this life, we can expect that the kinds of pleasure which are secure to be mixed into the life are allowed to come into this life. This is confirmed when Socrates sees no problem in mixing a certain kind of pleasure with wisdom if it is not risky to mix it. That is, when he first mixes the truest kind of pleasure just for security (*asphales*, 62e6-9),¹⁹⁷ it is affirmed that a certain kind of pleasure is permitted to be included in this life if this kind of pleasure is secure to be mixed into it. Moreover, we have to note that it is only after mixing the truest kind of pleasure into this life that the two interlocutors concede that, as they did in the case of knowledge, they should proceed by mixing other kinds of pleasure if these kinds of

¹⁹⁶ (ΠΡΩ.) Οὐκ οὐκ ἔγωγε οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι τις ἂν βλάπτοιτο πάσας λαβὼν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας, ἔχων τὰς πρώτας.

¹⁹⁷ (ΠΡΩ.) Πολύ τι διαφέρει πρὸς γε ἀσφάλειαν πρώτας τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἀφεῖναι. (ΣΩ.) Μεθείσθων δὴ. τί δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἄρ' οὐκ εἰ μὲν τινες ἀναγκαῖαι, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ, συμμεικτέον καὶ ταύτας;

pleasure are necessary (62e8-9).¹⁹⁸ This means that the truest kind of pleasure is permitted to be in this life regardless of whether this kind of pleasure is necessary for this life or not. Accordingly, being secure suffices for the inclusion of this kind of pleasure into this life.¹⁹⁹

As I have argued so far, if a kind of pleasure is unharmed to be included in the well-mixed life, it is allowed for it to come into this life. So, although Socrates' statement at 63a1-5 may be misinterpreted as meaning that a certain kind of pleasure should be both advantageous and unharmed at the same time in order for it to be included in this life, we can invite several kinds of pleasure into this life merely because these kinds of pleasure are secure to be mixed into it. In view of this, we have to note that, before introducing List-1, Socrates does not examine what kinds of pleasure are advantageous. In other words, it is worth noting that there is no evidence that the pure kind of pleasure is included in this list because it is advantageous. Thus, we can presume that List-1 is the list of the kinds of pleasure which are unharmed to be mixed into this life.

However, what kind of security does Socrates here take into consideration while

¹⁹⁸ ἄρ' οὐκ εἰ μὲν τινες ἀναγκαῖαι, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ, συμμεικτέον καὶ ταύτας;

¹⁹⁹ I stand here against the interpretation which many scholars hold that all or some of pleasures on List-1 are necessary in the same sense that less pure kind of knowledge is necessary (see e.g. Gosling 1975, p.224; Cooper 1999, p.340; Aufderheide, *Ibid.*). On the contrary, I argue that every pleasure on List-1 meets only the 'unharmed' criterion, whereas less pure kinds of knowledge satisfy the two criteria, i.e. the 'beneficial' and 'unharmed' criteria, and are thus necessary.

mixing pleasure and knowledge into the Human Good Life? We do not have yet a clear answer to this question; so, strictly speaking, it is not justified yet whether the truest kinds of basic ingredients of the Human Good Life are secure to be mixed into this life.²⁰⁰ To make matters worse, since we do not know the ground of the security which Socrates takes into account in this context, we do not see the point of List-1 even if it is correct that this life is the list of the kinds of pleasure which are secure to be mixed into this life.

Let me clarify the meaning of ‘security’ or ‘unharmful’ by examining 63d1-e3, where we can discover an answer to the question of what kind of harm Socrates cares about in this context, namely the harm which prevents wisdom from functioning or existing. Here is the text.

Our discussion would then continue as follows: “Will you have any need to associate with the strongest and most intensive pleasures in addition to the true pleasures?”, we will ask them. “Why on earth should we need them, Socrates?”, they might reply, ‘They are a tremendous impediment to us, since they infect the souls in which there dwells madness or even prevent our own development altogether. Furthermore, they totally destroy most of our offspring, since neglect leads to forgetfulness.’²⁰¹

²⁰⁰ I think Aufderheide is right when he sees it as to be understood that the two interlocutors begin to establish the well-mixed life by mixing the truest kinds of pleasure and knowledge, because, if the best pleasure and knowledge were not appropriate to be mixed, there would be no mixture of pleasure and knowledge at all. Yet, I depart from him when he regards it as sufficient for something to be mixed without risk that it is among the purest kinds of pleasure and knowledge (Aufderheide 2013, p.823.).

²⁰¹ Ὁ δὲ γ' ἡμέτερος λόγος μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁδε. Ἐπὶ τὰς ἀληθείαις ἐκείναις ἡδοναῖς, φήσομεν, ἅρ' ἔτιπροσδεῖσθ' ὑμῖν τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς συνοίκους εἶναι καὶ τὰς σφοδροτάτας, καὶ πῶς, ὧς σώκραπετες, ἴσως φαῖεν ἄν, αἳ γ' ἐμποδίσματα τε μυρία ἡμῖν ἔχουσι, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν

This passage is the only place where a certain sort of pleasure, i.e. intense pleasure, is eliminated from the Human Good Life. While disallowing intense pleasure to come into this life, Socrates spells out why this pleasure should be expelled from this life in a complicated manner; yet, for me, the core reasoning is simple: intense pleasure prevents wisdom from existing or functioning properly in this life. It must be for the same reason that Socrates exiles pleasure when it is accompanied by a vicious state (63e7-8),²⁰² provided that intense pleasure comes out of the bad state (*ponêria*) of the body and the soul (45e5-7).²⁰³ So, we can presume that no pleasure is allowed to reside in this life if it disturbs wisdom. This means that mixing pleasure into this life is insecure when it obstructs wisdom. Hence, the harm he cares about here is the harm which is posed to wisdom. Therefore, it is highly likely that pleasure can be included in this life insofar as it does not harm wisdom.

So, why does Socrates spell out this security in terms of a security for wisdom? A superficial answer might be that it is not permitted to banish some kinds of knowledge with a view to pleasure, because every kind of knowledge is in any case allowed to

αἷς οἰκοῦμεν ταράττουσαι διὰ μανίας [ἡδονάς], καὶ γίνεσθαι τε ἡμᾶς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔωσι, τὰ τε γινόμενα ἡμῶν τέκνα ὡς τὸ πολὺ, δι' ἀμέλειαν λήθην ἐμποιοῦσαι, παντάπασι διαφθεύουσιν;

²⁰² τὰς δ' αἰεὶ μετ' ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἐπομένους πολλή που ἀλογία τῷ νῷ μειγνύναι

²⁰³ καὶ εἴ γε τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς ἔν τινι πονηρίᾳ ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἀρετῇ μέγισται μὲν ἡδοναί, μέγισται δὲ καὶ λῦπαι γίνονται.

come into this life before it becomes mixed with pleasure (62d). Yet, this answer seems unsatisfactory, since it may imply that if Socrates investigated pleasure prior to his scrutiny of knowledge, the two interlocutors might allocate different sorts of pleasure to the well-mixed life.

In light of this, it is worth noting that, just after admitting every knowledge to come into the Human Good Life, Socrates first asks the personification of pleasure whether it wants to live with every item of wisdom or without any wisdom at all. The response given consists of two parts: (i) it is neither possible nor beneficial for pleasure to live alone; and (ii) the best kind of wisdom to live with is that which knows pleasure the best (63b7-c3).²⁰⁴ Socrates then questions the personification of wisdom whether it needs any pleasure to live with (63c5-7).²⁰⁵ I want to highlight here that it is the personification of pleasure which requests having a certain kind of wisdom in the well-mixed life. I also want to stress that it is this specific kind of wisdom which makes a restriction on the kinds of pleasure included in this life. That is to say, because pleasure requests inviting a specific kind of wisdom into the life, there is a certain restriction

²⁰⁴ “Τὸ μόνον καὶ ἔρημον εἰλικρινὲς εἶναι τι γένος οὔτε πάνυ τι δυνατὸν οὔτ' ὠφέλιμον· πάντων γε μὴν ἡγούμεθα γενῶν ἄριστον ἐν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς συνοικεῖν ἡμῖν τὸ τοῦ γινώσκειν τὰλλὰ τε πάντα καὶ [αὖ τήν] αὐτὴν ἡμῶν τελέως εἰς δύναμιν ἐκάστην.”

²⁰⁵ “Ὅτι καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐρρήθη, ‘Τὸ μόνον καὶ ἔρημον εἰλικρινὲς εἶναι τι γένος οὔτε πάνυ τι δυνατὸν οὔτ' ὠφέλιμον· πάντων γε μὴν ἡγούμεθα γενῶν ἄριστον ἐν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς συνοικεῖν ἡμῖν τὸ τοῦ γινώσκειν τὰλλὰ τε πάντα καὶ [αὖ τήν] αὐτὴν ἡμῶν τελέως εἰς δύναμιν ἐκάστην.’ (.....) ‘Ὅρθῶς, πάλιν τοῖνυν μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτητέον· ‘Ἄρ' ἡδονῶν τι προσδεῖσθε ἐν τῇ συγκράσει;’

on the kinds of pleasure which are mixed into the Human Good Life. So, we can regard that, ultimately, it is pleasure itself which allows a certain restriction on the kinds of pleasure mixed into this life. Accordingly, pleasure and wisdom are in agreement when expelling two kinds of pleasure, i.e. intense pleasure and pleasure that is accompanied by a vicious state.²⁰⁶

Conversely, pleasure and wisdom are in agreement on the Human Good Life's having every kind of knowledge. Apparently, unlike wisdom, pleasure does not select the kinds of wisdom that are contained in the Human Good Life. So, one might consider that several kinds of wisdom are permitted to come into this life without pleasure's consensus, and then regard that there is no agreement between pleasure and wisdom in selecting what kind of pleasure is contained in this life. Yet, I maintain that there is not any kind of knowledge that pleasure would not agree to allow to come into this life, so pleasure has no reason to reject the inclusion of the kinds of knowledge which it does not explicitly agree being with. For this claim, we have to note that the only kind of knowledge which pleasure explicitly permits to come into this life is the kind of knowledge which best knows pleasure. So, the kind of knowledge which decides what kinds of pleasure should come into this life is the very kind of knowledge which pleasure agrees to stay with. This means that the kinds of knowledge which pleasure

²⁰⁶ C.f. Frede, who believes that it is because of Protarchus' hesitancy to decide what kinds of pleasure are included in the Human Good Life that Socrates lets the ingredients themselves decide the composition of mixture. (Frede 2016, p.180.). By contrast, I think the main effect is to reveal that harmony is the basic principle of establishing a constructive view on what the Human Good Life is like.

does not explicitly allow to come into this life do not expel any kind of pleasure from this life. Accordingly, pleasure has no reason to reject living with these kinds of knowledge, since they do not harm pleasure by expelling it from this life. Therefore, we can state that pleasure and wisdom are in agreement when accepting all kinds of knowledge into this life.

Pleasure and knowledge become of one mind when selecting the kinds of pleasure and wisdom the mixed life possesses. This is why Socrates sees the life as an exemplar of the most beautiful and factionless (or unrowdy, *astasiotatê*) mixture in which one can find what is good for humans and the universe (63e-64a). That is, given the political connotation of *astasiotatos* in ancient Greek (cf. *Republic* 459e3-4, Aristotle's *Politics* 1302a9),²⁰⁷ the life is understood to be analogously factionless since there is no dictatorship of wisdom. In other words, wisdom is not against pleasure's will when it makes its decision of expelling certain pleasures from the Human Good Life.

The fact that the Human Good Life is illustrated as being beautiful and factionless provides us with a hint for solving our question of why wisdom should be free from any damage. Every beautiful thing finds itself to be measured (26a-b) and then harmonized (31b), so the life which is beautiful must be harmonized. Also, that which

²⁰⁷ εἰ αὖ ἡ ἀγέλη τῶν φυλάκων ὅτι μάλιστα ἀστασίαστος ἔσται. (*Republic* 459e3-4); ὁμῶς δὲ ἀσφαλεστέρα καὶ ἀστασίαστος μᾶλλον ἢ δημοκρατία τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας. (*Politics* 1302a9).

suffers factions is not appropriately described as well-mixed or harmonized. So, we can presume that, strictly speaking, the harm Socrates cares about is not merely whether wisdom is damaged but whether there is no harmony in the mixed life, since the former becomes an issue because of the latter. If pleasure and knowledge make their own factions, a human life which is a mixture of them is neither harmonized nor well-mixed, meaning that this life is not good. Hence, for Socrates, it is insecure to mix every pleasure into the mixed life because it would make a life poorly-mixed and bad as a result.²⁰⁸

This line of interpretation for the ‘insecurity’ at issue accords well with the point that pleasure is an ingredient of the Human Good Life. Just as wood, as a basic ingredient of a ship, can be used to construct a ship only if this wood does not harm the goodness of this ship, so can a kind of pleasure be included in this life insofar as this kind of pleasure is not harmful for the goodness of this life. Indeed, from the perspective that pleasure is an ingredient of this life, there is no problem in the criterion that being unharmed suffices for a kind of pleasure to be included in this life.

We can now argue that a kind of pleasure is permitted to be mixed into the Human Good Life if this kind of pleasure makes no infractions in this life. We can proceed

²⁰⁸ Hampton sees the importance of the agreement between knowledge and pleasure in the well-mixed life (Hampton 1990, p.82.). I depart from her by maintaining that the agreement between these two faculties is significant not only in the well-mixed life as a product but also in making a good mixture as a process of production.

further by contending that List-1 is the list of the kinds of pleasure which do not conflict with wisdom, because the ‘security’ criterion is the only criterion for letting a kind of pleasure into this life which is introduced prior to compiling the list. We also have to note that it is for the sake of the most harmonious mixture that Socrates expels the kinds of pleasure which are opposite to the kinds of pleasure on the list (63e7-64a1).²⁰⁹ This implies that the kinds of pleasure which are on List-1, i.e. (1) the pure pleasure and (2) the pleasure which is accompanied by health and all virtues, can be included in the most harmonious life. Hence, these two kinds of pleasure create no harm for the harmony of a mixed life and thus they are secure to be mixed into this life.

Just as a material, e.g. wood, is for the sake of a ship, so is pleasure as a *genesis* for the sake of the Human Good Life. Yet, just as only wood which meets certain conditions is needed for a good ship, so only pleasure which satisfies certain criteria is mixed into the Human Good Life. The first criterion is that pleasure which is contained in this life is secure to be mixed into this life. In other words, only pleasure which makes no conflict with wisdom is permitted to come into this life. Thus, presumably, every Rational Pleasure is allowed to be contained in this life because we can believe that the pleasure which one takes in what is true is compatible with every kind of knowledge which is true.

²⁰⁹ τὰς δ' αἰ μετ' ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἐπομένας πολλή που ἀλογία τῷ νῷ μειγνύναι τὸν βουλόμενον ὅτι καλλίστην ἰδόντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοτάτην μεῖζιν καὶ κρᾶσιν.

If this is so, does the List-1 include all kinds of Rational Pleasure? This list does not explicitly speak about Rational Pleasure, but we can presume that all kinds of Rational Pleasure can be included in this list. Roughly speaking, Rational Pleasure is understood to be taken either in the process of recognizing what is true or in the state of having this recognition. Every pure pleasure consists in filling (51b3-7). Wisdom is a significant human virtue (49a), so we can regard that the pleasure which is derived from wisdom is on the list as the pleasure that is accompanied by virtue. To be more precise, the label ‘wisdom’ and ‘intelligence’ are given to the kind of knowledge which conceives of the real truth (59d1-5), and thus the pleasure derived from wisdom can be counted as the same as the pleasure of possessing the real truth. One cannot possess wisdom without going through the process of acquiring it, so having the kind of pleasure which accompanies wisdom on the list implies that the pleasure obtained through the process of acknowledging what is true should be on the list. In view of this, we have to note that the pure kinds of pleasure on the list includes the pleasure of learning. Although there is no explicit guarantee that this kind of pleasure covers every sort of pleasure obtained through the process at issue, the pure pleasure of learning, which consists in filling (52a5-7), can be classified under the first sort of Rational Pleasure, i.e. the pleasure that is derived from the process of acquiring the truth. Also, as I will reveal in VIII.2.2.2., the pure pleasures that are derived from shapes and sounds, which consist in filling (51b3-7), are obtained in what is true, so these kinds of pure pleasure can be counted as instances of the pleasure taken in the process under consideration. Therefore, we can presume that every kind of Rational Pleasure is

allowed to be contained in the Human Good Life because every kind is safe to be mixed into this life.

VIII.2.2.2. Rational Pleasure as an Instrument for The Human Good Life

In the previous section, I argued that Rational Pleasure is sufficient to be included in the Human Good Life because it does not harm the harmonious mixture of this life. Yet, if we note 63a1-5 where Socrates confesses that he would like to include every pleasure in this life if it were advantageous and unharmed, it would be unsatisfactory to infer that being unharmed is the only criterion for pleasure to be mixed into this life. In other words, the possibility remains open that some kinds of pleasure can be contained in this life because they are deemed to be advantageous for this life. Thus, we have to investigate whether Socrates introduces certain kinds of pleasure into the Human Good life because they are advantageous for this life.

In view of this, in this section, I shall claim that the kinds of pleasure on List-2, i.e. the pure pleasures of the soul itself,²¹⁰ are included in the Human Good Life since they are advantageous in the sense that they contribute to the goodness of this life in some way. To be more specific, I shall argue that this kind of pleasure is a necessary

²¹⁰ “The fifth kind will be those pleasures we set apart and defined as painless; we called them the soul’s own pure pleasures, since they are attached to the sciences, some of them even to sense-perception” (Πέμπτας τοίνυν, ἃς ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν ἀλύπτους ὀρισάμενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμαις τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπομένους, 66c3-5)

motivator for studying the two disciplines which have the greatest power of rendering the goodness of the life, i.e. philosophical mathematics and dialectic.²¹¹

Before scrutinizing how Socrates establishes List-2, it is necessary to recall the context in which this list is found. The initial question of the dialogue is the question of the state or disposition of the soul that can provide the happy life to all humans (11d4-6). Protarchus paraphrases this issue as what the supreme human possession (*ktêma*, 19c6) is. The Choice Argument encourages them to examine the life that is a mixture of pleasure and knowledge in order to find the answer of what the good is (22a-b, 61b). The two interlocutors investigate pleasure (31b-55c) and knowledge (55c-59c) in order to see what the well-mixed life looks like (61b-64b), i.e. what kinds of pleasure and knowledge are mixed into it. Hence, the two interlocutors stand on the threshold of where the good is (64c1-2), meaning that the Human Good Life from which they can find the good is at hand.

In this context of seeking to understand what the good is, the question which the two interlocutors ought to ask is what makes the Human Good Life good, because it must be the good that is responsible for this life's being good. Here, we can consider that Socrates formulates a question about the identity of the good when he asks what the

²¹¹ It is one of the main assertions of Vogt 2007 that the pure pleasures on the list are key motivators of allowing one to live a good life, which is similar to my interpretation. However, it is unclear why she believes that one needs this motivation.

most honorable and greatest cause (*aitia*) is which renders the mixture loveable to everyone (63c5-6). In other words, when he begins to seek the cause of the most valuable mixture (64d3-5), presumably, he is starting to investigate the good.²¹²

This line of understanding is fully confirmed by Socrates' suggestion of taking beauty (*to kalon*), proportion (*to summetron*), and truth (*hê alêtheia*) as a unity by virtue of which the mixture is good because it is impossible to chase the good in one form (65a1-5).²¹³ He states that we must correctly find the cause (*aitiasthai*, 65a3) when we consider beauty, proportion, and truth as the three features of the good which renders this life good,²¹⁴ so the cause of the goodness of this life is equated with the good.

Socrates confirms both that a good mixture should be measured and that beauty and truth should be mixed into it (64d-65a). So, we can at least believe that the life which displays these three abstract features at issue is a well-mixed one. Furthermore, given his suggestion of treating the three features as a unity which renders this life good,

²¹² See Barney 2014, pp.210-215 for a more detailed analysis of how the 'What is the good' question is intertwined with the 'What is the cause of the good' question throughout the dialogue.

²¹³ Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμεθα ἰδέειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν θηρεῦσαι, σὺν τρισὶ λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, λέγωμεν ὡς τοῦτο οἷον ἐν ὀρθότητι ἂν αἰτιασάμεθ' ἂν τῶν ἐν τῇ συμμείξει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὃν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν γεγονέναι.

²¹⁴ For a good argument for understanding beauty, proportion, and truth as three features of the good, see Ferber 2010, pp.54-62.

what he contends is that, taken in unison, they have the causal power of providing its goodness to this life. Hence, to identify the Human Good Life, it is necessary to investigate the condition on which these features can most successfully exert their causal power.

The dialogue is silent on precisely how the causal power is actualized in the Human Good Life.²¹⁵ Yet, given the initial organizing question of the dialogue, i.e. what is the disposition or state of the human soul which provides for the happy human life, it is an underlying supposition that whether one's life is happy or not depends on the condition of one's soul. So, it is highly likely that the causal power at issue is realized in one's life through one's soul, and thus we can presume that the causal power is realized in the Human Good Life by being actualized in the human soul which lives this life. Accordingly, we have to pay especial attention to how one's soul displays these three features.

In light of this, I suggest that we can read the passage I explored in VIII.2.2.1., i.e. 59b-64b, as revealing one way for the soul to display these three features of the good, since these features are revealed in the relations between several mental states, such as pleasure and knowledge. When Socrates considers the most factionless mixture to be the most beautiful one when he is selecting unharmful kinds of pleasure (63e), he

²¹⁵ C.f. Frede, who points to that the dialogue is silent of the origin of measure of the life (Frede 2016, pp.192-193.)

is obviously concerned with there being a measured and beautiful relation between pleasure and knowledge. He also draws attention to the importance of mixing truth in the well-mixed life by stating that no life would come about or persist at all without it (64b). This shows that he cares about the truth of the relation at issue, since it is not one's external, but one's internal world where pleasure is mixed with wisdom. Thus, presumably, he believes that the three features of the good are actualized in the Human Good Life when the relations between several mental states realize them.²¹⁶

Insofar as each mental state stands in a proper relation to the others, presumably, the three features of the good can be displayed by what each mental state reveals them. To illustrate this point, we can say that, just as a ship is well-measured when its materials which are properly put together are well-measured, so is the soul well-measured when its several mental states that stand in proper relations between one another are well-measured.²¹⁷ In view of this, we can see that Socrates investigates how much of the two ingredients of pleasure and knowledge respectively actualize the three features in the human soul when he scrutinizes which of the two is closer to the cause of the goodness of the Human Good Life (64c, 65a-b). Hence, if wisdom better actualizes the three features in the soul than pleasure does, the former would be judged more akin

²¹⁶ C.f. Aufderheide 2013, p.826, who asserts that the three features exert their causal power on the life "only if they are instantiated in the ingredients of the good life."

²¹⁷ C.f. The fact that both pleasure and knowledge are well-measured is not necessary for the relation between the two is well-measured, because it is possible that a composite can have a feature-X even when its main component lacks this feature. Plato sees it possible as well when he states that a human statue can be beautiful even if its eye alone is not the most beautiful (*Republic* 420c-d).

to the cause of the goodness of this life than the latter.

In this context, it is worth exploring the comparative analysis of pleasure and wisdom in terms of measure, beauty, and truth (65b-66a). This analysis consists of the following three points made by Protarchus: (i) wisdom is either the same or the most similar to the truth, whereas pleasure is the greatest imposter (65c-d); (ii) wisdom and knowledge are the most measured (*to emmetron*, 65d-e); and (iii) wisdom and knowledge are not ugly at all in any aspect, whereas we detect in intense pleasures the greatest ugliness (65e-66a). In truth, I find it a little weird that Protarchus focuses on erotic pleasures in his final assessment of pleasure in terms of the three features of the good. Nevertheless, Socrates does not explicitly reject his three points. Rather, he explicitly admits the second point by saying “You are saying finely (Καλῶς εἶρηκας)” (65e1); and the third point is also accepted when Socrates says “That is correct (Ὅρθῶς)” (65e8). Thus, it is affirmed by Socrates that wisdom as a kind is considered to be something which instantiates the three features of the good better than pleasure as a kind does. Presumably, this means that wisdom as a kind best instantiates the three features, because wisdom and pleasure are the two strong candidates for the disposition or state of the soul which renders the Human Good Life. Thus, every knowledge is beneficial not only in the sense that it has its practical role in the Human Good Life; more importantly, knowledge as a kind is more beneficial than any other mental state as a kind, because it best actualizes the power of making the life good.

However, is it justifiable to claim the superiority of wisdom to pleasure based on the

three points made by Protarchus, who ends up focusing merely on erotic pleasures?²¹⁸

Does it make sense that even every kind of trivial knowledge make one's life good?

Even if this is so, what is the ground for arguing that, say, the knowledge of '2+2= 4'

causes a human life to be good more than so than does the supreme kind of pleasure?

I am sure that we can respond to all of these questions by examining the ranking of knowledge with a view to understanding the three features of the good.

Here is the hierarchical ranking of the different kinds of knowledge (55e-58a):

(1) Lower crafts (music, medicine)

(2) Higher crafts (building)

(3) Ordinary arithmetic, measuring, weighing, and calculation, i.e. ordinary mathematics

(4) Philosophical arithmetic, measuring, weighing, and calculation, i.e.

Philosophical mathematics

and (5) Dialectic.

Let us first scrutinize these several kinds of knowledge with respect to the truth. I want to start my scrutiny by investigating dialectic which is regarded as the truest knowledge. Apparently, dialectic is truer than other kinds of knowledge merely because its object is "being, what is really, and always in every way eternally the same"

²¹⁸ C.f. Frede 2016, pp.167-179, who sees no sufficient reason for believing that Socrates accepts Protarchus' three points based on an examination of erotic pleasures.

(τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταύτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως, 58a2-3). In other words, dialectic, which is the prime knowledge (57c-e), searches what is precise, accurate, and the truest (τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὰκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, 58c2-3) and as a result it is the superior knowledge in terms of truth (58e1-3).

In Socrates' assessment of dialectic, we can see an assumption that the truth of an attitude is transmitted by the truth of the object over which it is set. Yet, this assumption does not suffice to demonstrate that dialectic is the truest knowledge, since the object of philosophical mathematics does not change but possess eternal sameness (56e1-3) as well.²¹⁹ That is to say, on this assumption, philosophical mathematics is not just true but the truest kind of knowledge, as well. In view of this, we have to note that dialectic is identified as the soul's capacity of loving truth and doing anything for its own sake (58d2-8). This implies that dialectic, since it manifests an absolute love of truth, is superior to philosophical mathematics, because the latter falls short of revealing an absolute love of truth. Thus, although even philosophical mathematics would be identified with a love of truth for its own sake, philosophical mathematics cares about a severely circumscribed range of objects, unlike dialectic, which is the soul's capacity of doing *anything*.²²⁰ Therefore, although both disciplines are true, dialectic is truer than philosophical mathematics with regard to the greater generality of its love of truth.

²¹⁹ Harvey 2012, p.283.

²²⁰ Carpenter 2016, p.161.

According to the assumption mentioned above, in terms of truth, the three most lowly ranked kinds of knowledge should be assessed as inferior to the two highly graded kinds of knowledge, which deal with what is true, because the former kinds of knowledge deal with what is not certain, i.e. what was, is, and will be coming into being (59a-c). It is also worth noting that the two interlocutors concede that philosophical mathematics is more accurate and truer than the two kinds of practical knowledge and ordinary mathematics (57d-e). Obviously, these two disciplines are superior to others in terms of truth.

In addition, I argue that every kind of knowledge is true to some degree. For this argument, I first want to indicate that dialectic is described not as the one and only true knowledge but as the *truest* one (*to alêthestaton*, 58a). This at least opens us to the possibility that all other kinds of knowledge are true to some degree as well. Furthermore, we have to note 55d5-6,²²¹ in which Socrates distinguishes every handicraft into two sorts: the one sort which is more akin to knowledge and the other sort which is less so. It is unsatisfactory to suppose here that he commits to a mere equivocation in this distinction. So, I suggest to consider that what Plato means is the following: knowledge-(1) is more akin to the purest kind of knowledge than knowledge-(2) is. This is first because the distinction means that knowledge-(1) is more akin to knowledge than knowledge-(2) is, since it is obvious that the first sort of

²²¹ Ἐν δὴ ταῖς χειροτεχνικαῖς διανοηθῶμεν πρῶτα εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμης αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἐχόμενον,

handicraft corresponds to knowledge-(1), i.e. the lower crafts, and the second to knowledge-(2), i.e. the higher crafts. Also, we can presume that the ranking of knowledge is established with respect to the degrees of purity, so the distinction between two sorts of handicraft is established in terms of their degrees of resemblance to the purest kind of knowledge. Moreover, Socrates at 55d6-8²²² relates the distinction of handicrafts immediately to degrees of purity. He relates the distinction of two kinds of mathematics to degrees of purity as well (57c), and thus it is highly likely that the purest kind of knowledge is the top-ranked kind of knowledge, i.e. the paradigmatic kind of knowledge. The top-ranked knowledge, i.e. the purest kind of knowledge, is dialectic. Dialectic is so far characterized as both the truest and most truth-loving kind of knowledge, and thus even the kind of knowledge at the bottom of the scale is true to some degree because even this kind of knowledge resembles dialectic. Accordingly, we can presume that all kinds of knowledge are true to some extent.

Next, I want to examine all these kinds of knowledge in terms of their allocation of measure and beauty. Prior to assessing each kind of knowledge, we have to note that beauty comes with measure or proportion (64e) because every beautiful thing finds itself also to be measured (26a-b). So, if a kind of knowledge is measured, we can also assess it as beautiful. Accordingly, I maintain that showing every kind of knowledge is measured suffices to show that all kinds of knowledge are beautiful.

²²² τὸ δ' ἥττον ἔνι, καὶ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ὡς καθαρώτατα νομίζειν, τὰ δ' ὡς ἀκαθαρότερα.

Let me start by investigating the two kinds of knowledge at the bottom of the *scala scientiae*. I argue that the two kinds of practical knowledge, i.e. knowledge-(1) and knowledge-(2), integrate measure to some degree and thus one's soul acquires measure to some extent by its possession of these kinds of knowledge. In the case of knowledge-(1), Socrates makes it explicit that even a flute-player tries to find the measure of each note by guesswork (*stokhasmos*, 56a5-6). That is, insofar as a flute-player plays her instrument through her knowledge of flute-playing, she seeks measure through her knowledge of this craft in order to play notes in a harmonized way. In this respect, we can contend that her knowledge integrates measure to some degree, implying that even knowledge-(1) invites measure in one's soul and so actualizes the causal power of making one's life good. With respect to knowledge-(2), we can presume that someone who has this kind of knowledge attempts to find a measure while utilizing it, given that a builder must try to establish a harmony between building materials while building something. So, insofar as a builder builds something by virtue of his craft of building, he seeks measure through this craft in order to build a well-organized thing. Hence, we can argue that his craft integrates measure to some degree as well, meaning that one can allow measure to come into one's soul by having knowledge-(2).

Even the kind of knowledge at the bottom, i.e. knowledge-(1), hence integrates measure and thus can instantiate it. Yet, this kind of knowledge is inferior to all other kinds of knowledge because of the epistemic method it employs: conjecture (*eikazein*,

55e5). To illustrate this dimension, music attains harmony not by measure but by guesswork based on practice (56a3-4), so there is a lot of imprecision mixed with in it and very little certainty (*to bebaion*, 56a6-7). Knowledge-(2) is at least superior to knowledge-(1) because of its use of measurement (*metron*, 56a4). To be more specific, by virtue of its use of mathematical measuring tools, such as straightedges and a compass, the former kind of knowledge is superior to the latter kind of knowledge (56b9-c2). Indeed, by virtue of its use of some independently verifiable way of confirming that the measure will in fact be right, the former kind of knowledge is more measured than the latter kind of knowledge which merely uses guesswork and then lacks any sort of independent way of confirming the correctness of measure.²²³

Let us next turn to the two kinds of arithmetic, measuring, weighing, and calculation, i.e. knowledge-(3) and knowledge-(4). It is in virtue of the presence of counting, measure, etc. within knowledge-(2) that this kind of knowledge becomes worthwhile (55e1-3).²²⁴ Given that knowledge-(1) which lacks counting, measure, etc. is less certain than knowledge-(2), we can regard that the presence of counting, measure, etc. is responsible for the certainty that is possessed by knowledge-(2). Thus, these two kinds of mathematics deserve to be considered as possessing greater accuracy (*akribeia*) than the two more lowly graded kinds of knowledge (56c-d). Moreover,

²²³ Carpenter 2015, p.190.

²²⁴ Οἷον πασῶν που τεχνῶν ἂν τις ἀριθμητικὴν χωρίζῃ καὶ μετρητικὴν καὶ στατικὴν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν φαῦλον τὸ καταλειπόμενον ἐκάστης ἂν γίνοιτο

these two kinds of mathematics are associated with measure more than the two lower kinds of knowledge are, because the two kinds of crafts are the practices of measurement, whereas the two kinds of mathematics are the theoretical examinations of it.

As there is a hierarchical difference between two kinds of practical knowledge, philosophical mathematics is distinguished from ordinary mathematics in respect of its measure, number, accuracy, and truth (57c-d). Socrates states that the object of the former is an abstract and commensurable unit when stating that this object is the unit which is not different at all from any of the others. By contrast, the object of the latter is a phenomenal commensurable unit, such as the units of armies and herds (56d9-e3).²²⁵ That is, ordinary mathematics cares merely about the measured perceptible objects. Although it is not entirely evident what the object of the former mathematics is,²²⁶ measuring with wholly uniform units results in better measurements than

²²⁵ Οὐ σμικρὸς ὅρος, ὧ Πρώταρχε. οἱ μὲν γάρ που μονάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμόν, οἷον στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο καὶ δύο τὰ σμικρότατα ἢ καὶ τὰ πάντων μέγιστα· οἱ δ' οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολουθή- σειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἐκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει.

²²⁶ Scholars are inclined to regard that the philosophical mathematics described here is the same as the mathematics in the *Republic* (Hackforth 1945, p.115; Gosling 1975, p.127; Hampton 1990, pp.76-77; Frede 1993, p.lix.). This means that it is generally agreed that the object of philosophical mathematics is the mathematical truth including (quantitative) measures themselves, their relations, etc. (Carpenter 2015, p.193.). Yet, if we read the passage at issue on its own, what is clear about the objects is merely that they are units which have absolute uniformity. So, it is not entirely clear that the

measuring with unstable units does.²²⁷ So, we can maintain that philosophical mathematics is more measured than its counterpart in the sense that one can yield better measurement with the former than one can with the latter.

Although measurement plays a significant role in ranking the kinds of knowledge which we have examined so far, Socrates does not mention measurement while ranking the dialectic as the highest kind of knowledge.²²⁸ Yet, we can presume that dialectic is the most measured knowledge, since it is more likely that he maintains the same principle of grading knowledge rather than that he does not care about the coherency of using a single scale. This claim is tacitly supported when Socrates states that the speculation (*ennoia*) of what-really-is is the most beautiful thing while comparing dialectic to rhetoric (59c-d). Beauty comes with measure or proportion (64e), so his statement that dialectic is the most beautiful affirms that this discipline is the most measured as well. Accordingly, the more highly ranked a kind of knowledge is the more measured and beautiful it is.²²⁹ Therefore, the more one engages in the

study of the measures themselves is centred at this discipline or at the highest discipline, i.e. dialectic.

²²⁷ Moss 2019, p.223.

²²⁸ C.f. Gosling, who complains that there is no single principle in accordance with which every kind of knowledge is graded because dialectic does not employ more measurement than other kinds of knowledge (Gosling 1975, pp.222-223.)

²²⁹ C.f. Moss 2019, pp.228-229, who insists that “just as the products of human crafts are characterized by measure, and therefore knowledge of them is *inter alia* knowledge of measure, so too is the whole of reality characterized by measure, and therefor knowledge of reality – dialectic – is

highest kind of knowledge the more measure and beauty one's life displays.²³⁰

We can now understand what kind of list List-2 is. Socrates makes it explicit that this list is a list of possessions (*ktēmata*, 66a5). The guiding issue of the dialogue, i.e. what is the state or disposition of the soul that can provides the life which is happy to all humans, is reformulated by Protarchus as what the supreme human possession is (19c); thus we can expect that the list which concludes the dialogue is a ranking of human possessions that can render the human life happy. This expectation is supported when we take a close look at each item on the list. Here is List-2:

- (1) Measure, Being Measured (*to metrion*), and Timely (*kairion*)
 - (2) Proportion, Beauty, Perfection, and Sufficiency
 - (3) Intelligence and Wisdom
 - (4) Knowledge, Crafts, and Correct Belief
 - (5) The pure pleasure of the soul itself (*tês psuchês autês*)
- (66a4-c6).

a kind of measure.”

²³⁰ C.f. Frede's reading, according to which, the pure sciences, i.e. philosophical mathematics and dialectic, form a distinct part of the Human Good Life not because they best instantiate the three features of the good but because, except for them, there is no proper candidate for the discipline which lines up the several goods in the life and then makes it good (Frede 1996, p.238.) I think, however, the dialogue does not support the view that a discipline which deals with perfect objects achieves an ability of lining up the different goods in an imperfect world, since Socrates indicates that the knowledge of a divine circle does not suffices to provide one with the knowledge of secular circles (62a-b).

The ultimate thing which causes the goodness of the Human Good Life must be the good, so the three features of the good seem to deserve being ranked at the top. Yet, strictly speaking, truth is not that which makes something good but that which guarantees that something is what it is (64b2), and thus truth does not deserve to be included in the list.²³¹ Additionally, something is beautiful only since it exhibits measure and thus is proportioned, so measure is prior to beauty and proportion and thereby ranked in the first position. The good life is beautiful, perfect and sufficient by virtue of having (1), so (2) is ranked at the second highest position. Every knowledge instantiates (1) and (2) to some degree, and thus it follows that the two highest ranks are what makes the life good; yet, knowledge is bisected in terms of its object: (i) knowledge of what comes about and perishes; and (ii) knowledge of what is eternal and unchanged with respect to proportion, beauty, etc. (61d-62d). Surely, by virtue of its object, knowledge-(ii) is more valuable than knowledge-(i). Moreover, wisdom and intelligence are restricted to knowledge-(ii) (59d). Thus, during our investigation into the knowledge types (1)-(4), we find no problem in understanding the list as the ranking of the human possessions which are able to render a human life good.

However, how does (5), i.e. the pure pleasures of the soul itself, cause the goodness of

²³¹ The absence of truth from the list has been regarded as a problem by several scholars. Hackforth argues that 'perfection and sufficiency' convey the meaning if Socrates mentioned *to alêthes* (Hackforth 1945, p.139.). Hampton also believes that truth belongs to the second rank (Hampton 1990, p.125 n.8.). Lang thinks that truth is included in all items (Lang 2010, p.166.).

the Human Good Life?²³² One might believe that the pure pleasures at issue are true (52d6-53c2), measured (52c7-d1), and then beautiful, and thus that they deserve to be on the list as being good in their own rights.²³³ I do not deny that pure pleasure is good for its own sake. I also admit that pure pleasure's being good in its own right may allow it to have its own place in the Human Good Life. However, I think that it is dubious whether pure pleasure's being good for its own sake suffices for its being a cause of the goodness of this life, partially because the list does not include virtue, which must be a human possession and good in its own right.

Moreover, pure pleasure's being measured does not suffice to show that it has the power of actualizing the measure which every kind of knowledge possesses, because the sense in which knowledge is measured is somewhat different from the sense in which pure pleasure is measured. Every kind of knowledge is measured in an objective sense. Even in the case of the kind of knowledge which is ranked at the bottom, its measured-ness can be viewed not only by someone who possesses this knowledge but also by others, since, say, audiences can appreciate the harmony of music while enjoying a flute-player's performance. On the other hand, pure pleasure is measured only in the sense that it has a fixed size or intensity from the agent's perspective by

²³² Lang claims that the pure pleasures ranked in the fifth position depend on the fourth-ranked items (Ibid., pp.155-159.). I agree with her that the pure pleasures are ranked lower than every kind of knowledge in part because one needs intellectual capacities to experience pleasure. Yet, unlike her, I shall argue for the significant relation between the third-ranked items and the pure pleasures: one needs the latter to be motivated to engage in the former.

²³³ C.f. Aufderheide 2013, p.834; Fletcher 2014, p.138; Garner 2017, pp.70-71.

virtue of its admixture of pain (cf. 41e-42a). In other words, the measured-ness of pure pleasure can be viewed just by the agent. Thus, it is dubious whether the sort of measure which pure pleasure instantiates is a sort of measure which can have an effect beyond the agent's internal world. A state or disposition of the soul can make one's life happy only when it can have an effect beyond one's internal world, so it remains unclear whether the pure pleasure has this effect.

In light of this, we have to note that (5) is not just denoted as pure pleasure but the pure pleasure of the soul itself. This may first imply that the list does not include every kind of pure pleasure of perception, because the pure pleasure of perception is not a pleasure of the soul itself.²³⁴ Yet, it is also unlikely that all kinds of pure pleasure of perception are excluded from this list. This is because Socrates would explicitly inscribe the pleasure of learning, the only pure pleasure which is not derived from perception, on the list rather than the somewhat confusing expression at issue, i.e. "the pure pleasure of the soul itself", if every kind of pure pleasure of perception did not deserve to be on the list. Hence, presumably, (5) includes both some kinds of pure pleasure of perception *and* the pleasure of learning. Accordingly, the list does not include all kinds of pure pleasure which are good in their own right, so the pleasures on the list are highly ranked not because they are good for their own sakes.

²³⁴ C.f. Mouroutsou 2016, p.144, who regards the List-2 as a piece of evidence that every pure pleasure is of the soul itself.

To see what the pure pleasures of the soul itself are, we have to return to the point that the life which is devoted to pursuing the most highly ranked kinds of knowledge, i.e. philosophical mathematics and dialectic, better instantiates the three features of the good than do any other kinds of knowledge. Indeed, we have to note that the Human Good Life must be the life which focuses on these two disciplines. So, first, it is worth remembering that a human being ought to study these two disciplines to the greatest possible extent in order to live the best livable life.²³⁵

Next, to investigate why only one specific kind of pure pleasure achieves the fifth rank, it is worth noting that it is not easy for ordinary people to find a motive for studying philosophical mathematics and dialectic. Even after the Fourfold Classification is provided, Philebus believes that pleasure should be classified as something unlimited since it is good (27e), showing that he does not see the importance of measure in goodness. Additionally, even after going through the ranking of all kinds of knowledge, Protarchus seems not to be convinced of the ranking of which criteria are the three features of the good (58a-b). So, we can contend that it is difficult for Socrates' two interlocutors to see the importance of these three features. Thus, it must be difficult to persuade ordinary people to study the top two kinds of knowledge by merely stating that to study them is the best way of instantiating these three features in one's life.

²³⁵ I agree with Harte 2018 who argues that the two 'useless' disciplines are valuable because they embody measures as being constitutive of value and so a knower of them embodies genuine value. I only proceed further by claiming that, by study the two disciplines, one becomes an agent of living the good life.

Therefore, it is very hard to make people study them by recognizing the real value of studying these two disciplines.

To make matters worse, people rarely find a practical use of philosophical mathematics and dialectic. The first place where Socrates implies that the knowledge of the philosopher whose object is beyond the perceptible has less benefit for humans is 58b-d, in which he compares dialectic to rhetoric. There, he seems to admit that people regard rhetoric as superior to dialectic in terms of its usefulness (*chreia*, 58c6). That is, he seems to approve that the latter is inferior to the former with respect both to benefit and to the practitioner's good reputation (*eudokimia*, 58d4). This shows that dialectic does not achieve a high reputation in the eyes of ordinary people, since they do not find it useful for them. The second place where the same point is implied is 61d-62d, in which the two interlocutors agree to allow every knowledge to come into the well-mixed life. As we recognized just above, they bisect knowledge with respect to the object: (i) knowledge of what comes into being and perishes; (ii) knowledge of what is always and unchanged. Apparently, knowledge-(ii) is included in this life because it is the best, whereas knowledge-(i) is mixed into this life for a practical purpose. This does not confirm that knowledge-(ii) lacks any practical value; yet, it is almost useless in a practical context without knowledge-(i), as the knowledge of a divine circle is of no use without knowledge of non-divine circles in the context of building (62a-b). By contrast, knowledge-(ii) can be used without knowledge-(i), since a builder does not need the knowledge of divine circles to construct a building. Accordingly, knowledge-(i) seems useless in a practical sense, and thus one is

motivated by something other than its practical use if one studies it.

In view of this, I want to maintain that the relation between the kinds of pleasure on List-2 and the Human Good Life amounts to one of the three ‘for the sake’ of relations which, we saw, Socrates is concerned with in the *Genesis* Argument, namely the ‘instrument-product’ relation. In VIII.2.1., I argued that the instrument is there compared to a sort of device which assists what it is for the sake of to overcome its limit, and thus pleasure can be something which helps the Human Good Life to overcome its limit if pleasure is compared to an instrument. I consider it a limit of the *Human* Good Life that one should study philosophical mathematics and dialectic to live this life but it is hard to make one study them. To overcome the limit that it is difficult to motivate one to study the two, I want to claim that the kind of pleasure on List-2 gives a motive for engaging in them.

More specifically, I will argue that the pleasure on the list, i.e. the pure pleasure of the soul itself, is the pleasure of obtaining an access to that which a human can come into contact with only through the soul itself. In other words, I will maintain that one enjoys the pleasure of this kind when studying the two disciplines at issue, given that the objects of them are what are eternal and self-same (61d10-e4). I will proceed further by claiming that it is necessary for one to be motivated to study them by the pleasure of studying them, since one’s life is rendered or kept measured and then is made to be good in studying them.

Let us start a new investigation of the pure pleasure of the soul itself by examining the pleasure of learning. At first glance, the pleasure of learning may be derived from any sort of knowledge, since Socrates calls the entire kind of knowledge ‘knowledge about learning’ (*hê peri ta mathêmata epistêmê*, 55d1-2) when he grades every kind of knowledge. That is, seemingly, one can be a recipient of this pleasure by studying any sort of knowledge. However, this pleasure is a kind of pure pleasure, and thus it is weird to consider that one can be a recipient of it when studying any kind of knowledge, since it is often painful to study something. Moreover, Socrates makes it explicit that this pleasure belongs only to a few people (52b6-8), so there is a certain limited scope of learning which gives rise to this pleasure. Accordingly, to examine the pleasure of learning, it is significant to clarify the scope of the learning in question.

To scrutinize the scope of learning in question, I believe that examining the condition under which the lack of knowledge is painful is a fruitful first step to take. Notably, Protarchus at 52a8-b1²³⁶ states that the fact of having forgotten can be painful if one comes to recognize both one’s lack of previous knowledge and the *chreia* of what has been lost although the fact of forgetting itself is not painful.²³⁷ This shows the twofold

²³⁶ (ΣΩ.) μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν ἔαν ὕστερον ἀπο-βολαὶ διὰ τῆς λήθης γίνωνται, καθορᾶς τινὰς ἐν αὐταῖς ἀλγηδόνας; (ΠΡΩ.) Οὐ τι φύσει γε, ἀλλ' ἐν τισι λογισμοῖς τοῦ παθήματος, ὅταν τις στερηθεῖς λυπηθῇ διὰ τὴν χρεῖαν. (52a5-b1)

²³⁷ I leave *chreia* untranslated for a moment, because I think we can see the exact meaning of this word here after a careful investigation of the text.

sufficient condition according to which a lack of knowledge is painful: (a) the lack of knowledge is recognized; and (b) the knowledge is noticed as having *chreia*. The lack of a first-order knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of X, is not painful. Having a second-order knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of one's lacking the first-order knowledge, in isolation does not suffice to give rise to pain. Recognizing the *chreia* of the first-order knowledge in isolation also does not suffice to give rise to pain. Only when the two conditions are combined, is one in a state of pain derived from ignorance.²³⁸

In light of this, and from a logical perspective, we can distinguish three possible sets of conditions under which the pleasure of learning is not preceded by pain: (1) one recognizes neither one's lack of a first-order knowledge nor the *chreia* of this knowledge; (2) one recognizes one's lack of a first-order knowledge but does not see the *chreia* of this knowledge; and (3) one does not recognize one's lack of a first-order knowledge but sees the *chreia* of this knowledge. Among the three conditions mentioned above, we can eliminate condition-(3), since, if one sees that the knowledge of X has the *chreia* then one must reflect on whether one oneself possesses this knowledge and thus realize one's ignorance of X. We can disregard the case in which one reaches a false belief that one has the knowledge of X, although lacking it, after checking whether one oneself possesses it. This is because, in this case, one would not voluntarily learn X and then not be a recipient of the pleasure of learning X.

²³⁸ In this paragraph, I am entirely indebted to Warren 2014, pp.23-29, who enquires into the precise sense in which the pleasure of learning is painless.

Furthermore, even when one incidentally learns X, one might be in pain in being ashamed of both one's previous ignorance of X and one's previous false belief that one has knowledge of X. One might be in pain while one is ashamed of something, so the pleasure which follows from one's feeling of shame is not *necessarily* pain-free. In short, condition-(3) allows some exceptional cases in which the pleasure of acquiring the knowledge of X follows pain. Accordingly, when one experiences the pleasure of learning, one is likely to be under either of the two sets of conditions, i.e. set-(1) or set-(2).

Both of the sets of conditions which suffice for experiencing the pleasure of learning, i.e. set-(1) and set-(2), include the condition that one does not see the *chreia* of knowledge. Indeed, one takes pleasure in learning only when one was previously not aware of the *chreia* of the knowledge one is learning. Thus, it is significant to clarify the exact meaning of *chreia* and the way it stands in relation to the pleasure of learning.

It is intuitively persuasive that one is in pain when one recognizes one's ignorance of something and realizes that one needs it. More importantly, given the original meaning of '*chreia*', one may want to understand it as 'need.' Yet, provided that the pleasure of learning has its own place in the Human Good Life, it becomes problematic to translate '*chreia*' as 'need'. The person who lives the Human Good Life sees that she herself has to have every kind of knowledge, or in other words, that she needs all kinds of knowledge (63a). So, whenever she realizes her ignorance of any kind of knowledge, she acknowledges it as a lack of something needy. Thus, if '*chreia*' in question

indicates ‘need’, she would be unable to enjoy the pleasure of learning which occurs only when she does not see any *chreia* of what she is learning. In addition, if the translation in question were correct, it would be dubious why only a few can enjoy the pleasure of learning (52b), because it is an ordinary experience that one enjoys a painless pleasure in trivial discoveries that one does not need, such as the acquisition of the knowledge that some ladybugs are brown. Accordingly, we should not translate ‘*chreia*’ as ‘need’.

In view of this, it is noticeable that it is also considered a ‘*chreia*’ (58c6) in terms of which rhetoric is the supreme and thereby superior to dialectic. That is to say, it is worth noting that, in another context of the dialogue, ‘*chreia*’ explicitly means ‘usefulness’ by virtue of which people put value on its possessor. Unfortunately, there is no passage which clearly determines what kind of ‘usefulness’ Socrates takes into account in the dialogue. Yet, we can be convinced that the two most highly graded kinds of knowledge either lack or rarely have it because people do not find them useful, as I revealed above. So, if we suppose that ‘*chreia*’ also means ‘usefulness’ in the context of investigating the pleasure of learning, we can regard that one can enjoy the pleasure of learning only when studying the two kinds of knowledge at issue, since people, including someone who lives the Human Good Life rarely find *chreia*, i.e. usefulness, in the two disciplines. Moreover, only a few people study these disciplines, so we can justifiably maintain that only a few people can enjoy the pleasure of learning if ‘*chreia*’ means ‘usefulness.’ Therefore, presumably, the pleasure of learning is the pleasure taken in the two disciplines.

Now, it is worthy of note that there should be a motive for learning the two most highly ranked disciplines, because living the Human Good Life requires study of them in order to best instantiate the three features of the good, and then to cause the goodness of this life. In view of this, the fact that one can enjoy the pleasure of learning at issue in studying these disciplines can motivate someone to engage in them. That is, pleasure is a tempting thing (*to epagôgon*, 44c8), and thus the pleasure of learning can tempt one to study them. Therefore, this kind of pleasure can be regarded as one of the causes of the goodness of this life.

Yet, one might think it problematic to count the pleasure of learning as one of the main causes of the Human Good Life, because that which plays this kind of instrumental role may be substituted by another thing which can play the same role. For instance, someone may be motivated by curiosity to engage in philosophical mathematics and dialectic.²³⁹ Yet, just as there are only a few people who can see the value of measure which the two disciplines instantiate, so are there only a few people who possess this kind of natural motivation for learning these disciplines although they do not find any reason for learning. The main issue of the dialogue is what the state or disposition of the soul which renders *all humans* (*anthrôpois pasi*, 11d5) happy, so only that which can work in everyone's soul deserves to be on the list. So, curiosity itself does not

²³⁹ Gosling believes that the account of the pleasure of learning fits well with the gratification of a child's curiosity. (Gosling 1975, pp.122-123.)

deserve to be on the list.

By contrast, if one studies the two disciplines of philosophical mathematics and dialectic, in principle, one must take pleasure in learning them, and thus pleasure can be a common motivator for undertaking research of them. I cannot imagine anything other than pleasure which draws *everyone* to study these two disciplines. Accordingly, we can argue that the pleasure of learning as a sort of the pure pleasure of the soul itself deserves to fare well by gaining the fifth rank.

Let us now scrutinize the pure pleasure of perception. There are four kinds of the pure pleasure of perception which Socrates deals with. Among them, I will argue that only the following two kinds of the pure pleasure of perception are on List-2: the pure pleasure of shapes and the pure pleasure of sounds. More specifically, I will first maintain that the ultimate object of these two kinds of the pure pleasure is not a perceptible thing; rather, this object is something abstracted from perceptible things, i.e. the measure as a unifying principle.²⁴⁰ The abstracted measure is an object of philosophical mathematics, thus I will claim that the pure pleasure of perception on the list motivate one to study the philosophical mathematics, just as the pleasure of learning motivates one to study the two most highly graded kinds of knowledge.

²⁴⁰ My analysis of this sort of pleasure is highly inspired by Aufderheide 2013, pp.831-832. However, I do not see his logic of considering that the object of the pleasure derived from beautiful colors, shapes, or sounds is something abstracted from perceptible things.

Let me start my investigation of the pure pleasure of perception by citing the significant passage.

By ‘beauty of shape’ I don’t in this instance mean what most people would understand by it -I am not thinking of animals or certain pictures, but, so the thesis goes- a straight line or a circle and resultant planes and solids produced on a lathe or with ruler and square. (...) On my view these things are not, as other things are, beautiful in respect of something (*pros ti*), but are always beautiful in themselves, (...) I include colours, too, that have the same characteristic. (...) Well, with sounds, it is the smooth clear ones I am thinking of, ones that produce a single pure tune, and are beautiful not just in a certain context but in themselves (51b9–d9, trans. Gosling with slight modifications)²⁴¹

I argue that the passage implies that the object of pure pleasure of shapes and sounds is the measure that one can grasp only through using intellectual capacities. In order to uncover this implication, let us first think about the pure pleasure of shape. Socrates distinguishes between two types of shape: the first type of shape (Shape-1), e.g. animals’ shapes or pictures, is beautiful in respect of something; while, on the contrary, the second type of shape (Shape-2), e.g. a resultant plane produced with measuring tools, is beautiful by itself and gives rise to a pure pleasure. Yet, on the one hand, it is

²⁴¹ σχημάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος οὐχ ὅπερ ἂν ὑπολάβοιεν οἱ πολλοὶ πειρῶμαι νῦν λέγειν, ἢ ζώων ἢ τινων ζωγραφημάτων, ἀλλ’ εὐθύ τι λέγω, φησὶν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιφερὲς καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων δὴ τὰ τε τοῖς τόρνοις γιγνόμενα ἐπίπεδά τε καὶ στερεὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς κανόσι καὶ γωνίαις, (...) ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι πρὸς τι καλὰ λέγω, καθάπερ ἄλλα, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ καλὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι (...) καὶ χρώματα δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τύπον ἔχοντα [καλὰ καὶ ἡδονὰς] ἀλλ’ ἄρα μανθάνομεν, ἢ πῶς; (...) Λέγω δὴ ἡχὰς τῶν φθόγγων τὰς λείας καὶ λαμ- πράς, τὰς ἔν τι καθαρὸν εἰσας μέλος, οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον καλὰς ἀλλ’ αὐτὰς καθ’ αὐτὰς εἶναι, καὶ τούτων συμφύτους ἡδονὰς ἐπομένας.

unclear why Shape-1 is beautiful merely in a relative way. This is because every beautiful thing finds itself to have measure (26a-b), and thereby Shape-1 is measured to some degree and then beautiful by itself in some sense. On the other hand, it is unclear why Shape-2 is beautiful not in a relative sense. This is because a plane produced with measuring tools can be more measured than another plane which is produced with the help of measuring tools in regard to their end. For instance, a plane with a ratio of 1:1 may be more measured than another solid with a ratio of 1:2, in the sense that the former is more appropriate for producing a door than the latter is, meaning that the former plane is more beautiful than the latter plane. Therefore, as Protarchus does (51d), we encounter a difficulty in understanding the critical difference between the two sorts of shape.

This difficulty is alleviated when we see that only sounds which constitute a unified pure tune are beautiful by themselves and give rise to pure pleasures of sounds. As I have repeatedly indicated, what is measured is beautiful; so, plausibly, a beautiful sound is measured. Yet, it is weird to think that a single sound is measured; it is more plausible that a single tune constituted by certain sounds are measured and as a result beautiful. Thus, we can presume that a sound is beautiful by its reference to the beautiful tune that it constitutes when played together with other sounds.²⁴²

²⁴² C.f. Garner 2017, p.88.

In light of this, one can see it as necessary to engage in an intellectual activity in order to enjoy the pure pleasure of sound. This is because one ought to abstract the measure from the tune, since we can see why the single tune is beautiful only by its reference to this measure. In other words, only when we see the tune as beautiful, do the sounds which constitute it appear to be beautiful. Accordingly, one has to abstract the measure in order to enjoy the pure pleasure of sound.

In order to extend the investigation of the pure pleasure of sounds to other kinds of pure pleasure of perception, it is important to see that the tune's status in being beautiful and then in bringing about pure pleasure is a unified one. That is, the tune is not that which is measured while standing as a mere composition of several distinct sounds; rather, the tune is measured and thus unified (*hen*, 51d7). That is to say, the tune stands as a whole, so the measure we find in this tune is that which makes it a unity. This first means that obtaining an access to the principle which unifies audible sounds is the intellectual activity which one has to engage in in order to enjoy the pure pleasure of sound. Hence, one participates in an intellectual activity, i.e. abstracting, and then accesses the unifying principle, i.e. the abstracted measure, so that one can take pure pleasure of sound in the case of beautiful sounds. In addition, on this interpretation, it is clarified in what sense a beautiful sound is beautiful by itself: it is beautiful in regard not to other sounds but to the unity which it itself constitutes. It is the unified tune which is measured and then beautiful in a strict sense; sounds are beautiful by themselves in a derivative sense that the beautiful sounds constitute the beautifully unified tune. Again, it is proper to describe these sounds as beautiful by

themselves, since they are beautiful not in a comparative way with one another but by their reference to the unity established by their own powers.

Let us now revisit Shape-2, i.e. the shape which gives rise to pure pleasure derived from shape. When we focus on the measure of Shape-2 which can be perceived through the eyes, it does not make any sense to say that the shape is beautiful by itself; however, if we understand the shape as something which is unified by measure, we can see why Shape-2 is beautiful by itself whilst Shape-1 is not. In other words, if the object of the pure pleasure that is derived from shape is not a perceptible shape but the principle which unifies it, i.e. measure, it becomes understandable why Shape-1 is not beautiful by itself whilst Shape-2 is. In regard to Shape-1, it is not impossible to perceive, say, a lion's body as a unity. The possibility might remain open that a measure unifies its complex forms and thereby one may find beauty in its measuredness. Yet, this does not mean that the lion's body is beautiful as a whole, since this measure does not unify all elements of the body. A measure cannot unify, say, its yellow and orange color with the stream-like form of its back. Hence, although the body can be beautiful in respect of something, namely, in respect of its forms, it cannot be beautiful as a whole, or in other words by itself. Moreover, the complexity of a lion's body can bring about several desires whose gratification may be preceded by pain.²⁴³ For instance, the pleasure of seeing this body may consist partly in the desire of seeing its yellow and orange color which may be painful as a desire, so this pleasure

²⁴³ C.f. Frede 1997, p.300.

may not be pure.

By contrast, in the case of Shape-2, say, a well-measured square can be seen as a unity if one abstracts its measure which is the unifying measure of it. The square as a whole is measured, so it deserves to be beautiful by itself. In addition, just a few can join in with the complex intellectual job of abstracting a unifying measure, and thus Shape-2 is not something which many people find beautiful (51c1-3).

But why are the pleasures of seeing Shape-2 and listening to beautiful sounds called pure? The answer is that pleasure is preceded by pain only when it follows a desire of seeking the very filling which causes pleasure. Either a well-measured square or a unified tune is something which takes place in a constantly changing world and thereby has never been before. So, the very measure which unifies this specific square at a specific moment is not sought before one finds it, since it is impossible for one to ever find the same measure before, because this specific measure emerges just once.

The ultimate object of the pure pleasure of shapes and sounds is a measure which constitutes a unity being beautiful by itself. One ought to use one's own intellectual capacity to abstract the measure which is the principle of unifying the perceptible object, since it is this which brings about pure pleasure. Undoubtedly, the measure is not the object of ordinary mathematics, given its difference from philosophical mathematics. Ordinary mathematics is a sort of mathematics which deals with units

indiscriminately, such as counting cows, armies, etc. On the contrary, philosophical mathematics does not exercise this practice (56d-e), meaning that this kind of mathematics focuses on the uniqueness of its object. Suppose that it is the ratio of 2:1 which is the measure associated with a square that gives rise to pure pleasure. Even in this case, in order to enjoy pure pleasure, what one has to take into consideration is not merely the ratio of 2:1 that one may find in other shapes; rather, as I stressed above, one has to take into account a specific measure which constitutes a unity of the specific object, that in turn brings about pleasure. That is to say, in order to regard this object as beautiful, one has to speculate about the abstracted measure which is the object of philosophical mathematics. Therefore, the fact that it is pleasant to listen to beautiful notes and to see beautiful shapes motivates one to appreciate them and thereby to obtain an access to the abstracted measure, i.e. to study the kind of mathematics which lacks any practical motive for be pursued, since one has to abstract a measure in order to enjoy the pleasure that is derived from appreciating them.

Now, what about the remaining kinds of pure pleasures of perception, i.e. the pure pleasures which are derived from color and from smell? Does one engage in either of these two disciplines at issue while enjoying the two kinds of the pure pleasure? My answer is “No”, because it is unnecessary to engage in abstracting the unifying principle in order to enjoy these pleasures. Accordingly, I will argue that the pure pleasures of smell and color are not on List-2 because these pleasures are not of the soul itself.

In order to investigate this point, let me first visit the pure pleasure which is derived from colors (51d2-3). Socrates does not explicitly explain the character of colors which bring about pure pleasures. Yet, we can presume that these colors are pure, or unmixed, since, probably, the complexity of colors may give rise to several different desires. This suggestion is buttressed by the assumption Socrates employs to analyze the extent to which each kind of knowledge is ranked in being true: the feature of the attitude is determined by the feature of the object over which it is set. Pure white is white, which lacks adulteration and any part of the other colors (53a5-7). That is, pure white has no element which mars its whiteness. Thus, unlike the object of the pure pleasures of shapes and sounds which can be recognized only by an agent's intellectual activity of abstracting, the object of the pure pleasure of color is perceived without any intellectual activity.

Similarly, it is possible to take the pure pleasure in an odor without engaging in a further intellectual activity after smelling it. In other words, given the definition of perception introduced in VIII.1.2.1, you can enjoy the pure pleasure of smell merely when having the same affection on the body and the soul by, say, the fine odor of a rose. On the contrary, in the case of the pure pleasure of shape, it does not suffice to take pure pleasure in, say, several harmoniously connected musical notes in order to have the same affection on the body and the soul through them. Only when one proceeds further by abstracting the measure which unifies the notes, does one obtain the pure pleasure. In this respect, we can understand why the pure pleasure of smell is less divine than the pure pleasure of sound (51e). Provided that the Divine Life is

considered as the life of intelligence, taken in isolation, what is divine corresponds to what is intellectual. So, the former kind of pleasure is less divine than the latter kind in the sense that the former engages less in intelligence than the latter does. Therefore, the pure pleasures of shapes and sounds are of the soul itself and thereby deserve to be on List-2; by contrast, the pure pleasures of colors and smells are not on the list because they are not of the soul itself.

By inquiring into the pure kinds of pleasure of perception on List-2, I first maintain that the object of these pleasures is the abstracted measure. I then contend that one has to engage in a sort of intellectual activity in order to enjoy these pleasures. The intellectual activity at issue is a kind of activity which instantiates the measure in the Human Good Life at a second-best degree, i.e. philosophical mathematics. Thus, just as the pleasure of learning deserves to be on the list, so does the pure kind of pleasure of the soul itself deserves to be on the list, because it motivates one to do philosophical mathematics and thereby live the Human Good Life. Again, there might be another motivator for doing this kind of mathematics; yet, I do not find any other option than curiosity, which I have already expelled.

IX. Rational Pleasure and The Divine Life

In Chapter VII, I distinguished two sorts of the good life, i.e. the Human Good Life

and the Divine Life. As I addressed there, the Divine Life lacks pleasure, and thus it is worth asking how this life is good without pleasure, and especially without Rational Pleasure, since this pleasure is one of the important causes of the goodness of the Human Good Life.

Let me start by highlighting that pleasure is necessary for a human life because of humans' in-born imperfection, so there may be a good life which lacks pleasure that is viable not to humans but to a perfect kind of being. As I indicated in Chapter VII, what the Choice Argument maintains is that a mixed life of pleasure and wisdom is good to human beings. This leaves open the possibility that the good life which is not viable to humans lacks pleasure. The nature of pleasure also opens up the possibility that there is a form of the good life which is devoid of pleasure. As I showed in VIII.1.2.1., pleasure consists in a restorative process. Every restorative process is preceded by a destructed or disharmonized state, meaning that it is the human being's constantly shifting and thus imperfect state which makes pleasure desirable to a human being.²⁴⁴ Therefore, there may be a sort of life which is viable to a perfect being and which is still devoid of pleasure.

Only an imperfect being experiences pleasure. So, a god which is a perfect being can live without pleasure.²⁴⁵ In other words, a perfect being cannot enjoy pleasure, which

²⁴⁴ Frede 1992, p.440.

²⁴⁵ Lear 2004, p.57.

is clearly confirmed when the two interlocutors explicitly agree that it would be ‘improper’ (*aschémon*) for gods to undergo pleasure and pain (33b). Accordingly, even if it may be counterintuitive that a life which lacks pleasure is good, the Divine Life which is the good life lived by gods is devoid of pleasure.²⁴⁶

However, some scholars regard 33b as insufficient to show that the Divine Life lacks pleasure, because they consider that the interlocutors have not considered purely psychological pleasures at this point.²⁴⁷ It is correct to say that the two discussants at this point care mainly about pleasures which are associated with the body while making this agreement; yet, it is too quick to confirm that they ignore purely psychological pleasures. This is because the two interlocutors already mentioned a sort of pleasure which is of the soul itself, i.e. the pleasure of anticipation (32b-c). Insofar as it is unclear whether this pleasure must be associated with the body, we should be cautious in restricting the scope of pleasure which gods must not enjoy to bodily ones. More importantly, in the beginning of the dialogue, the two interlocutors mentioned the kind of pleasure that is taken in one’s being wise (12d3-4), which cannot be a bodily kind of pleasure. Most importantly, even if the agreement at 33b were not provided, my main argument, i.e. that the Divine Life is the unmixed life of wisdom, would not be marred, because it is not appropriate for gods to experience any pleasure because they are perfect beings as I argued in VII.1.2.1.

²⁴⁶ Evans 2007, p.353.

²⁴⁷ Carone 2000, p.262; Fletcher 2014, p.138.

To defend that the Divine Life is free from pleasure, I also have to scrutinize 65a7-b2,²⁴⁸ where Socrates asks his interlocutors to judge which of the two, i.e. pleasure and wisdom, is more honorable among humans and gods alike, because some scholars believe that this passage opens up the possibility that gods can enjoy pleasure. These scholars seem to suppose that a god should be able to experience pleasure in order to evaluate it.²⁴⁹ Yet, I disagree with these scholars, since X can make a certain negative assessment of Y just because X cannot possess it. For instance, you may disvalue a wonderful holiday at a luxurious resort at Hawaii just because you cannot afford to it. Likewise, a god may evaluate pleasure valueless to herself just because she cannot experience pleasure. Hence, 65b1-2 is compatible with my argument so far that the Divine Life is pleasureless.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁸ Ἡδὴ τοίνυν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἱκανὸς ἡμῖν γένοιτ' ἂν ὅστισοῦν κριτῆς ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ φρονήσεως, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν τοῦ ἀρίστου συγγενέστερόν τε καὶ τιμιώτερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις τέ ἐστι καὶ θεοῖς.

²⁴⁹ E.g. Fletcher 2014, pp.139-140.

²⁵⁰ Fletcher insists that a god can enjoy certain sorts of pleasure by referring to the *Timaeus* 37d-c, in which the Demiurge delights in the similarity of the world he creates to its model (Ibid., p.139). I think it improper to draw the cosmogony of this dialogue to analyze the *Philebus* without further appropriate justification, because whether “the ‘model’ plays a role analogous to that of limit” (Ibid.) has to be proven. Moreover, for me, it is uncertain whether Demiurge in the former dialogue is a god or just an analogy. Furthermore, if it were appropriate to draw the cosmogony of the *Timaeus* to examine the *Philebus*, one might regard it as evidence that the Divine Life is pleasureless, by reading that this cosmogony shows that the World Soul doesn’t experience any intellectual pleasure because it represents a kind of cognitive ideal by knowing the totality of propositional knowledge in the universe, yet pleasure isn’t a part of that cognitive supremacy (Corcilius 2018).

Although the Divine Life is significantly different from the Human Good Life, the two sorts of the good life must be categorically the same. In other words, just as the Human Good Life is good with respect to the three features of the good, the Divine Life must be good in terms of these features, because something good must be assessed as good with a view to the good. In particular, measure is the central feature of the good, so the Divine Life must be measured. Yet, if this is so, how does a god instantiate measure in this life through knowledge and then make or retain the life as good without pleasure? Or, does a god make his or her life to be measured in a completely different way from the way humans do?

The *Philebus* is silent about how god makes or maintains her own life to be measured. Yet, given how the intelligence is regarded throughout the dialogue, it is highly likely that the divine intelligence which characterizes the Divine Life itself has an intrinsic power of actualizing measure. First, the Fourfold Classification makes it explicit that the Mixture of the Limit and the Unlimited is measured (26a7, d9). According to this Classification, it is intelligence which is the canonical member of the genus *Aitia* which makes the Mixture (30b-d). Furthermore, it is the intelligence of the universe which makes the universe beautiful (30d1-e1). Provided the relation between measure and beauty, this means that the intelligence of the universe brings measure into the universe. The soul of the universe is compared to a producer (*to dêmiourgoun*, 27b1) of the universe. So we can presume that, unlike human intelligence which instantiates measure in a human being in an indirect way, i.e. by studying disciplines and inviting

measure into a human soul, the intelligence of the universe actualizes measure in a direct way, i.e. by making measure. Thus, presumably, the divine intelligence which is either superior or the same as the intelligence which rules over the universe has the power of realizing measure.²⁵¹

Even if a god had to study the two top-ranked disciplines to instantiate measure, she would be motivated to study them without any help of pleasure. This is first because it is highly unlikely that a god studies a discipline because of its practical use, so she does not find the two disciplines at issue to be less worth pursuing than other disciplines due to their low practical value. Also, presumably, for god, it is sufficient to study these disciplines that measure is best instantiated through them, since a god can make the most rational judgment as a possessor of the divine intelligence. Given that intelligence is the most praiseworthy kind of knowledge (59d1-5), and given that divine intelligence must be the greatest among every sort of intelligence, a god possesses the greatest kind of intellectual capacity. So, it is highly likely that she can make the most rational judgment that she has to study the two disciplines at issue in order to live the supreme life, if it is needed. Thus, without pleasure, the Divine Life can be measured and then good.

²⁵¹ Note here that some scholars equate the soul of the universe to the divine soul and then equates the two sorts of the intelligence by identifying the soul of the universe with the Demiurge of the *Timaeus* (e.g. Russell 2005, p.146.). I do not find it convincing to identify the soul with the Demiurge just based on the fact that the soul is described as *to dêmiourgoun* (27b1).

X. Conclusion

The final part of this dissertation has examined why Rational Pleasure has its own place in the good life viable to humans, whilst the good life lived by gods lacks any pleasure according to the *Philebus*. As an imperfect being, a human being fluctuates between his natural state and the opposite state, so he or she cannot live without experiencing pleasure, since pleasure emerges when a human being restores his natural state. Yet, not every pleasure is contained in the good life lived by humans, in part because pleasure is not good for its own sake, as the *Genesis* Argument maintains. Also, this life is measured since every good thing in the universe displays measure, and thus only the kinds of pleasure which make a harmony with another ingredient of this life, i.e. knowledge, are mixed into the life, because what is measured is harmonized. In addition, the pure kinds of pleasure of the soul itself are derivatively good, in the sense that these kinds of pleasure contribute to the life by motivating one to engage in the two disciplines which best instantiate measure in the life. By contrast, the good life lived by gods, which is characterized by having divine intelligence, is absent of every kind of pleasure including Rational Pleasure, since a god is perfect and thus cannot enjoy pleasure.

In the case of the best life for humans, the role Rational Pleasure plays is significant because humans rarely find the motive for studying the two disciplines which best instantiate measure in this life. Yet, this role is merely instrumental, and thus pleasure does not constitute the goodness of this life. With respect to the best life lived by gods, there is no pleasure, and thus pleasure has no impact on the goodness of this life.

Therefore, just like the *Phaedo*, the *Philebus* maintains that Rational Pleasure does not constitute the goodness of the good life in general.

Conclusion

It is time to remind ourselves of the question which this dissertation tries to answer by exploring the three Platonic dialogues: namely, why Rational Pleasure, i.e. the pleasure of learning, possessing, and managing what is true, has its own place in the good human life. As I argued in the Introduction to the dissertation, if we want to understand what the good human life is, then this question is worth asking, first of all because pleasure is one of the basic elements of this life. Yet, is it really obvious that pleasure is included in the list of the basic elements at issue? Have there been ascetics who have aimed at leading a good life without pleasure? Thus, we can first ask Plato why pleasure is one of the basic elements of this life.

There is no doubt that Plato was never an anti-hedonist who maintains that pleasure is not good at all.²⁵² Yet, this does not mean that he is a hedonist who asserts that pleasure is either the good or the highest good.²⁵³ Although there are differences in the details, the three dialogues under consideration are in all agreement that a human being is an imperfect being and so she cannot help experiencing pleasure. This means that, insofar as the good human life is a life lived by a human being, this life cannot

²⁵² When Evans 2008 and Shaw 2015 ascribe ‘anti-hedonism’ to Plato, they mean that Plato is striking out the gist of the hedonism, i.e. pleasure is the good, rather than that Plato believes that every pleasure is not good but evil.

²⁵³ Some scholars suspect that Plato endorses a sort of hedonism at least when writing the *Protagoras* (e.g. Gosling and Taylor 1982, pp.45-68; Irwin 1995, pp.85-94.) Although I do find every argument of Shaw 2015 persuasive, this book is powerful enough to disarm this suspicion.

lack pleasure. Among the three dialogues, the *Philebus* states most explicitly that it is because of human imperfection that a human cannot but experience pleasure. The dialogue considers that pleasure consists in a restorative process toward the natural state, so only the being who can be in an unnatural state, namely one who is unable to keep her natural state, is able to experience pleasure. Unlike god, a human cannot maintain her natural state, so she cannot but have pleasure as a basic element of her life. Similarly, the *Republic* implies that the reason why a human being cannot help taking pleasure in her life is that she is not a fulfilled being. That one has desires means that one is in need of something, thus a human being who has several desires is not a perfect being who has no needs to be fulfilled. The dialogue maintains that pleasure consists in the satisfaction of one's desires, so it alludes to the point that a human being cannot but experience pleasure since she is an imperfect being who cannot be free from desires. In particular, the life of a philosopher is continuously pleasant because of her imperfection: she cannot always remember or pay attention to everything. The *Phaedo* is in agreement that you can have pleasure only when you are in an imperfect state as well. According to the dialogue, 'we' are identified with our souls. So, the dialogue maintains that you are in the best state when you remain in Hades as a soul itself according to itself, whilst a human being while she is alive as an embodied soul is compared to a prisoner in a prison. Clearly, if you are not embodied, you cannot have any experience of bodily pleasures. In other words, you experience these pleasures because you are in an inferior state. In terms of the pleasure obtained in the intelligible, it is not entirely clear how as a body-soul composite, one is supposed to enjoy this kind of pleasure. Yet, this pleasure can be enjoyed unless you fall short of full-fledged wisdom, which is to say that you are in an imperfect state. Accordingly,

while a human being is imperfect in the sense that she is not in a fulfilled state, she cannot help experience pleasure and so her life should involve pleasure.

The fact that a human being cannot help experiencing pleasure signifies a human imperfection. Yet, this does not automatically mean that there is not any kind of pleasure which constitutes the goodness of the good human life. So, apparently, the possibility remains open that there *is* a kind of pleasure that is valuable in this life as something constituting its goodness. In view of this, it is worthy of note that, presumably, Rational Pleasure is the very kind of pleasure which only the good life viable to humans can contain. Thus, we can ask Plato whether Rational Pleasure constitutes the characteristic goodness of the good human life which distinguishes this life from other kinds of good life viable to other beings.

In spite of our hope, Plato assigns no more than certain limited roles for Rational Pleasure to play in this life. To be more specific, from the three dialogues, roughly speaking, we can see two different views on why Rational Pleasure as an element of a good human life is valuable in this life: (i) as an instrumental good; and (ii) as an indicator of the goodness of a good human life.

First of all, according to both the *Phaedo* and the *Philebus*, this kind of pleasure is instrumentally valuable in the sense that its value resides in its contribution towards that which constitutes the goodness of this life. The *Phaedo* contends that the

philosopher has every reason to be keen on the pleasure of learning, namely the pleasure taken in the intelligible through recollection. This pleasure helps her to keep her characteristic true belief about true reality and thus maintain her life which is counted as an instance of the best lived life, since the best lived life is the philosophical life which is underpinned by the true belief about true reality. Without allotting a special role to Rational Pleasure, the *Philebus* first allows this kind of pleasure to be contained in the best human life, since this kind of pleasure can be included in the life without damaging its goodness. The dialogue then proceeds further by arguing that the pure pleasure of the soul itself motivates one to study philosophical mathematics and dialectic, which directly contributes toward the goodness of this life.

Unlike the other two dialogues here studied, the *Republic* makes the unique argument that one's preference for Rational Pleasure over other kinds of pleasure indicates that one's life is good in three ways. First, one's life-long preference for Rational Pleasure over other kinds of pleasure denotes the fact that one's life is arranged according to the highest value. This preference also indicates that one meets one's overall human desire to the greatest possible degree. The preference finally signifies that one satisfies one's overall desire in the best way, i.e. in that way which is most conducive to ensuing the best state of one's soul. This means that the preference indicates that one develops and maintains one's ability to live a good life since living is a function of the soul. Thus, according to this dialogue, one's preference for Rational Pleasure is an indicator of the supremacy of one's life.

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